Williams v. Hampton, 18-6132
| Decision Date | 16 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-6132,18-6132 |
| Parties | MICKEY WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. KEVIN HAMPTON, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0408n.06
JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Warden Kevin Hampton appeals the conditional grant of habeas relief on Blakely grounds to Mickey Lee Williams. Issues presented are (1) whether the state trial court erred by relying at sentencing on the factual conclusion that Williams had a "previous history of unwillingness to comply" with conditions of release without such a finding by the jury, (2) the status of any such Sixth Amendment error under federal law, and (3) whether any such error was harmless. The Warden now concedes that the enhancement applied was inconsistent with Blakely and that the state court's decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The only remaining issue in dispute is whether the conceded error was harmless—whether, had the jury been asked to, it would have made the necessary factual findings. Because evidence that would support this enhancement was not presented to the jury, we cannot know what the jury would have found. Accordingly, there is no basis to conclude that the trial court's error was harmless. We therefore AFFIRM.
Williams was convicted of second-degree murder and arson for stabbing and killing Terry Johnson and starting a fire in the decedent's home. The facts as recounted by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals ("TCCA") portray a chaotic episode in which Williams stabbed Terry Johnson—the husband of Patricia Johnson, with whom Williams had had an affair—after confronting the Johnsons at their home and fighting with Terry Johnson in the yard. A jury convicted Williams of second-degree murder and arson on June 7, 2004, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 24 years.
On October 27, 2004, Williams filed an untimely motion for a new trial, which included a challenge to the trial court's decision to sentence him above the presumptive minimum sentence in reliance on aggravating factors not found by a jury. The trial court denied the motion but, without explanation, reduced Williams's sentence to 23 years. On direct appeal, the TCCA affirmed Williams's conviction, but reinstated the original 24-year sentence on the basis that the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify it. At the state post-conviction stage, the Grainger County Circuit Court denied Williams's post-conviction claims as to trial court error, but granted a delayed appeal, finding that Williams's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion for new trial. Williams raised his Blakely claim in another motion for new trial and it was denied on the merits.
Williams filed a § 2254 federal habeas petition on September 16, 2015, raising numerous grounds for relief concerning his trial, sentencing, and state court collateral proceedings. On September 26, 2018, the district court issued a comprehensive opinion denying all but Williams'sBlakely claim. It reasoned that the trial court erred by relying on facts not found by the jury to impose a sentence above the presumptive minimum. The Warden appeals the disposition of Williams's Blakely claim.
In a federal habeas case, we review a district court's conclusions of law de novo. Hand v. Houk, 871 F.3d 390, 406 (6th Cir. 2017). We review a district court's own findings of fact for clear error. Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 2005).
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a petitioner is entitled to relief on a constitutional claim adjudicated by a state court on the merits only where the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). In addition to showing that the state court's adjudication of a constitutional claim warrants federal relief under § 2254(d), a Blakely error must amount to more than harmless error. Lovins v. Parker, 712 F.3d 283, 303 (6th Cir. 2013). To establish a harmful error on habeas review, Williams must show that the Blakely error had "'a substantial and injurious effect' upon [his] sentence, or that there is 'grave doubt' as to whether the error had such an effect." Owens v. Parris, 932 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995)); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). It then clarified this holding in Blakely v. Washington, reasoning that "'the statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendants." 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis in original); see also Lovins, 712 F.3d at 289-90.
At the time the district court issued its opinion, the question of whether the Tennessee Supreme Court's application of Blakely to judicial fact-finding at sentencing was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of," Supreme Court precedent was pending before this court in Owens v. Parris. 932 F.3d at 459. We concluded that it was unreasonable. Id. Owens held that the Tennessee sentencing scheme allowing judges to find facts that increased a defendant's exposure to punishment violated the Sixth Amendment, and that the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Blakely. Id. at 458-59. In light of Owens, the Warden now concedes that Williams's sentence violated the Court's clearly established Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and that the only remaining issue on appeal is whether the error was harmless.
The trial court found three sentencing enhancement factors applicable to Williams's second-degree murder conviction: "(1) previous history of criminal convictions in addition to that necessary to establish the appropriate range; (2) previous history of unwillingness to comply with conditions of release in the community; and (3) possession or use of a deadly weapon during thecommission of the offense." Williams v. Cook, No. 3:15-CV-00415, 2018 WL 4621820, at *17 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2018). Based on these enhancements, the trial court increased Williams's sentence from the presumptive sentence of 20 years to a term of 25 years. Id. The sentencing court explained that it placed "great weight" on the first and third enhancement factors; but also included the second factor in its sentencing decision. Id. It then lowered Williams's sentence to 24 years in light of life history information presented in mitigation. Id. The parties agree that the first enhancement factor occupies the exception explained in Blakely, 542 U.S. at 302, permitting judicial fact-finding about a defendant's criminal history, and that the third was necessarily encompassed by the jury's findings of fact. Id. at *17 n.18. Only the second enhancement factor is at issue in this appeal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(9) (2004).
To assess whether the conceded error had a substantial and injurious effect upon Williams's sentence, we ask "whether the jury would have found [the enhancement] if that question had been submitted to it." Owens, 932 F.3d at 459. Owens explained that "the question whether the court would have imposed the same sentence on remand is itself incoherent in cases where—as here—the court's factfinding liberated the court to impose the sentence that the court in fact imposed, rather than mandated that sentence." Id. at 460. And it concluded that Id. Because the court's fact-finding "liberated" it to impose the sentence at issue in this case, that test applies here.
Owens concluded that the factual findings necessary to the "exceptional cruelty" enhancement at issue were established from the findings made by the jury. We reasoned that because the "jury did in fact convict him of second-degree murder. . . . we are confident that the jury rejected Owens's account of the murder and accepted the State's." Id. at 460-61. Andbecause believing Owens's testimony would have been the only basis not to find the facts necessary to the enhancement, we had "little doubt that, if asked, the jury would have made the requisite finding" that Owens's actions constituted "psychological abuse or torture." Id. at 461. Critically, we asked what the jury would have found based on the evidence actually presented to it.
Here, by contrast, the evidence of the enhancement at issue was not—in any form—before the jury. Unlike in Owens, where evidence about the circumstances surrounding the crime had the effect of supporting a finding of the exceptional cruelty enhancement, the jury in this case was presented with no evidence that had any bearing on whether Williams had a previous history of unwillingness to comply with conditions of release. Neither the enhancement, nor any evidence related to it, was presented to the jury. And because the state did not present the jury with such evidence, we are...
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