Williams v. First Nat. Bank of Mobile

• Decision Date: 30 May 1980
• Parties: Clayton W. WILLIAMS, Jr., Johnny May and H. W. Souther v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MOBILE et al. Calvin N. SOUTHER and Edwin D. Souther v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MOBILE et al. 78-869, 78-870.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 89

384 So.2d 89

Clayton W. WILLIAMS, Jr., Johnny May and H. W. Souther v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MOBILE et al.

Calvin N. SOUTHER and Edwin D. Souther v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MOBILE et al.

78-869, 78-870.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 30, 1980.

Norborne C. Stone, Jr. of Stone & Partin, Bay Minette, Sam W. Pipes and Norton Brooker, Jr. of Lyons, Pipes & Cook, Mobile, for appellants Clayton W. Williams, Jr., et al.

William W. Stoudenmire of Pillans, Reams, Tappan, Wood, Roberts & Vollmer, P. C., Sterling F. Stoudenmire, Jr., Mobile for appellants Calvin N. Souther and Edwin D. Souther.

Albert W. Key of Hamilton, Butler, Riddick, Tarlton & Allen, Mobile, for appellees, The First National Bank of Mobile, etc., et al.

Robert P. Denniston of Gallalee, Denniston, Cherniak & Moon, Mobile, for appellee, Denniston Land Trust.

MADDOX, Justice.

These appeals involve the validity and constitutionality of the so-called Grove Act in a case involving the oil, gas and mineral rights to over 10,000 acres of land located in Baldwin County.

In 1942, Denniston-Boykin Company, Inc. and Baldwin Timber and Naval Stores Company, Inc., filed a bill of complaint in the circuit court of Baldwin County, sitting in equity, in which they alleged that they jointly held title in fee simple to the subject lands through various tax sales and other conveyances, and asked the court to quiet title in them. Specifically named as respondents to the in rem proceedings were 83 corporations and individuals whom the complainants believed may have had claims against the subject lands.

Complainants in the 1942 action proceeded under the provisions of the Grove Act, which was originally enacted by the legislature in 1923. Acts of Alabama, 1923, No. 526. (Tit. 7, § 1116, et seq., Code of Ala.1940; now codified at Code 1975, § 6-6-560, et seq.) The Act has remained substantially unchanged since its original enactment. In 1951, the legislature, among other things, provided for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent infants and lunatics in proceedings when indicated. Code 1975, § 6-6-562.

In the original proceeding, service was perfected on all named defendants either by registered mail, personal service or publication.

Among the named defendants were ". . . Southern Plantation Development Company, a corporation; (and) the heirs, representatives and devisees of and all persons claiming under Calvin N. Souther, deceased. . . ."

The bill further alledged:

". . . (T)hat said Southern Plantation Development Company is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, but Orators are unable to learn where its principal office and place of business is located, after diligent inquiry, though Orators are informed and believe, and therefore allege the fact to be, that respondent Pearl G. Baker, whose address is Foley, Alabama, is its Secretary; that Orators are unable to ascertain, after diligent inquiry, the names, ages and addresses of the heirs, representatives and devisees of and of any persons claiming under said Calvin N. Souther, deceased. . . ."

The complainants properly published a notice of the proceeding for four consecutive weeks in the Baldwin Times, a local newspaper. A decree pro confesso was taken against several of the defendants, including Southern Plantation and those persons claiming under Calvin N. Souther. Several other defendants answered and generally denied the allegations of the complainants. Testimony was then taken by a commissioner, after which the trial court entered its final decree quieting title in the complainants. This Court dismissed the appeal from the 1943 decree. Baker v. Denniston-Boykin Co., 245 Ala. 407, 17 So.2d 148 (1944).

H. W. Souther, purportedly as "president" of "Southern Plantation Development Company", as lessor, on April 2 and July 1, 1977, did execute three oil, gas and mineral leases in favor of Johnny May, as lessee. Johnny May and Betty R. May, his wife, then executed assignments of two of these leases to Clayton W. Williams, Jr. on July 4, 1977. All claims under these initial leases were subsequently disclaimed by Williams and May who then obtained leases from various members of the Souther family, including the appellants H. W. Souther, Edwin D. Souther and Calvin N. Souther.

