Williams v. Illinois
| Decision Date | 30 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-CV-02495 |
| Parties | TARRAN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, OFFICE OF GOVERNOR JB PRITZKER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Tarran Williams filed this suit against the State of Illinois and the Office of Governor JB Pritzker (for convenience's sake, referred to collectively as Illinois or the State) alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623; the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her Fourteenth and First Amendment rights.[1] R. 1, Compl. Specifically, Williams alleges that her supervisors in the Office of the Governor intentionally discriminated against Williams by delegating her job responsibilities to Williams' peers who are under the age of 40. Id. These peers, in turn, have received promotions and raises over Williams. Id. at 2. Illinois now moves to dismiss Williams' complaint on the grounds that Williams failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to the Title VII and age claim; Williams pleaded facts that both men and women have received promotions over Williams, thus undermining the Equal Pay Act claim; and that the State is not suable under Section 1983 R. 13, Defs.' Mot. As explained in this Opinion, Illinois is right that the Title VII and age claims are not exhausted the Equal Pay Act allegations fail to adequately state a claim; and the State cannot be sued under § 1983. The discrimination claims are dismissed without prejudice, and the Section 1983 claim is dismissed with prejudice.
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the allegations in the Complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Even though she now has recruited counsel, Williams filed the operative complaint as a pro se litigant, so the Complaint will be expansively construed and held to a less stringent pleading standard. Id.
Although not crystal clear, it appears that Williams was a Special Assistant to the General Counsel under former Governor Bruce Rauner. Compl. at 2, 3. Williams alleges that, after the transition in administrations, Ann Spillane (the new General Counsel) and Jasmine Hooks (the Chief Operating Officer) did not provide Williams with a job description or a performance appraisal. Id. at 2. The two supervisors apparently deemed Williams ineligible for promotions. Id. Williams also asserts that she never received credit or recognition on the job so that her achievements would not be rewarded. Id. at 5-6, 11. To that same end, Williams alleges that Spillane “and others” reassigned Williams' responsibilities. Id. at 2. Meanwhile, her coworkers, [2]both men and women, received performance reviews and promotions within months of their arrival. Id. at 3, 8, 9. Williams asserts that she tried to complain about the ongoing treatment, but initially received only silence from her supervisors. Compl. at 3-4. As Williams complained more, her supervisors and peers excluded her from various work projects and verbally abused Williams. Id. at 5-6, 10, 11.
In May 2021, Williams filed this pro se lawsuit, claiming that she was the victim of employment discrimination. Compl. at 1. Williams appears to claim that she was the target of discrimination on the basis of her sex, age, and political affiliation with the former governor.[3] Id. at 1, 2. Illinois moved to dismiss Williams' complaint for failure to state a claim, and the Court recruited counsel for Williams. R. 34, Pl.'s Resp.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (cleaned up)[4]. The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim' rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). These allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Williams alleges that Illinois engaged in sex and age discrimination, invoking Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Pl.'s Resp. at 1. Title VII bars employment discrimination on the basis of sex (as well as on other grounds), and the ADEA bars employment discrimination on the basis of age for individuals over 40 years of age. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; § 623(a); 29 U.S.C. § 631. Both Title VII and the ADEA require that claimants exhaust all administrative remedies for employment discrimination by filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (well known as the EEOC) or the equivalent state agency before bringing suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).
Illinois moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Williams failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing suit. Defs.' Mot. at 3. But the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense-not a failure on the merits. See Salas v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr., 493 F.3d 913, 922 (7th Cir. 2007). And affirmative defenses are, generally speaking, a poor fit for consideration under Rule 12(b)(6) for two reasons. First, “a plaintiff may state a claim even though there is a defense to that claim.” Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012). Second, affirmative defenses typically require consideration of facts not available to the court at the pleading stage. Id.
Having said that, a court may nonetheless construe a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings when presented at the outset of a case and when presented with all the facts needed to decide the affirmative defense. Brownmark Films, 682 F.3d at 690; see Gunn v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir. 2020). The key is whether discovery or other factual development is needed; if yes, then the affirmative defense must await presentation via a summary judgment. If not, then the court may proceed under Rule 12(c), and the defendants bear the burden of showing that the affirmative defense would “conclusively defeat[ ] [the claim] as a matter of law.” Gunn, 968 F.3d at 807. And on a Rule 12(c) motion, as on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the facts are construed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1204 (7th Cir. 1989).
Neither Williams nor Illinois contend that discovery is needed to resolve the exhaustion defense at this stage of the case, so the Court will treat the dismissal motion as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to Williams and ask whether the defense has shown that her claim is “conclusively defeated” by a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Gunn, 968 F.3d at 807.
Exhaustion does defeat the Title VII and ADEA claims here. Williams failed to file an EEOC charge before bringing suit in federal court. Employees must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC to bring a claim under the ADEA in federal court. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); Trujillo v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 926 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2019) (“An ADEA claimant must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and then wait sixty days before bringing an action in federal court.”); Hamilton v. Komatsu Dresser Industries, Inc., 964 F.2d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 1992) (). Likewise, under Title VII, employees must first exhaust their administrative remedies by filing their complaint with the EEOC and receiving a right to sue letter. Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1003-04 (7th Cir. 2019).
Williams does not actually contend that that she filed an EEOC charge for sex and age discrimination, nor is there anything in the record suggesting that she did. Williams nonetheless argues that, because not all aspects of the Complaint are subject to the administrative-exhaustion requirement, all of Williams' claims should survive a motion to dismiss. Pl.'s Mot. at 2. But Williams does not identify any support- whether statutory, regulatory, or case precedent-for that kind of exception to the exhaustion requirement. Id. Indeed, Rule 12(c) motions are rightfully deployed to assess a plaintiff's claims on a claim-by-claim basis. See BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 325 (7th Cir. 2015) (...
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