Williams v. Hansen

• Decision Date: 22 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-1573.,02-1573.
• Citation: 326 F.3d 569
• Parties: Gregory A. WILLIAMS; Virgil Hugh Reaves, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Ronald E. HANSEN, individually and in his official capacity as Police Chief, Defendant-Appellant, and The City of Fayetteville; Roger Stancil, individually and in his official capacity as City Manager; John Smith, individually and in his then official capacity as City Manager; Ron Robun, individually and in his official capacity as City Manager; Bradley Chandler, individually and in his official capacity as a City Police Officer; Richard Bryant, individually and in his official capacity as a City Police Officer; Katherine Guilette, individually and in her official capacity as a City Police Officer; Steve McIntosh, individually and in his official capacity as a City Police Officer; The Fayetteville City Council; Sherry Sparks, individually and in her official capacity as a City Police Officer, Defendants. The National Association of Police Organizations, Incorporated; National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Fayetteville, North Carolina Branch, Amici Supporting Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

326 F.3d 569

Gregory A. WILLIAMS; Virgil Hugh Reaves, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Ronald E. HANSEN, individually and in his official capacity as Police Chief, Defendant-Appellant, and The City of Fayetteville; Roger Stancil, individually and in his official capacity as City Manager; John Smith, individually and in his then official capacity as City Manager; Ron Robun, individually and in his official capacity as City Manager; Bradley Chandler, individually and in his official capacity as a City Police Officer; Richard Bryant, individually and in his official capacity as a City Police Officer; Katherine Guilette, individually and in her official capacity as a City Police Officer; Steve McIntosh, individually and in his official capacity as a City Police Officer; The Fayetteville City Council; Sherry Sparks, individually and in her official capacity as a City Police Officer, Defendants.

The National Association of Police Organizations, Incorporated; National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Fayetteville, North Carolina Branch, Amici Supporting Appellee.

No. 02-1573.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: January 21, 2003.

Decided: April 22, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED: Steven Craig Lawrence, Anderson, Johnson, Lawrence, Butler & Bock, L.L.P., Fayetteville, North Carolina, for Appellant. James Harvestus Locus, Jr., Fayetteville, North Carolina, for Appellees. Joseph Michael McGuinness, The McGuinness Law Firm, Elizabethtown, North Carolina, for Amicus Curiae Police. ON BRIEF: William J. Johnson, National Association of Police Organizations, Inc., Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Police. Dennis Courtland Hayes, Hannibal G. Williams II Kemerer, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amicus Curiae NAACP.

Before KING, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and GREENBERG, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Senior Judge GREENBERG wrote the opinion, in which Senior Judge HAMILTON joined. Judge KING wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

GREENBERG, Senior Circuit Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes on before this court on defendant Ronald E. Hansen's appeal from an order entered in the district court on May 15, 2002, to the extent that the order denied Hansen's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on claims against him by plaintiffs Gregory A. Williams and Virgil Hugh Reaves under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs predicated their section 1983 actions insofar as implicated on this appeal on Hansen's alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹ The district court decided this case in a comprehensive opinion setting forth the background of this case. Williams v. Fayetteville, 5:99-CV-449-BR(2) (E.D.N.C. May 13, 2002).

We describe the facts less expansively as the issues before us are narrower. Williams and Reaves are black men who served as police officers employed by the Fayetteville, North Carolina, police department during the time relevant to this appeal. It appears that there have been racial problems within the Fayetteville police department for in 1974 Fayetteville settled a discrimination action brought against it by agreeing to increase the opportunities of black officers for better training and assignments and for promotions. The parties to that litigation memorialized their settlement in a consent decree that still was in effect at the time of the events leading directly to this action. The decree, however, was terminated in 1997.

