Williams v. Federal Express Corp.
| Decision Date | 02 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 01-1143-JO. |
| Citation | 211 F.Supp.2d 1257 |
| Parties | Darryl J. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
David H. Black, Jr., HR Juris, Vancouver, WA, for Plaintiff.
Anne E. Denecke, Davis Wright Tremaine, Portland, OR, Frederick Douglas, Richard C. Paul, Sandra C. Isom, Federal Express Corporation, Memphis, TN, for Defendant.
This is a race discrimination case in which plaintiff Darryl J. Williams claims that his former employer, defendant Federal Express ("defendant" or "FedEx"), terminated him because he is African American and because he complained of discriminatory treatment. Plaintiff's complaint, originally filed in state court on June 11, 2001, asserts federal claims for race discrimination and retaliation, and state law claims for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment, filed May 2, 2002. Defendant essentially contends that plaintiff was terminated because he repeatedly falsified time cards and other records, despite repeated warnings and in violation of company policy. Having carefully reviewed the papers, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part in accordance with this opinion.
Plaintiff was hired by defendant as a delivery courier in September of 1992, where he remained until he was terminated on June 11, 2001. He initially worked at the Portland location, but was eventually transferred to the Tualatin, Oregon facility. While plaintiff's primary duty was to work as a delivery driver, he, like other couriers, was also expected to aid with the morning support operation, during which time the deliveries were sorted and distributed to individual drivers.
On August 13, 1998, plaintiff received a warning letter from his then-manager, Tony Vandenberg, accusing plaintiff of falsifying delivery records by recording single deliveries as two separate stops. Plaintiff concedes that this written warning came after a series of prior verbal warnings to the same effect. See Williams Deposition, p. 49. Plaintiff also admits that these warnings, received by Mr. Vandenberg, were not motivated out of racial animus or any other improper motive.
The following spring, plaintiff was "counseled" by another manager, Tim Conley, for repeated tardiness. Mr. Conley first counseled plaintiff on May 28, 1999, when he was late for his "sort" position. At that time, Mr. Conley allegedly put his arm around plaintiff in a "threatening" way, and yelled in plaintiff's ear that he was going to write him up for excessive tardiness. On June 1, 1999, plaintiff was forty minutes late, and Mr. Conley again reprimanded him. During their meeting, plaintiff accused Mr. Conley of harassment, stating "[y]ou are harassing me, I know how to start a harassment case against you." See Conley Deposition, p. 56. After the June 1 reprimand, defendant issued to plaintiff a "documented counseling," according to defendant, "because of [plaintiff's] pattern of tardiness and because he had been forty minutes late to his sort position that day." Defendant's Concise Statement of Facts, p. 2.
Apparently in order to hide his tardiness on June 1, 1999, plaintiff now admits in his deposition that he intentionally altered his start time for that date, by hand writing (in two places) his scheduled start time of 6:45 a.m. in place of his actual start time of 7:25 a.m. Plaintiff claims that after he falsified his time card, he went in to discuss the matter with his immediate supervisor, Paul Bersani, because his "conscience was bothering [him]." See Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 110. Mr. Bersani states that he does not recall this conversation.
Plaintiff calls into question Mr. Bersani's motives, contending that Mr. Bersani was critical of African Americans in general, and unfair to plaintiff in particular. Plaintiff claims that between 1996 and 1998, before Mr. Bersani became a manager, he made racially derogatory comments, including "blacks have no ethics," "blacks have no class," and "those black bastards." See Complaint, ¶ 8. He also cites the deposition of Will Rogers, another African American FedEx employee, who stated that Mr. Bersani said "watch out for the driver, lady driver, they're all Jews out here." See Rogers Deposition, p. 8. Finally, plaintiff alleges that Mr. Bersani disproportionately selected him to assist the "handlers" in unloading "cans" between two and four times per week, despite the fact that as many as 21 other couriers could have been selected. Plaintiff admits, however, that on May 20, 1999, Mr. Bersani, gave plaintiff a very positive performance evaluation. Mr. Bersani rated him as a "good employee" with an overall performance evaluation of 6.0 out of 7.0. On the same evaluation, plaintiff was given a 7.0 on "attendance and punctuality" and "adherence to acceptable practices of FedEx." See Bersani Deposition, p. 53.
On June 1, 1999, the same day plaintiff was reprimanded by Mr. Conley for falsifying his time card, plaintiff initiated a harassment complaint against defendant. Defendant contends that this initial complaint alleged sexual harassment, and there is no copy of the complaint included in the materials. The following day, on June 2, 1999, the Managing Director of the Pacific Northwest District, Patrick Little, acknowledged the receipt of plaintiff's complaint and requested additional information. Plaintiff submitted a follow-up complaint on June 7, 2001, in which he checked boxes indicating that he had been subjected to "sexual harassment," "harassment" on the basis of "color," and "retaliation." See Employee Information Form, p. 33, attached as Exhibit 6 to plaintiff's deposition.
In the meantime, on June 4, 1999, still investigating the falsification charges against plaintiff, Mr. Bersani placed him on suspension pending the outcome of the investigation. Thereafter, Mr. Bersani consulted with his superior, Russell Bronson, and with the personnel department, about the charges against plaintiff. On June 11, 1999, plaintiff was terminated, for the stated reason of violating defendant's "Acceptable Conduct Policy's" prohibition against deliberate falsification of company documents. Mr. Bersani himself stated in his deposition that he based the decision to terminate plaintiff solely on the June 1, 1999 incident, and not on any other incidents of tardiness or alleged falsification.
On June 11, 2001, exactly two years after he was terminated, plaintiff filed his complaint in state court, alleging state and federal claims for race discrimination, retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint was served on defendant on June 25, 2001, and defendant removed to this court on July 25, 2001, on the basis of both diversity and federal question jurisdiction.
Summary judgment should be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). If the moving party shows that there are genuine issues of material fact, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A scintilla of evidence, or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative, does not present a genuine issue of material fact. United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge, 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir.1989).
The substantive law governing a claim determines whether a fact is material. T.W. Elec. Service v. Pacific Elec. Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987). Reasonable doubts as to the existence of a material fact issue are resolved against the moving party. Id. at 631. Inferences drawn from facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 630-31.
In its motion for summary judgment, defendant attacks each of plaintiff's asserted claims: 1) Race Discrimination; 2) Retaliation/Wrongful Discharge; and 3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. The arguments related to each are addressed in the discussion that follows.1
The Ninth Circuit recently held that the McDonnell-Douglas "burden-shifting" analysis applies to employment discrimination claims brought under O.R.S. § 659.030. Snead v. Metropolitan Crop. & Casualty Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir.2001) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). Courts are therefore directed to apply the same analysis to discrimination claims brought under federal and Oregon state law. Under the McDonnell-Douglas analysis, a plaintiff may establish discrimination by direct evidence of discriminatory motive. Because such proof is generally unavailable, however, the Court held that plaintiffs may indirectly establish employment discrimination with a three-step process. First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of retaliation or other discriminatory action on the part of the employer. Second, if plaintiff makes such a showing, then the burden shifts to the defendant to put forth a legitimate reason for the adverse action. Plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant's proffered justification is a pretext for discrimination. Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1993).
To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must offer evidence that "give[s] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). An inference may be established either by direct evidence of discriminatory intent (not alleged here), or by the burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v....
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