Williams v. Illinois

Decision Date18 June 2012
Docket NumberNo. 10–8505.,10–8505.
Citation183 L.Ed.2d 89,567 U.S. 50,132 S.Ct. 2221
Parties Sandy WILLIAMS, Petitioner v. ILLINOIS.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Brian W. Carroll, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner.

Michael R. Dreeben, for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Respondent.

Anita Alvarez, Chicago, IL, for Respondent.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defender, James E. Chadd, Assistant Deputy Defender, Brian W. Carroll, Counsel of Record, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner.

Anita Alvarez, Counsel of Record, State's Attorney, Cook County, Chicago, IL, Alan J. Spellberg, Ashley A. Romito, Michelle Katz, Annette Collins, Amy Watroba Kern, Assistant State's Attorneys, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Chicago, IL, for Respondent.

Justice ALITO announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice KENNEDY, and Justice BREYER join.

In this case, we decide whether Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), precludes an expert witness from testifying in a manner that has long been allowed under the law of evidence. Specifically, does Crawford bar an expert from expressing an opinion based on facts about a case that have been made known to the expert but about which the expert is not competent to testify? We also decide whether Crawford substantially impedes the ability of prosecutors to introduce DNA evidence and thus may effectively relegate the prosecution in some cases to reliance on older, less reliable forms of proof.

In petitioner's bench trial for rape, the prosecution called an expert who testified that a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory, Cellmark, matched a profile produced by the state police lab using a sample of petitioner's blood. On direct examination, the expert testified that Cellmark was an accredited laboratory and that Cellmark provided the police with a DNA profile. The expert also explained the notations on documents admitted as business records, stating that, according to the records, vaginal swabs taken from the victim were sent to and received back from Cellmark. The expert made no other statement that was offered for the purpose of identifying the sample of biological material used in deriving the profile or for the purpose of establishing how Cellmark handled or tested the sample. Nor did the expert vouch for the accuracy of the profile that Cellmark produced. Nevertheless, petitioner contends that the expert's testimony violated the Confrontation Clause as interpreted in Crawford.

Petitioner's main argument is that the expert went astray when she referred to the DNA profile provided by Cellmark as having been produced from semen found on the victim's vaginal swabs. But both the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court found that this statement was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and it is settled that the Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of such statements. See id., at 59–60, n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985) ). For more than 200 years, the law of evidence has permitted the sort of testimony that was given by the expert in this case. Under settled evidence law, an expert may express an opinion that is based on facts that the expert assumes, but does not know, to be true. It is then up to the party who calls the expert to introduce other evidence establishing the facts assumed by the expert. While it was once the practice for an expert who based an opinion on assumed facts to testify in the form of an answer to a hypothetical question, modern practice does not demand this formality and, in appropriate cases, permits an expert to explain the facts on which his or her opinion is based without testifying to the truth of those facts. See Fed. Rule Evid. 703. That is precisely what occurred in this case, and we should not lightly "swee[p] away an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evidence." Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting).

We now conclude that this form of expert testimony does not violate the Confrontation Clause because that provision has no application to out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. When an expert testifies for the prosecution in a criminal case, the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the expert about any statements that are offered for their truth. Out-of-court statements that are related by the expert solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions on which that opinion rests are not offered for their truth and thus fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Applying this rule to the present case, we conclude that the expert's testimony did not violate the Sixth Amendment.

As a second, independent basis for our decision, we also conclude that even if the report produced by Cellmark had been admitted into evidence, there would have been no Confrontation Clause violation. The Cellmark report is very different from the sort of extrajudicial statements, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and confessions, that the Confrontation Clause was originally understood to reach. The report was produced before any suspect was identified. The report was sought not for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against petitioner, who was not even under suspicion at the time, but for the purpose of finding a rapist who was on the loose. And the profile that Cellmark provided was not inherently inculpatory. On the contrary, a DNA profile is evidence that tends to exculpate all but one of the more than 7 billion people in the world today. The use of DNA evidence to exonerate persons who have been wrongfully accused or convicted is well known. If DNA profiles could not be introduced without calling the technicians who participated in the preparation of the profile, economic pressures would encourage prosecutors to forgo DNA testing and rely instead on older forms of evidence, such as eyewitness identification, that are less reliable. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 716, 181 L.Ed.2d 694 (2012). The Confrontation Clause does not mandate such an undesirable development. This conclusion will not prejudice any defendant who really wishes to probe the reliability of the DNA testing done in a particular case because those who participated in the testing may always be subpoenaed by the defense and questioned at trial.

I

A

On February 10, 2000, in Chicago, Illinois, a young woman, L.J., was abducted while she was walking home from work. The perpetrator forced her into his car and raped her, then robbed her of her money and other personal items and pushed her out into the street. L.J. ran home and reported the attack to her mother, who called the police. An ambulance took L.J. to the hospital, where doctors treated her wounds

and took a blood sample and vaginal swabs for a sexual-assault kit. A Chicago Police detective collected the kit, labeled it with an inventory number, and sent it under seal to the Illinois State Police (ISP) lab.