In February 1996, in response to renewed complaints of racial discrimination against blacks in the police department, Hansen, then the Fayetteville chief of police, directed two high ranking black police officers, Major George Moyd and Captain Robert Shambley, to interview all of Fayetteville's black police officers to determine whether any had experienced racial discrimination or whether they had information regarding discrimination against blacks. At that time, however, Hansen did not direct that Moyd or Shambley or anyone else question white officers as to whether they had information regarding discrimination against blacks. Hansen further directed that Lt. Richard Bryant, chief of the department's Office of Professional Standards ("OPS"), was to interview any black officer who had perceived discrimination so that the complaints could be investigated.

In accordance with Hansen's direction, Moyd and Shambley interviewed all 68 black police officers in the department, Shambley interviewing Reaves and Moyd interviewing Williams. Both Reaves and Williams reported that there had been discrimination within the department and, in all, 17 officers did so. Williams and Reaves charge that the subsequent investigation of the reports of discrimination was nothing more than an effort to discredit the officers who had complained of discrimination and an attempt to determine the membership in a group of black officers called Officers for Equity that opposed racial discrimination in the police department.² Hansen, not surprisingly, disagrees with these allegations but, as will be seen, this dispute of fact does not preclude us from deciding the legal issues posed on this appeal.

Even though this action involves other claims and defendants in addition to Hansen, on this appeal we deal only with plaintiffs' allegations that Hansen violated their rights to equal protection of the laws by causing Moyd and Shambley to interview only the 68 black officers and not the more numerous several hundred white officers. Hansen, in moving for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, contended in the district court and contends here that his decision to require interviews of black officers with respect to racial discrimination was lawful and, in any event, did not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Thus, in his view, he is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on plaintiffs' section 1983 equal protection claims and the district court erred in denying him that relief.

The district court rejected Hansen's immunity defense for the following reasons. First, it cited and quoted Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993), to demonstrate the Supreme Court's disapproval of racial classifications, quoting the portion of the opinion holding that "state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race [must] be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest." Id. at 643, 113 S.Ct. 2816. The district court then indicated that this principle has led courts "to conclude that intentional racial harassment of a public employee by a supervisor constitutes race discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is also actionable under [42 U.S.C] § 1983." Slip op. at 77.

The district court then stated that Hansen, when investigating racial discrimination within the police department, "in electing to interview only the black officers... effectuated a racial classification that immediately and ultimately subjected plaintiffs to unequal treatment." Id. The court indicated that it was not determinative that the case did not involve a statutory classification for in Sylvia Development Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir.1995) (emphasis in original), we stated that the "Equal Protection Clause limits all state action, prohibiting any state from denying a person equal protection through the enactment, administration, or enforcement of its laws and regulations." Id. The district court then said that inasmuch as "Hansen's investigation was explicitly limited to black officers, a suspect class, the court must apply strict scrutiny" in considering the investigation's legality. Id. Thus, the district court stated that "Hansen must show that the investigation was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest," citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996). Id. at 77-78.

The district court held that even assuming that the stated purpose for interviewing and investigating only the black officers, i.e., to determine if there was racial discrimination in the department, was its actual purpose and was compelling:

The court cannot conclude that the means chosen to effectuate the stated purpose were narrowly tailored. It was clearly overinclusive in that it subjected to investigation black officers who did not feel that discrimination or retaliation existed in the Department and underinclusive in that it did not take into account the perceptions of white officers regarding racial discrimination in the Department. There were certainly other, more narrowly tailored, non race-based methods that the Department could have employed to accomplish its stated purpose.

Id. at 78. The court, however, did not indicate what these alternative methods were.

Finally, after having concluded that Hansen's conduct violated the Equal Protection Clause, the court held that he was not entitled to qualified immunity for the following reasons:

The court also concludes that plaintiffs' right to equal protection of the laws protecting them from being subjected to coercive state conduct solely on the basis of their race was clearly established in February 1996. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) ("The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.") The court also concludes that a reasonable person in Chief Hansen's position would have known that his conduct would violate that right. Accordingly, the court concludes that defendant Ronald Hansen is not entitled to qualified immunity and thus is not entitled to summary judgment on plainti...