Williams v. Hawkeye Community College
| Decision Date | 27 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-CV-2093-LRR.,06-CV-2093-LRR. |
| Citation | 494 F.Supp.2d 1032 |
| Parties | Francine WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. HAWKEYE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Thomas Andrew Newkirk, Fiedler & Newkirk, PLC, Urbandale, IA, for Plaintiff.
Beth E. Hansen, Jim D. Dekoster, Swisher. & Cohrt, PLC, Waterloo, IA, for Defendant.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Petition
B. First Motion
C. Amended Complaint
D. Second Motion ......................................
III. JURISDICTION ............................................
IV. MOTION TO DISMISS .......................................
A. Standard ...........................................
B. Count II ...........................................
C. Count III ..........................................
D. Count IV ...........................................
1. Allegations ...................................
2. Arguments .....................................
3. Analysis ......................................
V. MOTION TO STRIKE ........................................
VI. CONCLUSION ..............................................
The matter before the court is Defendant Hawkeye Community College's Partial Motion to Dismiss and Strike Amended Complaint (docket no. 15) ("Second Motion").
On November 27, 2006, Plaintiff Francine Williams filed a two-count Petition against Defendant in the Iowa District Court in and for Black Hawk County. In Count I, Plaintiff alleged "Race Discrimination and Retaliation," in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. In Count II, Plaintiff alleged a "Violation of [C]ontractual [R]ights [D]ue to [R]ace," in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. On December 14, 2006, Defendant removed the Petition to this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441.
On January 13, 2007, Defendant filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss (docket no. 6) ("First Motion"). On February 21, 2007, the court dismissed Count II of the Petition, because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The court held that, because Defendant is a state actor, Plaintiff was required to enforce her § 1981 rights through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (); Lockridge v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ark., 315 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir.2003) (en banc) (); Artis v. Francis Howell N. Band Booster Ass'n, Inc., 161 F.3d 1178, 1181 (8th Cir.1998) (). The court dismissed Count II without prejudice, however, and granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within ten days. Cf. Lockridge, 315 F.3d at 1007 ().
On February 22, 2007, Plaintiff filed a four-count Amended Complaint against Defendant. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges "Race Discrimination and Retaliation," in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges a "Violation of [C]ontractual [R]ights [D]ue to [R]ace," in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges a "Violation of Rights [G]ranted under Federal and State [L]aw to [A]ffirmative [A]ction to [P]revent [R]ace from [O]perating as a[B]arrier to [E]qual [E]mployment," in violation of Executive Order 11246,1 Iowa Code chapter 17A (2003), Iowa Code chapter 19B and Iowa Code section 260C.29. In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges a "Violation of Rights [G]ranted under Federal [L]aw `under [C]olor of [S]tate [L]aw," in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On March 2, 2007, Defendant filed the Second Motion. In the Second Motion, Defendant asks the court to dismiss Counts II, III and IV of the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant also asks the court to strike certain allegations from the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
On March 5, 2007, the court granted the Second Motion in part and dismissed Count II of the Amended Complaint. See Order (docket no. 16), at 1. The court reiterated that § 1983 "provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor." Jett, 491 U.S. at 736, 109 S.Ct. 2702. The court ordered Plaintiff to respond to the remainder of the Second Motion on or before March 12, 2007.
On March 12, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Resistance to the Second Motion. In the Resistance, Plaintiff resists the Second Motion in its entirety. She also asks the court to reinstate Count II of the Amended Complaint. Defendant did not file a Reply.
The Second Motion is fully submitted. Neither party requests oral argument, and the court finds that oral argument is not necessary.
The court finds that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the Amended Complaint. The court has jurisdiction over all counts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (); id. § 1367(a) (). But see id. § 1367(c) ().
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the district court to dismiss a claim if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In assessing the Second Motion, the court is required to view the allegations in the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party. In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig.; 418 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir.2005). The court must accept all the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Mo. River Sys. Litig., 418 F.3d at 917. The court may "dismiss the case only when it appears beyond [a] doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief." Mo. River Sys. Litig., 418 F.3d at 917 (internal quotations omitted). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the [plaintiff] is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Thus, "as a practical matter, [dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted] only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show, on the face of the [Amended Complaint], that there is some insuperable bar to relief." Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 317 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Frey v. Herculaneum 44 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 1995)).
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges a "Violation of [C]ontractual [R]ights [D]ue to [R]ace," in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. As indicated, the court already granted the Second Motion in part and dismissed Count II of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, because § 1983 "provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor." Jett, 491 U.S. at 735, 109 S.Ct. 2702.
In her Resistance, Plaintiff asks the court to reinstate Count 11.2 The court denies this request for the same reasons expressed in the court's February 11, 2007 Order (docket no. 11), at 2-4, and March 5, 2007 Order (docket no: 16), at 1.
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges a "Violation of Rights [G]ranted under Federal and State [L]aw to [A]ffirmative [A]ction to [P]revent [R]ace from [O]perating as a[B]arrier to [E]qual [E]mployment," in violation of Executive Order 11246 and three Iowa statutes, namely, Iowa Code chapter 17A, Iowa Code chapter 19B and Iowa Code section 260C.29. In the Second Motion, Defendant asks the court to dismiss Count III pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendant con.: tends that Executive Order 11246 and the three Iowa statutes do not create private rights of action. In the alternative, Defendant argues that the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 ("ICRA"), Iowa Code chapter 216, preempts any cause of action under the three Iowa statutes.
The court holds that neither Executive Order 11246 nor any of the three Iowa statutes creates a private right of action. See, e.g., Utley v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 811 F.2d 1279, 1284-86 (9th Cir.1987) (); Cohen v. Ill. Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 822 n. 4 (7th Cir.1975) (same); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 411 n. 23 (2d Cir.1975) (same); Morris v. Amalgamated Lithographers of Am., Local One, 994 F.Supp. 161, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (same); Iowa Code § 17A.1(2) (...
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