Williams v. Ferrentino
| Decision Date | 02 June 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 67--25,67--25 |
| Citation | 199 So.2d 504 |
| Parties | Broward WILLIAMS, State Treasurer and ex-officio Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida, and Jack D. Kane, Director of the Division of Financial Responsibility, Appellants, v. Eddie J. FERRENTINO and Elaine Ferrentino, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Thomas E. Boyle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Walter E. Rountree, Gen. Counsel, and Charles C. Anderson, Attorney, Tallahassee, for appellants.
Robert E. Beach, of Law Offices of Roney & Beach, St. Petersburg, for appellees.
This case started out as an ordinary, run-of-the-mill, negligence suit, but finally wound up as a 'real weirdie'. And no one is perhaps more responsible than 'ol' Father Happenstance' himself.
On October 10, 1963, Llewellyn D. Illingworth and Dean Illingworth filed a complaint in the Pinellas County Circuit Court, Case #16,905 Law, against Eddie J. Ferrentino and his wife, Elaine Ferrentino, for damages arising out of an automobile accident allegedly caused by the negligent driving of an automobile owned and driven by the Ferrentinos. The record here shows nothing further for over three years, at least affirmatively.
On October 26, 1966, a copy of a 'Petition for Injunction', entitled in the Circuit Court action, #16,905, was served upon one Jack D. Kane in Tallahassee, as the 'Acting Director of the Financial Responsibility Division, State of Florida.' The 'petition' Alleged substantially the following facts: that the suit filed by the Illingworths against the Ferrentinos 'resulted in a judgment in favor of' the Illingworths for $6,200.00 plus costs of $172.50; that both the Illingworths and the Ferrentinos contended that, at the time of the accident on August 26, 1962, which precipitated the law suit and subsequent judgment, the American Mutual Fire Insurance Company was insurance carrier for the Ferrentinos and 'should be made to satisfy the judgment'; that garnishment proceedings were instituted against the insurance company by the Illingworths in the original negligence suit, #16,905, subsequent to entry of judgment, in an effort to enforce payment thereof; that the garnishment action had 'not been resolved', and the company was denying liability as insurer; that on September 14, 1966, Kane issued an order 'suspending' the driving licenses of the Ferrentinos, which apparently stemmed from the assumption by Kane that the Ferrentinos were 'uninsured drivers' due to nonpayment of the judgment plus the fact that the insurance company was disclaiming insurance coverage; that F.S.Chap. 324, F.S.A., the Financial Responsibility Law, provided that 'judgments against an uninsured driver requires suspension of the driving privileges of the judgment debtor, until such time as the judgment is satisfied'; that the Ferrentinos' attorney, on September 26, 1966, had notified Kane 'of the circumstances surrounding the judgment * * * and requested the order of suspension be held in abeyance until such time as the parties * * * determine whether or not' the Ferrentinos were actually insured on the day of the accident, but that Kane 'refuses and continues to refuse to revoke the order of suspension of the driving privileges of' the Ferrentinos; and that inasmuch as Both the Illingworths and the Ferrentinos contended that insurance coverage was In effect it would be 'unfair, unjust inequitable and against public policy to suspend the driving privileges of' the Ferrentinos 'until * * * the dispute between the parties' was adjudicated, pointing out that if it should be eventually determined that the Ferrentinos were 'insured at the time of said accident, they will have no remedy at law or equity for loss of their driving privileges during the period of suspension.'
The 'petition' thereupon prayed the Court of enjoin Kane from revoking the Ferrentinos' driving licenses until 'the dispute' between the parties was settled. Attached to the 'petition' were two 'orders of suspension' signed by Kane, directed to each of the Ferrentinos, advising that 'pursuant to Chapter 324, Florida Statutes (F.S.A.)' their privilege of driving motor vehicles in Florida was , and further advising that their driver's licenses must be immediately surrendered.
