Williams v. Garraghty
| Decision Date | 03 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | 940729,Nos. 940727,s. 940727 |
| Citation | 249 Va. 224,455 S.E.2d 209 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 67 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 785, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,464, 10 IER Cases 722 Gloria B. WILLIAMS v. David A. GARRAGHTY. David A. GARRAGHTY v. Gloria B. WILLIAMS. Record |
Barbara J. Gaden, Asst. Atty. Gen. (James S. Gilmore, III, Atty. Gen., Catherine C. Hammond, Deputy Atty. Gen., Guy W. Horsley, Jr., Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee in Record No. 940729.
James B. Thorsen, Richmond (Thorsen, Page & Marchant, on brief), for Garraghty.
Present: All the Justices.
These consolidated appeals from a single judgment present various issues arising out of a plaintiff's recovery of damages in a defamation action.
David A. Garraghty, a prison warden employed by the Virginia Department of Corrections (the Department), sued Gloria B. Williams, a subordinate employee, seeking damages for defamation, insulting words, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from a memorandum written by Williams. In the memorandum, Williams accused Garraghty of sexual harassment.
Williams filed a demurrer to Garraghty's motion for judgment, contending, inter alia, that the statements in the memorandum were constitutionally protected expressions of opinion. In ruling on the demurrer, the trial court rejected Williams' contention that the statements were expressions of opinion and concluded that Garraghty could proceed with his common law defamation claim and his statutory insulting words claim. The court also ruled that Garraghty's damage claim would be limited to "non-personal" damages, i.e., damage to community reputation, lost wages, and financial detriment resulting from injury to occupation. With respect to Garraghty's damage claim for pain and suffering, humiliation and embarrassment, and mental distress, the court ruled that such damages were not recoverable because they were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Act. The court also ruled that Garraghty's claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Act.
Prior to trial, Williams moved for summary judgment, claiming that her statements in the memorandum were absolutely privileged because the statements were made (a) in the context of her exercise of a federally protected right, or, alternatively, (b) in the course of a judicial proceeding. Williams also reasserted the claim that her statements were constitutionally protected expressions of opinion, incapable of being proved objectively as true or false. The trial court overruled the summary judgment motion.
The case proceeded to trial before a jury on Garraghty's common law defamation and statutory insulting words claims. Following a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in Garraghty's favor, awarding him compensatory damages in the amount of $152,597 and punitive damages in the amount of $125,000.
Williams thereafter moved the court to set aside the verdict. Williams argued that Garraghty did not prove that the statements in the memorandum were false or, if false, that she was negligent in making the statements. Williams also claimed that the punitive damages award should be set aside because the record did not disclose clear and convincing evidence that she had acted with actual malice.
The trial court found that the compensatory damages award was supported by the evidence, but that the punitive damages award was excessive. The trial court then required Garraghty to elect whether to accept a new trial or a remittitur of a portion of the punitive damages award. Upon Garraghty's election, under protest, the trial court overruled the motion to set aside the verdict and ordered Garraghty to remit $100,000 of the punitive damages award. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict as modified, and each party appeals therefrom.
The memorandum that is the basis for Garraghty's action was written by Williams on stationery with a Commonwealth of Virginia Upon discovering Williams' memorandum, Garraghty called Kern Gillian, the business manager of Nottoway Correctional Center, to his office. Garraghty also called Williams to his office. Garraghty was angry and showed the memorandum to Gillian. When Williams arrived, Garraghty told Williams that he would not allow her to "blackmail this position."
Department of Corrections letterhead. At the time, Garraghty was the warden and Williams was the personnel supervisor (also known as the "Human Resource Officer") at the Nottoway Correctional Center. Garraghty discovered the memorandum in an envelope on his office desk. 1
Garraghty then reported the memorandum to the regional administrator, in accordance with Department policy, and requested a full investigation. An investigation was conducted and a report thereof was filed with the director of the Department. Based upon the investigation, the director terminated Garraghty. Subsequently, Garraghty was rehired by the Department at a lower paying position.
An economist testified that Garraghty would suffer $152,597 in lost income over the course of his career as a result of his demotion. This is the precise amount of the compensatory damages that were awarded to Garraghty.
The memorandum alleging sexual harassment by Garraghty reads as follows:
I am requesting a meeting with you to discuss what I perceive to be Sexual Harassment once again. Since 3/17/92, when I brought your paycheck to your house and you made the following remarks:
1. You---"Do you want to mess around?"
2. You--"I guess your husband would kill you if you did."
You did discontinue that line of conversation at that point and we finished discussing work and I left your house.
Since that time, once again, I have started getting derogatory notes reference my work and performance from you. You have as yet to speak to me personally reference any problems (just notes).
David, from 1986--1988 you and I had a similar problem after I advised you that I was pregnant and getting married. You and I had been seeing each other from 1982 to April 1986. You asked me at that time, why I had not told you about Chuck. Since we had not been seeing each other outside work since April of 86, I did not understand why you felt I needed to discuss Chuck with you. Soon after that, I started getting derogatory notes, and you took my performance from 50 to 28 over the two year period. You had me so stressed out because of your attitude toward me that you caused me to have an angina attack and spend 5 days in the hospital (3 days of this in ICU) and eventually to resign in July of 1989.
It took my going to the hospital for you to stop attacking my work performance and stop sending me derogatory notes, and evaluate me fairly on my performance.
Previously when this all happened, I felt threatened and knew if I made a formal complaint, that I would have to resign. I was not in a position at that point in time financially to do this. However, after the trip to the hospital and near heart attack, at the recommendation of my doctor, I started making plans to resign and relocate.
David, I don't want to have to make a formal complaint now. I'd like to think we can work this out, but I can't deal emotionally with another sparring match with you.
Please advise me of a time that will be convenient to meet [to] discuss this situation.
The evidence regarding the alleged sexual harassment by Garraghty is in sharp conflict. Pursuant to established principles of law, however, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Garraghty, the prevailing party at trial.
The first instance of harassment referenced in the memorandum allegedly occurred during an encounter between the parties at Garraghty's home on March 17, 1992. Garraghty was ill, and Williams claims she took Garraghty's pay check to his house in response to his request that "someone" deliver the check. Garraghty testified that he had asked David Robinson, the assistant warden, to deliver the check, but Williams insisted on doing so. When Williams arrived, Garraghty was lying on a sofa. Rather than sitting in a chair, Williams sat on Garraghty. Garraghty emphatically denied that he asked Williams if she wanted to "mess around" or that he said, "I guess your husband would kill you if you did." He did not proposition Williams, and he did not pat her on the knee, as she later claimed.
In the memorandum, Williams next referenced Garraghty's course of conduct after the March 17, 1992 encounter. Garraghty allegedly had written "derogatory notes" regarding Williams' "work and performance" on three interoffice communications.
One communication, titled "Leave Activity Reporting Form," had been filed by Williams on March 20, 1992, to report eight hours of "Other Leave" (OT) that she had taken. On this document, Garraghty had written, "No, I have told you too many times about 8 hrs. of OT and the arbitrary accumulation of OT."
Another communication was an "Interoffice Memorandum" from Brenda Smithson to Williams, dated April 14, 1992, requesting verification that seven named individuals were no longer employees of Nottoway Correctional Center. On this document, Garraghty had written the following note to Williams: "This information should have been sent much earlier than this as per policy."
The third communication was a memorandum from Garraghty to Williams, dated April 21, 1992, which reads as follows:
You have been spending a great deal of time in Richmond lately. Some of these trips are not worth the effort and can be consolidated or...
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