Williams v. Field
Decision Date | 14 November 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 23299.,23299. |
Citation | 416 F.2d 483 |
Parties | John WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Harold V. FIELD, etc., Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
John Williams, in pro. per.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jack K. Weber, Robert P. Samoian, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
Before HAMLIN and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, District Judge.*
Appellant Williams, an inmate of a California prison, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials, acting under color of state law, deprived him of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On motion of appellee under Rule 12(b) (6), F.R.Civ.P., the district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim under section 1983. Jurisdiction on appeal is properly lodged under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Viewing appellant's allegations in the light most favorable to him, United Milk Products Co. v. Lawndale National Bank of Chicago, 392 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1968), we find that the court below properly granted appellee's motion to dismiss and therefore affirm the decision of the district court.
The following are excerpts from appellant's complaint filed in the district court:
appellant suffered certain damages.
The district court, in granting the motion to dismiss, gave two alternative grounds for its decision; that the complaint did not allege intentional conduct by the defendants, and second, that the conduct complained of did not violate any federally secured rights. The court held that at most the allegations made out an "unintentional common law tort."
Since Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), some courts, like the district court in the instant case, have held that unintentional conduct does not state a claim under section 1983. See United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. Pennsylvania, 281 F. Supp. 175 (E.D.Pa.1968); Kent v. Prosse, 265 F.Supp. 673 (W.D.Pa.), aff'd, 385 F.2d 406 (3rd Cir. 1967). Another court has indicated that negligent conduct in the appropriate circumstances may support a claim under section 1983. See Huey v. Barloga, 277 F.Supp. 864 (N.D.Ill.1967). A close reading of the relevant portion of the Monroe opinion, set out here in the margin,1 indicates that the Court was merely rejecting the proposition that "specific intent" to violate constitutional rights was required. The "natural consequences" test formulated by Mr. Justice Douglas apparently leaves open the question of the degree of culpability required by section 1983. It may be that negligent conduct, in the appropriate circumstances, will support an action under section 1983. See Huey v. Barloga, supra. Mere negligent failure to act, standing alone, however, would seem insufficient.
In order to be actionable under section 1983, however, we believe that more than an isolated incident of negligent failure to protect must be alleged. The federal courts have stated on numerous occasions that absent unusual circumstances they will not intervene in the internal administration of state prison systems. See, e. g., Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Lee v. Illinois, 343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965); Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964). In Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.Supp. 674 (N.D.Cal. 1966), the federal court did intervene in the administration of the California prison system. There the action, brought under section 1983, involved serious circumstances existing in the state prison for which the remedy of section 1983 was designed. No such circumstances are present here. No allegations of direct prison guard beating are made such as those found in Wiltsie v. California Department of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1968).
In addition to an allegation of the requisite degree of culpability, plaintiffs in section 1983 actions must show a violation of federally secured rights. Here appellant has alleged that his rights to equal protection of the laws and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment have been violated by state prison officials. While Monroe v. Pape, supra, eliminated the necessity of alleging specific intent to discriminate, compare Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959), we think that more than an isolated incident of failure to protect is necessary to make out a violation of the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause forbids the establishment of laws which arbitrarily and unreasonably create dissimilar classifications of individuals when, looking to the purpose of those laws, such individuals are similarly situated. It also forbids unequal enforcement of valid laws, where such unequal enforcement is the product of improper motive. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed.220 (1886); People v. Harris, 182 Cal.App....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Pryor-El v. Kelly
...classifications of individuals when, looking to the purpose of those laws, such individuals are similarly situated." Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir.1969); see also Muckway v. Craft, 789 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir.1986) ("The equal protection clause `protects against intentional i......
-
Bonner v. Coughlin
...Cir. 1970); Puckett v. Cox, 456 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972); Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 284, 287 (8th Cir. 1973); Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1969), certiorari denied, 397 U.S. 1016, 90 S.Ct. 1252, 25 L.Ed.2d 431; Daniels v. VanDeVenter, 382 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1967). Contra......
-
United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey
...assault. 6 The district court could more correctly have relied upon Puckett v. Cox, 456 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972), and Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1969), which I read to state a view of the eighth amendment directly opposed to mine. I am persuaded by neither decision because ea......
-
Navarette v. Enomoto
...negligently; and such was also the gravamen of the sixth with respect to the acts charged in claims four and five. In Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1016, 90 S.Ct. 1252, 25 L.Ed.2d 431 (1970), we recognized that it was still an open question in ......