Williams v. Forbes.1

• Citation: 28 N.E. 463,114 Ill. 167
• Parties: WILLIAMSv.FORBES.1
• Decision Date: 15 May 1885
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

114 Ill. 167

28 N.E. 463

WILLIAMS

v.FORBES.1

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 15, 1885.

Appeal from appellate court, second district; JOHN V. EUSTACE, Judge.

Action by Lillie Williams against George H. Forbes, administrator of the estate of Delilah Deeds, on a note given by Delilah Deeds, to plaintiff. Defendant had judgment in the county court, and plaintiff appealed to the circuit court, where she had judgment, from which defendant appealed to the appellate court, where judgment was rendered for defendant, and plaintiff appealed. Affirmed. M. D. Brown and Jacob Fawcett, for appellant.

D. & T. J. Sheean and Robert D. Russell, for appellee.SCHOLFIELD, C. J.

Lillie Williams brought suit in the county court of Jo Daviess county against George H. Forbes, as administrator of the estate of Delilah Deeds, deceased, on the following instrument: ‘Pleasant Valley, Ill., Oct. 25, 1875. Whereas, my niece, Lillie Williams, has performed for me personal service for a long period of time, for which I desire she shall receive ample compensation from my estate, and not feeling able at present to fully compensate her, I therefore and hereby acknowlege myself indebted to her in sum of $2,500, with interest, but not to be due until my death, unless at my option. DELILAH DEEDS.’ On trial in that court, judgment was rendered for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to the circuit court of Jo Daviess county, and on trial in the circuit court before a jury the plaintiff recovered judgment for $3,708.75. The defendant then appealed to the appellate court for the second district, and that court, on hearing, reversed the judgment of the circuit court, and refused to remand the cause. In the order of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the circuit court occurs the following: ‘The judgment of this court being in consequence of finding the facts differently from those found by the court below, this court finds the facts to be that the note sued on, and which is the foundation of the claim of appellee in this case, was given by Delilah Deeds, deceased, without any consideration whatever; that it was a mere gift, intended by Delilah Deeds, deceased, to be given to appellee in the nature of a testamentary bequest; and that there is no other cause of action, or supposed cause of action, save the note, claimed by appellee in this suit.’ The present appeal is from that judgment.

The argument addressed to us by counsel for appellant is one that should have been addressed to the appellate court upon petition for rehearing. It is purely a discussion of facts to establish that the appellate court erred in finding the facts differently from what they were found to be by the circuit court. No ruling on any question of law was excepted to, which is now pressed as ground of error. Indeed, the only question of law which, on the finding of facts by the appellate court, it is possible now to raise is whether, on those facts, the law authorizes or precludes a recovery. Section 87 of the practice act, as amended by the act of June 2, 1877, in force July 1, 1877, (Pub. Laws 1877, p. 153,) provides: ‘If any final determination of any cause, as specified in the...