At the ISP lab, a forensic scientist received the sealed kit. He conducted a chemical test that confirmed the presence of semen on the vaginal swabs, and he then resealed the kit and placed it in a secure evidence freezer.

During the period in question, the ISP lab often sent biological samples to Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory in Germantown, Maryland, for DNA testing. There was evidence that the ISP lab sent L.J.'s vaginal swabs to Cellmark for testing and that Cellmark sent back a report containing a male DNA profile produced from semen taken from those swabs. At this time, petitioner was not under suspicion for L.J.'s rape.

Sandra Lambatos, a forensic specialist at the ISP lab, conducted a computer search to see if the Cellmark profile matched any of the entries in the state DNA database. The computer showed a match to a profile produced by the lab from a sample of petitioner's blood that had been taken after he was arrested on unrelated charges on August 3, 2000.

On April 17, 2001, the police conducted a lineup at which L.J. identified petitioner as her assailant. Petitioner was then indicted for aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnaping, and aggravated robbery. In lieu of a jury trial, petitioner chose to be tried before a state judge.

B

Petitioner's bench trial began in April 2006. In open court, L.J. again identified petitioner as her attacker. The State also offered three expert forensic witnesses to link petitioner to the crime through his DNA. First, Brian Hapack, an ISP forensic scientist, testified that he had confirmed the presence of semen on the vaginal swabs taken from L.J. by performing an acid phosphatase test

. After performing this test, he testified, he resealed the evidence and left it in a secure freezer at the ISP lab.

Second, Karen Abbinanti, a state forensic analyst, testified that she had used Polymerase Chain Reaction

(PCR) and Short Tandem Repeat (STR) techniques to develop a DNA profile from a blood sample that had been drawn from petitioner after he was arrested in August 2000. She also stated that she had entered petitioner's DNA profile into the state forensic database.

Third, the State offered Sandra Lambatos as an expert witness in forensic biology and forensic DNA analysis. On direct examination, Lambatos testified about the general process of using the PCR and STR techniques to generate DNA profiles from forensic samples such as blood and semen. She then described how these DNA profiles could be matched to an individual based on the individual's unique genetic code. In making a comparison between two DNA profiles, Lambatos stated, it is a "commonly accepted"...

To continue reading

Request your trial
530 cases
  • People v. Veamatahau
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • February 27, 2020
    ...the so-called expert can be prohibited from testifying altogether. ( § 801, subd. (a) ; accord Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. 50, 80, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 183 L.Ed.2d 89 (plur. opn.) ["trial courts can screen out experts who would act as mere conduits for hearsay by strictly enforcing the ......
  • Gardner v. Holland
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California
    • October 28, 2016
    ...Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices"); Williams v. Illinois , 567 U.S. 50, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2272, 183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (Crawford "made clear that the Confrontation Clause's protections are not coterminous with rule......
  • State v. Sinclair
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • July 9, 2019
    ...into question the continuing vitality of the primary purpose test, at least as articulated in Davis . In Williams v. Illinois , 567 U.S. 50, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 183 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2012), an expert had testified that a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory matched a profile produced by......
  • People v. Schultz
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • November 23, 2020
    ...profile constituted testimonial hearsay admitted in violation of defendant's confrontation clause rights under Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. 50, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 183 L.Ed.2d 89. Defendant further asserts the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Magee's testimony under the bus......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
19 books & journal articles
  • Trial defense of dui in California
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Drunk Driving Law - Volume 1-2 Volume 1
    • March 30, 2022
    ...“also reaches the use of technically informal statements when used to evade the formalized process.” Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. 50, Thomas J. (concurring opinion) at fn. 5, citing Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, Thomas, J., (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in pa......
  • STARE DECISIS AND INTERSYSTEMIC ADJUDICATION.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 97 No. 3, March 2022
    • March 1, 2022
    ...excludes consideration of dissenting opinions and concluding accordingly that the concurrence-dissent alignment of Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012), is not (89) I searched on Westlaw for Michigan state decisions citing Marks v. United States and reviewed the twelve results. The only......
  • Evidence
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Trial Objections
    • May 5, 2022
    ...this statement is offered to show that Ms. Jones could hear the church bell, it is not hearsay. CASES FEDERAL CASES Williams v. Illinois , 567 U.S. 50, 72, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2236, 183 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2012) 5 Justices of the Supreme Court held that an expert’s testimony that an expert’s answer ......
  • Evidence
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Texas Criminal Lawyer's Handbook. Volume 1-2 Volume 2
    • May 5, 2022
    ...not violated because the defendant is able to cross-examine the expert on the basis of his opinion. Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012) ( plurality op .). The admission of a supervising DNA analyst’s opinion regarding a DNA match does not violate the Co......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT