Williams v. Georgia Dept. of Human Resources, 85-8856

• Decision Date: 15 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-8856,85-8856
• Parties: Margaret WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, d/b/a Central State Hospital, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 881

789 F.2d 881

5 Fed.R.Serv.3d 454

Margaret WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, d/b/a Central State

Hospital, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-8856.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 15, 1986.

Thomas M. West, Atlanta, Ga., David S. Bills, The Keenan Law Firm, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.

Patricia Downing, David C. Will, Asst. Attys. Gen., State Law Dept., Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before VANCE and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, and BOWEN ^*, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

In the instant case, the district court granted a "directed verdict" in favor of the defendants without holding a trial. Because the district court had no authority to direct a verdict at the pretrial stage of the case, we reverse.

Plaintiff-appellant Margaret Williams was incarcerated in the Women's Unit of the Middle Georgia Correctional Institute during the year 1980. In May 1980, while appellant was incarcerated, she gave birth to a child. The child was born in an emergency delivery, during which appellant was given sedatives but no anesthesia. The placenta was not spontaneously expelled and had to be manually removed by the treating physician, defendant-appellee Dr. Luis Colon.

After giving birth, appellant suffered a series of urinary and vaginal problems. In September 1980, Dr. Colon performed a hysterectomy and anterior colporrhaphy (vaginal repair) on appellant. About a month later, appellant removed a gauze pack from her vagina, which she claimed had been left there since the surgery. Appellant continued to complain of urinary problems, and she was later referred by the correctional institute to Dr. Alan J. Pomerance, who examined her in June 1981. Dr. Pomerance subsequently performed posterior repair to appellant's vagina and removed her vulva nevus.

In May 1982, appellant filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. In her complaint she alleged that, by failing to give her anesthesia during childbirth and by his subsequent conduct, Dr. Colon exhibited deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs and caused her severe injury in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Appellant claimed that, in consequence of this constitutional violation, Dr. Colon, defendant-appellee Georgia Department of Human Resources, and defendant-appellee Georgia Department of Offender Rehabilitation were all liable to her under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983. Appellant included in her complaint a pendent state law claim for medical malpractice. She requested a jury trial.

In August 1984, the district judge held a pretrial status conference pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16. At the conference, the defendants' attorney requested permission to move for summary judgment. In response to this request, the judge said:

Well, let me tell you, I'm always uneasy, as I've probably told both of you, about Motions for Summary Judgment. The rule, to me, just doesn't fit this type of situation because it presupposes no genuine dispute of material fact. Then you argue what is a material fact, and what is an immaterial fact and it is a cinch on appeal for some law clerk working for--like my good law clerks--working for an appellate judge to suggest to the judge, "Gee, Judge, this case should have been tried." "Yeah, genuine issue of material fact, try it." They just come back wholesale, not just mine but everybody's.

The judge then stated that he wanted the parties to submit to him all the evidence that they would put on at trial if a trial were held. The judge said he would evaluate whether, if all this evidence were presented, it would be enough to go to a jury. He said, "Let's just assume that we were in the Courtroom, and that y'all presented everything you can present and a Motion for a Directed Verdict was made, would there be enough to submit to the jury."

Plaintiff's counsel objected to the use of this procedure. He stated that the defendants should be permitted to move for summary judgment, and if summary judgment were not granted, then the parties should go to trial. The district judge said that to empanel a jury and conduct a trial for two or three days, where it was doubtful whether there was sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury, would be an imposition on everyone. The judge asked the parties to agree that the court would consider their depositions and medical records and "all the same as if that were presented in court." The judge said, "To me, when there's a question as to whether or not you've really got a cause of action, this is a time and money saving procedure. I've done it two or three times."

Plaintiff's counsel reluctantly agreed to follow this procedure. The attorneys for both sides submitted affidavits, depositions, medical records, and briefs to the court. Plaintiff testified in a deposition that Dr. Colon cut, pulled, and tore the placenta from her womb for about three hours, during which time she begged and screamed for anesthesia but was not given any. She testified that Dr. Colon said the state would not pay for anesthesia. She complained that Dr. Colon failed to...