On March 20, 1978, the appellees filed a Motion to Show Cause, under the same docket number as the 1943 case (the docket number was subsequently changed to a new number, but the style remained the same), and asked the court to enforce its prior decree. The appellees alleged that they are the present owners of the mineral rights to the subject lands as purchasers from the successful complainants in the 1942 action. The appellees requested the court to have the appellants show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for violation of the 1943 decree; they also asked the court to expunge from the records of the Probate Court of Baldwin County the mineral leases recently executed by persons claiming to have an interest in the minerals; they also requested the court to enter its order enjoining the appellants from asserting any interest in the subject lands.

The appellants' answer and counterclaim to the Motion to Show Cause alleged that the 1943 decree is not binding on them because at that time Southern Plantation had ceased to exist by operation of law and ". . . any purported service over said corporation or any appearance in said case by said corporation was void; (and) that any purported service over and against any successors in interest to Southern Plantation Development Company . . ." was not made pursuant to the law. Appellants further alleged that on May 1, 1921, Southern Plantation conveyed to one C. N. Souther a 50-year mineral deed reserving an interest which ripened into a possessory right of the successors of Southern Plantation on May 1, 1971; that complainants were not diligent in the original proceeding in searching for named defendants; and that the Grove Act, as it existed in 1943, did not afford them their constitutional right of due process.

The case was removed to federal court, but remanded by U.S. District Judge Virgil Pittman upon a finding of a want of jurisdiction.

Appellants made various discovery requests of appellees seeking information related to the issue of whether counsel (Robert P. Denniston) for the original complainants (who is now counsel for one of the appellees), exercised due diligence in searching for C. N. Souther and his heirs.

Appellees filed a motion to strike the answer, the counterclaim and the discovery motions of the appellants on the grounds that, inter alia, the 1943 decree was a final judgment and that they, as successors in interest, are entitled to its benefits. They also contended that the original action complied with the provisions of the Grove Act, and that the appellants, as successors in interest to defendants who were named as parties in the original action, are bound by that judgment.

The cause and all pending motions were set for a hearing on February 22, 1979, before the Hon. Harry J. Wilters, Circuit Judge of Baldwin County. There was no court reporter present at that hearing; therefore, the only record of the hearing is those facts related in the trial judge's report of the "Identification of Evidence, Introduced in these Proceedings" and his final order. The appellees, or "movants" as they are referred to by the trial court, asked the court to take judicial notice of its file of the 1942-3 proceeding, and introduced the various leases which they wanted the court to expunge from the records of the probate court. The appellants presented no evidence. The trial court made the following conclusions of law:

"1. The 1943 decree is complete and regular on its face, and affirmatively shows compliance with the provisions of the Grove Act and other applicable statutes pertaining to service of process and publication, as constituted at the time thereof.

"2. The decree on its face held that the two complaining corporations were the true and lawful owners in fee simple of the property described therein. This included the title to all of the oil, gas and minerals in, on and under the said property, and this also included any reversionary interest in the same. The decree, on its face, quieted the title in the complainants to said lands against all persons, firms or corporations claiming any right or title to, interest in, or lien or encumbrance on said land, or any part thereof. The only appeal of the said decree having been dismissed in the year 1944, and the decree having not been reversed or set aside, remains now in full force and effect.

"3. This Court has the power to enforce its own judgments and decrees.

"4. The Movants are entitled to the protection of this Court in the enjoyment of the property rights previously adjudicated in favor of their predecessors in title and adversely to the predecessors in title of the Defendants and intervening Defendants.

"5. The answers and counterclaims filed by the Defendants and intervening Defendants, to the extent that they seek to attack the validity of and to controvert the findings of fact and other provisions of the 1943 decree in these proceedings brought for its enforcement, are due to be stricken. The motions for discovery, seeking to elicit facts or information in support of such allegations and defenses, are due to be denied.

"6. The Movants are only some of the numerous and diverse parties whose titles are held in reliance on the 1943 decree. The Defendants have failed and refused to make any attempt to bring before this Court any of the other parties whose interests would be affected by the attack Defendants seek to make on said decree in these proceedings brought for its enforcement. The manner in which they seek to attack said decree is improper and impermissible and the Defendants have failed and refused to initiate appropriate...