Williams v. Genentech, Inc.

Decision Date09 May 2006
Docket NumberNo. A110611.,A110611.
Citation139 Cal.App.4th 357,42 Cal.Rptr.3d 585
PartiesRochelle Y. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GENENTECH, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
42 Cal.Rptr.3d 585
139 Cal.App.4th 357
Rochelle Y. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
GENENTECH, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
No. A110611.
Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5.
May 9, 2006.

[42 Cal.Rptr.3d 588]

Mayo & Rogers and Richard M. Rogers, San Francisco, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Heller Ehrman, Patricia K. Gillette, San Francisco, and Greg J. Richardson Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent.

SIMONS, J.


Plaintiff Rochelle Y. Williams, a receptionist at Genentech, Inc. (Genentech), was criticized by her supervisors for mishandling an incident involving company security. Plaintiff suffered stress and an exacerbation of an existing medical condition following the criticism and began a medical leave that lasted seven months. Ultimately, plaintiff's position was filled during her leave, and, when she returned from the leave, she was unable to obtain a different position at Genentech and was terminated. Following her administrative complaint to the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) and the issuance of a right to sue letter, plaintiff filed the complaint in this matter. The trial court granted Genentech's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appeals that judgment as to her claims for disability discrimination (Gov.Code, § 12940, subd. (a)) (second cause of action), failure to provide a reasonable accommodation (§ 12940, subd. (m)) (third cause of action), failure to engage in a timely interactive process (§ 12940, subd. (n)) (fourth cause of action), and violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act) (Civ.Code, § 51) (fifth cause of action).1 We reject her contentions and affirm.

42 Cal.Rptr.3d 589
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working for Genentech as a receptionist in August 1990, and her job duties included greeting visitors, answering telephones, directing calls, and distributing security badges. Beginning in 1995, Rona Rios became supervisor of all the receptionists, including plaintiff. At the end of September 2000, Rios was promoted to the position of manager and Patricia Marasco became plaintiff's supervisor. Marasco reported to Rios, who reported to Arlene Thompson, the senior manager of telecommunications and transportation.

Receptionists were given daily "Per Alerts" regarding particular people to watch for and instructions to follow upon seeing them. The instructions included alerting security personnel by pressing a panic button in the lobby and responding to security's follow-up telephone call. On October 16, 2000, a woman identified in a Per Alert entered Genentech's lobby while plaintiff was on duty. Plaintiff contacted security and spoke to the security officer in a "code" of plaintiff's own devise, although there was no policy or procedure for doing so.2 Security personnel then escorted the woman out of the building.

Later that day, the security supervisor informed Marasco that plaintiff had improperly handled the situation, and on October 18, 2000, Marasco and Rios met with plaintiff to address the complaint. At the meeting, Rios told plaintiff that security personnel had complained about her performance, reminded her to follow the Per Alert procedure and refrain from speaking in code, and said her choice of words could have "messed up the investigation." Following the meeting, plaintiff began to cry uncontrollably and hyperventilate. Genentech medical personnel transported her to the hospital emergency room where she was diagnosed as suffering an exacerbation of asthma.

Plaintiff commenced a medical leave on October 18, 2000, and on October 20, her physician certified her as unable to work until October 28, noting she had job related stress. Genentech's records show that plaintiff's leave was extended several times between October 20, 2000 and January 22, 2001.3 On November 3, 2000, plaintiff's doctor noted she had depression and anxiety. On January 22, 2001, plaintiff's doctor extended her leave until March 5. Her doctor's records indicate that in early February she was being treated by a therapist. The record does not reveal when such therapy commenced or ended. Between April 12 and May 15, her physician diagnosed her as suffering from anxiety and depression and removed her from work as "totally incapacitated." She was released to return to work without restrictions effective May 16, 2001.