Thereafter, on November 15, 1966, order was entered in Case #16.905 (the title of which had been amplified by 'the American Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Garnishee'), ostensibly without notice, as follows:
Thereafter there was filed by 'Broward Williams, State Treasurer as ex officio Insurance Commissioner' a 'Motion to Dissolve' the temporary injunction on the grounds of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person, and (2) improper venue.
On December 16, 1966, the Court entered order, entitled the same as the order of November 15, 1966, which in its pertinent parts is as follows:
'The foregoing cause coming on this day to be heard upon the Motion to Dissolve this Court's Injunction of November 15, 1966, said motion being filed by the Insurance Commissioner for the State of Florida, Broward Williams, and it appearing to the Court that the Insurance Commissioner has not complied with the Injunction of November 15, 1966, and the same having been argued by counsel for the respective parties and duly considered by the Court
'IT IS ORDERED that said Motion shall be put in abeyance until compliance by the Insurance Commissioner.'
As before stated, none of the facts allegedly occurring in the Court proceeding, after the complaint was filed, are made to appear to this Court other than by the copy of 'Petition for Injunction' served upon Kane.
A--The 'Record' Here.
Rule 4.2 of the Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A. prescribes the procedure for taking interlocutory appeals. Sub-section d of said Rule, headed 'Record-on-Appeal' provides as follows:
(Emphasis supplied).
It is obvious from the foregoing that in an interlocutory appeal the record before the appellate Court, showing the pleadings, orders, and proceedings generally in the lower Court, is considerably more informal than when the appeal is from a final judgment or decree. See Rule 3.6 F.A.R. In interlocutory appeals neither the original papers and documents in the lower Court nor a transcript of record need be filed in the appellate Court. Only 'copies of all pleadings and other parts of the record needed to determine the appeal' are required to be filed and even these portions, which are only brought to the appellate Court in the appendices of the parties, are not required to bear certification by the Clerk of the lower Court.
We do not construe Rule 4.2 to contemplate the laxity attending the showing made to this Court of the pleadings filed and proceedings had in the lower Court by the parties to this appeal. The 'record' here consisted only of copies of the original negligence complaint of the Illingworths against the Ferrentinos, the 'petition for injunction', the injunctive order of November 15, 1966, the 'motion to dissolve' the injunctive order, and the order of December 16, 1966, holding the latter motion in abeyance. No copies of any other papers filed or proceedings had, including the supposed trial proceedings culminating in the judgment against the Ferrentinos, were brought here.
Rule 4.2 e. F.A.R. requires that '(a)ppendices shall be prepared, filed and served in accordance with Rule 3.7'. Rule 3.7 f. (5) provides that '(t)he appendix * * * shall conform with the requirements of the brief as to paper, size, type, spacing and titles.' Rule 3.7 e. (1) and (2) provides that
The copies that are actually in the 'record' are inferior machine copies or dim carbon copies of papers actually served; in places indistinct and illegible. The signatures are largely missing or omitted, even on the Court orders. The pages are of varying width and length and texture. The typing is anything but uniform, ofttimes single-spaced. All of which is contrary to the rules.
What we have said, however, is intended in no sense to be critical of any of the parties here, inasmuch as Rule 4.2 has never been construed as to just what constitutes the standard of compliance with the language of the Rule as to preparation of the 'record' in the appendices. But our...
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...Statutes (1973). Jurisdiction to enjoin administrative action was vested exclusively in the circuit courts. Williams v. Ferrentino, 199 So.2d 504, 513 (Fla.2d DCA 1967). But see Charbonier v. Wynne, 282 So.2d 171, 173 (Fla.2d DCA 1973) (dictum), cert. den., 292 So.2d 18 (Fla.1974), suggesti......
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...in a particular location.' Jurisdiction is `the power to act,' the authority to adjudicate the subject matter." Williams v. Ferrentino, 199 So.2d 504, 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). Although all circuit courts in the state have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, see art. V, § 5(a), Fla. Cons......
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...venue. Id. at 1211. The Bush court explained that "[v]enue is one thing; jurisdiction is another," id. (quoting Williams v. Ferrentino, 199 So. 2d 504, 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) ), but since all circuit courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, "the question here is where in the sta......