Williams v. Fuqua, 4761
Decision Date | 20 January 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 4761,4761 |
Citation | 199 Va. 709,101 S.E.2d 562 |
Parties | RUTH S. WILLIAMS v. FRED B. FUQUA, EMPLOYER, AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY. Record |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Basil G. Watkins (L. Bradford Waters, on brief), for the appellant.
James R. Caskie and William W. Sweeney (Caskie, Frost, Davidson & Watts, on brief), for the appellees.
This appeal brings up for review an award of the Industrial Commission refusing compensation to appellant on the ground that there was no causal connection between the death of her husband, John C. Williams, and the work he was doing for his employer.
Williams, 59 years old, was employed as a brickmason by Fred B. Fuqua. On May 7, 1956, while engaged in pulling a board, attached to a rope, up to a scaffold, he suffered a painful injury to his back. The board, 12 to 15 feet long, was made of oak and weighed approximately 30 pounds. He made no complaint of his injury on the above date, and continued to perform his work as usual for the remainder of the day. On the next day, May 8, he informed his fellow employees and his employer that his back was hurting him and that the pain was a result of his accident the previous day. He then consulted Dr. John Devine for treatment of the strain to his back. On May 11, Dr. Devine had Williams enter a hospital for treatment of his back injury. On May 12, five days after the date of his injury, Williams suffered a coronary occlusion. Dr. Devine, a surgeon and general practitioner, then called in Dr. Robert L. Brickhouse, who practiced internal medicine including cardiology, to treat his patient. Dr. Brickhouse consulted with Dr. W. S. Hooten, who specialized in cardiology; but Dr. Hooten did not treat Williams. Williams remained at the hospital until June 13, when he was allowed to return to his home for convalescence. On June 14, he died. His death certificate, issued after an autopsy was performed, listed the cause of death as acute myocardial infarction.
Williams, in a written statement of his injury, dated May 30, 1956, stated that * * *'
Evidence of the claim of Mrs. Williams for compensation was heard by Commissioner Evans. At that hearing, Dr. Brickhouse and Dr. Hooten, the consultant, testified that it was their considered opinion that the strain suffered by Williams in lifting the board on May 7, brought about the heart attack on May 12, which resulted in his death.
Dr. R. Earle Glendy, a cardiologist, was furnished a chronological history of the events leading up to employee's death, the clinical and pathological reports, and a report of the Veterans Administration Hospital. The hospital report showed that Williams, prior to his death, was receiving permanent total disability benefits based upon nonservice-connected conditions defined as: 'Valvular heart disease, myocardial damage, auricular fibrillation, Class III; Hyperthyroidism; Adenoma of the thyroid, operated, cured; Pterygium, left.'
Dr. Glendy made a written report in which he expressed, in part, the following opinion:
'After a careful review of your investigation and the clinical reports attached it is my opinion that the proximate cause of this man's death was myocardial infarction due to severe coronary atherosclerosis, and that the etiology of the heart condition is in no way related to the back condition for obvious reasons evident in the pathological protocol. Coronary atherosclerosis is an insidious, slowly developing condition unrelated to trauma or strain.
'Now the question as to whether the 'slight' exertion of lifting the board to the scaffold had any relation to the heart condition and the subsequent heart attack I would say first that it had no etiological relationship to the heart condition, which despite his denial of symptoms, undoubtedly existed before the strain occurred. The next question to be answered is: Can a strain precipitate thrombosis in a coronary vessel that is already atherosclerotic? In answer to this I quote directly from a chapter on Trauma and Heart Disease by Dr. Paul D. White and myself from Trauma and Disease edited by Brahdy and Kahn * * *.
Commissioner Evans, on account of the conflict in the medical evidence, referred the file in the case to Dr. L. W. Hulley, Jr., Medical Advisor to the Industrial Commission, for his opinion as to the relationship between the injury of May 7, and the fatal heart attack. Dr. Hulley came to the conclusion that there was no causal relation. It...
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