Williams v. Fanning

Decision Date08 December 1947
Docket NumberNo. 47,47
Citation332 U.S. 490,68 S.Ct. 188,92 L.Ed. 95
PartiesWILLIAMS et al. v. FANNING
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. Richard L. North, of Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioners.

Mr. Frederick Bernays Wiener, of Providence, R.I., for respondent.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case, here on certiorari to resolve a conflict between the circuits,1 presents the question whether those against whom the Postmaster General has issued a postal fraud order may sue the local postmaster to enjoin him from carrying out the order or whether the Postmaster General is an indispensable party.

The Postmaster General, after a hearing in Washington, D.C., found that petitioners' weight-reducing enterprise was fraudulent. He accordingly issued a fraud order, R.S. §§ 3929, 4041, 39 U.S.C. §§ 259, 732, 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 259, 732, directing respondent, postmaster at Los Angeles, California (where petitioners do business) to refuse payment of any money order drawn to the order of petitioners, to advise the remitter of such money order that payment had been forbidden, and to stamp 'fraudulent' on all mail matter directed to petitioners and to return it to the senders.

Petitioners thereupon brought this suit in the District Court for the Southern District of California to enjoin respondent from carrying out the order,2 claiming that they had been deprived of the hearing to which they were entitled and that the fraud order was without the support of substantial evidence. On motion of respondent the District Court dismissed the complaint, holding in accord with the view of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals3 that the Postmaster General was an indispensable party. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 158 F.2d 95.

It was long assumed that the Postmaster General was not an indispensable party in those fraud order cases. Beginning at least with American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 23 S.Ct. 33, 47 L.Ed. 90, decided in 1902, the maintenance of the suit against the local postmaster alone was not challenged.4

Meanwhile, another line of cases was emerging. Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28, 17 S.Ct. 225, 41 L.Ed. 621, held that a suit against the Secretary of the Interior to compel him to issue patents to public lands abated on his resignation. As the purpose of the bill was 'to control the action of the secretary of the interior' (165 U.S. page 34, 17 S.Ct. page 228), he was held to be an indispensable party. Next came Gnerich v. Rutter, 265 U.S. 388, 44 S.Ct. 532, 68 L.Ed. 1068, which was a suit to enjoin a representative of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from enforcing a restriction embodied in a permit issued under the National Prohibition Act, 27 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. The subordinate official, acting for the Commissioner, had refused to give plaintiffs the more liberal permit which they desired; and he had no power to grant the desired permit without revision of his delegated authority. The Commissioner was held to be an indispensable party. Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 45 S.Ct. 148, 69 L.Ed. 411, followed. That was a suit brought by an Osage Indian to require payment to him of funds under an act of Congress. The power and responsibility of making the payments being in the Secretary of the Interior, he was held to be an indispensable party.

These cases evolved the principle that the superior officer is an indispensable party if the decree granting the relief sought will require him to take action, either by exercising directly a power lodged in him or by having a subordinate exercise it for him.

That principle was brought into clearer relief by State of Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 45 S.Ct. 505, 69 L.Ed. 927. There the director of national parks had issued regulations forbidding operation in the Rocky Mountain National Park of automobiles for hire. Toll was the superintendent of the park who was enforcing the regulation. A suit to enjoin him was allowed to be maintained without joining his superior, the director, who had promulgated the regulation. That result followed, 268 U.S. page 230, 45 S.Ct. page 506, by analogy to those cases which permit suit against a public official who invades a private right either by exceeding his authority or by carrying out a mandate of his superior. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 1 S.Ct. 240, 27 L.Ed. 171; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 619, 620, 32 S.Ct. 340, 344, 56 L.Ed. 570. In those situations relief against the offending officer could be granted without risk that the judgment awarded would 'expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration.' Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 1012.

But the distinction we have noted between these two lines of cases apparently was not as clear to others as it seems to us. For a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
177 cases
  • Rank v. Krug, Civ. No. 685-ND
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Southern District of California)
    • April 13, 1950
    ...505, 69 L.Ed. 927; and Land v. Dollar, 1949, 330 U.S. 731, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209; and the recent case of Williams v. Fanning, 1947, 332 U.S. 490, 68 S.Ct. 188, 92 L.Ed. 95. In that case the local postmaster was sued, and contended that the Postmaster General was an indispensable part......
  • Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • May 31, 1949
    ...party who must be joined as a party defendant in order to give the District Court jurisdiction of this suit. In Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 68 S.Ct. 188, 92 L.Ed. 95, the test as to whether a superior official can be dispensed with as a party was stated to be whether 'the decree whic......
  • Harman v. Forssenius
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • April 27, 1965
    ...local registrars, the State argues, their joinder was essential in order to effect the relief requested. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 493—494, 68 S.Ct. 188, 189—190, 92 L.Ed. 95. While the State is correct in asserting that the complaints were phrased broadly enough to encompass all p......
  • United States v. Jones Jones v. United States 8212 1949, s. 135
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • April 18, 1949
    ...be noted that district court suits to enjoin the Postmaster General's fraud orders are commonplace. See, e.g., Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 492, n. 2, 68 S.Ct. 188, 189. 31 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001—1011, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 32 See Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 444, n. 50 S.C......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT