Williams v. Field, 23299.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: HAMLIN and DUNIWAY, Circuit , and SMITH
• Citation: 416 F.2d 483
• Parties: John WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Harold V. FIELD, etc., Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 23299.,23299.
• Decision Date: 14 November 1969

416 F.2d 483 (1969)

John WILLIAMS, Appellant,
v.
Harold V. FIELD, etc., Appellee.

No. 23299.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

September 29, 1969.

Rehearing Denied November 14, 1969.

416 F.2d 484

John Williams, in pro. per.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jack K. Weber, Robert P. Samoian, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before HAMLIN and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, District Judge.^*

HAMLIN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Williams, an inmate of a California prison, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials, acting under color of state law, deprived him of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On motion of appellee under Rule 12(b) (6), F.R.Civ.P., the district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim under section 1983. Jurisdiction on appeal is properly lodged under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Viewing appellant's allegations in the light most favorable to him, United Milk Products Co. v. Lawndale National Bank of Chicago, 392 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1968), we find that the court below properly granted appellee's motion to dismiss and therefore affirm the decision of the district court.

The following are excerpts from appellant's complaint filed in the district court:

"Appellant * * * while imprisoned in the California Men\'s Colony, * * * Los Padres, California, * * * went to the `D\' Quad Administration Office and lodged a complaint concerning a `threat made against his life\' by a fellow inmate, John Doe Carrello * * * *

"John Doe Carrello * * * was called to the `D\' Quad Administration Office and having been asked `if he knew the plaintiff * * *,\' replied in the negative, but said that `You had better lock him up, because I am going to get him,\' * * * *

"The * * * Lieutenant told * * * Carello, that he * * * `wasn\'t going to lock up\' the plaintiff * * * *

"On the following day * * * the plaintiff * * * was passing through the line along side of the steamtable getting his food * * * when suddenly he was sat upon by * * * Carrello * * * who * * * threw a pitcher of `scalding hot coffee\' into the face of the plaintiff * * * *

"Carrello * * * began and continued to beat * * * plaintiff with the empty coffee pot until * * * an officer * * * stopped the matter."

Appellant's complaint further alleged that —

"* * * as a direct consequence of the said defendants\' * * * willful negligence in failing to exercise the authority vested in them as State Officials `acting under color of

416 F.2d 485

state law\' to prevent the injuries * * * to appellant * * * in violation of the cruel and unusual punishments provisions of the Eighth via the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution * * *",

appellant suffered certain damages.

The district court, in granting the motion to dismiss, gave two alternative grounds for its decision; that the complaint did not allege intentional conduct by the defendants, and second, that the conduct complained of did not violate any federally secured rights. The court held that at most the allegations made out an "unintentional common law tort."

Since Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), some courts, like the district court in the instant case, have held that unintentional conduct does not state a claim under section 1983. See United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v....