Williams v. Graff

• Decision Date: 10 February 1950
• Docket Number: No. 82,82
• Citation: 23 A.L.R.2d 106,194 Md. 516,71 A.2d 450
• Parties: , 23 A.L.R.2d 106 WILLIAMS v. GRAFF.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 516

194 Md. 516

71 A.2d 450, 23 A.L.R.2d 106

WILLIAMS v. GRAFF.

No. 82.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 10, 1950.

William F. McDonald, Baltimore, and J. Elmer Weisheit, Jr., Towson, (Michael Paul Smith, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

John Grason Turnbull, Towson, (Foster H. Fanseen, Baltimore, and Walter B. Siwinski, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

DELAPLAINE, Judge.

This suit was entered in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County by Cyrus Williams, a garbage collector, to recover for personal injuries which he sustained when he was knocked down by a taxicab owned by Theodore Edward Graff, of Dundalk, and operated by his employee on the Sparrows Point Road.

The accident happened on January 24, 1947, about 10 a. m. Plaintiff, an employee of Joseph B. Menser, collector of garbage and trash for Baltimore County, was collecting garbage along the highway. The garbage truck was parked on the south side of the road approximately 100 feet west of McComas Avenue. Plaintiff had just handed a can of garbage to Menser, who was standing on top of the truck, and had received back the empty can. He then came out from behind the truck and started to cross the road with the can, but was struck and thrown for a considerable distance by the taxicab, which was traveling westwardly.

The case was removed to the Superior Court of Baltimore City. Plaintiff testified at the trial in that Court that he had taken only a step or two when the taxicab bore down upon him. According to his version, the taxicab was traveling on the south side of the white line in the middle of the road. On the contrary, John Royston, defendant's driver, testified that he was driving on the north side of the road. Officer Frank Saraka, of the Baltimore County Police Department, who investigated the accident, testified that he saw skid marks north of the center line.

The jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendant. Plaintiff appealed here from the judgment entered upon the verdict. Plaintiff contends that the trial judge committed reversible error in admitting Officer Saraka's testimony as to the skid marks on the highway.

It is beyond question that, if the testimony of Officer Saraka as to the skid marks was admissible under our rules of evidence, it was also relevant and material to the issue of negligence. One of the rules of the road laid down by the legislature in the Motor Vehicle Act requires that upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows: (1) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing such movement; (2) when the right half of a roadway is closed to traffic while under construction or repair; (3) upon a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the rules applicable thereon; or (4) upon a roadway designated and a sign posted for oneway traffic. Laws of 1943, ch. 1007, Code Supp.1947, art. 66 1/2, sec. 162. In Crunkilton v. Hook, 185 Md. 1, 4, 42 A.2d 517, 519, this Court held that while a driver of a motor vehicle who violates the statutory rule requiring a motorist to keep to the right of the center of the road may not necessarily be negligent, his action is strong evidence of negligence where such violation directly and proximately causes a collision, and the burden is then on him to show that the condition of the road or an emergency in the traffic had caused him to be rightfully on the left side of the road.

We first consider plaintiff's contention that the testimony of the police officer as to skid marks was erroneously admitted on cross-examination because skid marks had not been inquired into on his direct examination. In this country the decisions are not harmonious as to the limits of cross-examination, the conflict having resulted in the pronouncement of two major principles known as the English rule and the American rule. According to the English rule, where a witness is called to testify to a particular fact, he becomes a witness for all purposes and may be fully cross-examined upon all matters material to the issue, the examination not being confined to the matters that were inquired about in the direct examination. This practice has been followed in only a few jurisdictions. Cowart v. Strickland, 149 Ga. 397, 100 S.E. 447, 7 A.L.R. 1110. On the other hand, the rule followed in nearly all of the States, including Maryland, is that where a witness is called to testify on a particular point, the adverse party in the cross-examination of the witness is restricted to the point on which he testified and cannot question him in regard to other issues in the case. Of course, a party may ask questions on cross-examination to show bias or prejudice in the witness, or to lay a foundation to admit evidence of prior contradictory statements. But if the party wishes to examine the witness as to other matters, he must do so by making him his own witness and calling him as such in the subsequent progress of the case. Philadelphia & T. Ry. Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448, 461, 10 L.Ed. 535; Wills v. Russell, 100 U.S. 621, 25 L.Ed. 607.

However, our rule does not go to the extent of restricting the cross-examination of the witness to the specific details inquired into on direct examination, but permits full inquiry into the subject matter entered into. Where a general aubject has been entered upon in the examination in chief, the cross-examining counsel may ask any relevant question on the general subject. In our judgment the rule limiting cross-examination to the general facts stated on direct examination should not be so applied as to defeat the real object of cross-examination, i. e., to elicit all the facts of any observation or transaction which has not been fully explained. Black v. First National Bank of Westminster, 96 Md. 399, 424, 54 A. 88; Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Ritter, 113 Md. 163, 177, 77 A. 388; Commercial State Bank v. Moore, 8 Cir., 227 F. 19, 23. The scope to which the cross-examination may extend rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling thereon will not be disturbed by the Court of Appeals, unless it appears that some injustice has been done. Regester v. Regester, 104 Md. 1, 13, 64 A. 286; Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. v. State, to Use of Smith, 109 Md. 186, 72 A. 651; Marino v. State, 171 Md. 104, 187 A. 858; Armiger v. Baltimore Transit Co., 173 Md. 416, 196 A. 111.

In the Court below the police officer who investigated the accident testified on direct examination as to his observations at the scene of the accident, including a pool of blood on the road. It is clear that, after he had been examined in chief in reference to one detail of his observation, it was permissible to cross-examine him in reference to another...