Genentech's written family and medical leave policy provided for six months of paid medical leave. It also provided that employees who qualified for leave under the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) (Gov.Code, § 12945.2) would be placed in the same or equivalent position upon their return to work if their leave did not exceed 12 weeks in a 12-month period. The policy provided that if an employee's CFRA/Family Medical Leave Act of 1993

42 Cal.Rptr.3d 590

(FMLA) (29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.) leave extended beyond 12 weeks, Genentech could not guarantee that a position would be available to the employee. The policy also provided that if an employee's position were filled during his or her leave, the employee would be provided 60 days following the employee's return to work to locate a position for which the employee was qualified, and Genentech would pay the employee his or her full salary during the first 30 days of that 60-day period.

Near the beginning of plaintiff's medical leave, she told Laura Bridgman, the senior human resources manager, that she felt "harassed" and unfairly treated by her "manager," Rios. In November 2000, while still on leave, she told Bridgman that she "did not want to return to work in a position under . . . Rios's management." Bridgman investigated plaintiff's "claim" and found that Rios had not engaged in any improper conduct toward plaintiff. However, Bridgman never responded directly to plaintiff's request for a different supervisor.

During plaintiff's medical leave, her position was covered by one of three floater receptionists who served as operators in the telephone operator room and covered the lobby receptionists during breaks, lunches, illnesses and vacations. Using a floater to cover plaintiff's position resulted in a number of business problems: inadequate coverage for illnesses, vacations and planned sabbaticals; receptionists' lunch breaks were shortened; only one receptionist could be out on a given day; and morale suffered.

On January 17, 2001, Bridgman sent a memo to the management team (Thompson, Rios and Marasco) with suggestions regarding plaintiff's expected return to work on January 22. A follow-up meeting was scheduled for January 29 "to strategize on next steps, i.e., the need for any type of follow-up meeting with [plaintiff] based upon the meeting which took place before she went out on leave, review all of [their] roles moving forward, [Marasco's] role to directly supervise [plaintiff] and give her feedback, etc." However, as explained above, on January 22 plaintiff did not return to work, since on that date her doctor extended her leave until March 5.

On January 29, 2001, Bridgman again met with Marasco, Rios and Thompson. According to Bridgman, Marasco and Rios, they discussed the need for a regular, full-time employee in plaintiff's position because using a floater to fill her position adversely impacted the other receptionists and the business. They also discussed that Andy Scherer, the former senior director of facilities, supported filling plaintiff's position. According to Bridgman and Marasco, they determined that having a temporary agency employee fill plaintiff's position was not a viable option due to the extensive training required, lack of qualified persons, and high turnover of temporary employees. Because of plaintiff's previous extensions of her medical leave, Marasco, Rios, Bridgman and Thompson questioned whether plaintiff would actually return to work in March. At the January 29 meeting, it was agreed that plaintiff's position should be filled by a regular, full-time employee. According to Bridgman, Rios and Marasco, there was no discussion about plaintiff's reaction to or inability to handle the criticism delivered at the October 18, 2000 meeting, and they did not consider that issue in assessing and recommending that her position be filled. Bridgman provided Scherer and Joel Spray, the former director of site services, with the business rationale for the management team's determination that plaintiff's position should be filled. Bridgman did not inform Spray or Scherer that plaintiff's reaction to criticism provided an additional

42 Cal.Rptr.3d 591

rationale for filling plaintiff's position. Spray and Scherer agreed that plaintiff's position should be filled based on the rationale Bridgman communicated to them and approved the decision.

On January 31, 2001, Bridgman notified plaintiff in writing that she had obtained a statement from plaintiff's doctor stating that plaintiff continued to be disabled and was unable to work through March 5. Bridgman's letter also notified plaintiff that on January 16, plaintiff had exhausted her 12-week "position guarantee," and Genentech was unable to hold her position open any longer and would need to hire a replacement. Bridgman also informed plaintiff that upon her expected return to work in March, she would be entitled to look for another position for 60 days, and Genentech would provide her with more information regarding job search benefits and services to assist her in locating that position. Plaintiff was also informed that she would continue on disability status as long as her doctor continued to certify her as disabled. Genentech posted plaintiff's position as vacant on February 7, 2001 and filled the position on February 26.

On March 21, 2001, Bridgman informed plaintiff that since plaintiff continued to remain disabled and unable to work, she would continue on disability status. Bridgman again informed plaintiff that when her doctor released her to return to work, she would have 60 days to look for another...

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