Williams v. Ind. Rail Rd. Co.
Decision Date | 31 March 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 77A04–1311–CC–580.,77A04–1311–CC–580. |
Parties | Berthal O. WILLIAMS and Patricia Williams, Appellants–Plaintiffs, v. The INDIANA RAIL ROAD COMPANY, Appellee–Defendant. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Louis F. Britton, Charles H. Ray, Cox, Zwerner, Gambill, & Sullivan, LLP, Terre Haute, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
John C. Duffey, Heather L. Emenhiser, Stuart & Branigin, LLP, Lafayette, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
PYLE
, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] This appeal involves an “indenture” or agreement—dating back to 1901—between property owners and a railroad company. The indenture gave the railroad company a right to build and maintain a dam and the resulting accumulation of water on the landowners' property at a depth of fourteen to twenty feet so that the railroad could use it for railroad purposes. More than 100 years later, subsequent property owners—Berthal O. Williams (“Berthal”) and Patricia Williams (“Patricia”) (collectively “the Williamses”)—attempted to enforce that indenture with a subsequent railroad—the Indiana Rail Road Company (“IRR”)—and argued that IRR had breached the indenture. IRR moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) the 1901 indenture between the original parties was merely a personal obligation and not a covenant that ran with the land; (2) even if it was, the express terms of the indenture did not impose a duty on it to maintain the pond at a specified depth; and (3) even if the indenture so required maintenance of a specific pond depth, the Williamses could not enforce it against IRR because any alleged breach occurred before the Williamses purchased the property, causing any such covenant to cease running with the land. The trial court summarily granted IRR's summary judgment motion.
[2] The Williamses now appeal that order and argue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to IRR because none of IRR's proposed arguments support that judgment. Because we conclude that the indenture was a covenant running with the land, that the terms set forth in the indenture required IRR to maintain the dam and the water level at a specified depth, and that the indenture contained a covenant, perpetual in nature, that did not cease upon a prior breach, we conclude that the trial court prematurely granted summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
[3] We reverse and remand.
Issue
[4] Whether the trial court erred by granting IRR's motion for summary judgment.
Facts
[5] In 1899, in a handwritten instrument, Lucy and Constantine Stewart (“the Stewarts”) conveyed a “perpetual” right-of-way over their land in Sullivan County to Southern Indiana Railway Company (“Southern”) for “railway purposes.” (App. 38). This right-of-way was granted to Southern and “its successors and assigns[.]” (App. 38). The instrument conveying the right-of-way was recorded that same day.
[6] Two years later, in April 1901, the Stewarts, along with another couple,1 entered into an “Indenture” with Southern.2 The Indenture provided:
[7] In November 2005, the Williamses purchased property east of and adjacent to the railroad's right-of-way from Alice Jane Schollaert via a warranty deed.5 The legal descriptions for the two tracts of land conveyed contained references to the railroad right-of-way as a boundary line for the tracts of land. Additionally, the warranty deed provides that it is “[s]ubject to any and all easements, agreements and restrictions of record.” (App. 86).
[8] In May 2006, IRR acquired the railroad, including the right-of-way, through a quit claim deed and easement agreement with Soo Line Railroad Company d/b/a Canadian Pacific Railway. After IRR acquired the right-of-way, it did not use the pond or any water from the pond.
[9] In August 2008, Berthal sent a letter to IRR to notify it that there was a “large sink hole” near the dam and railroad that, in Berthal's opinion, was “undermining the integrity of [IRR's] dam and the overlying rail tracks.” (App. 65). In the letter, Berthal opined that the “dangerous condition” of the sink hole would “eventually result [in] a significant surface, subsidence, possibly the washout of the dam, and potentially a catastrophic derailment.” (App. 65). Berthal also referenced the Indenture entered into by IRR's and Berthal's “predecessors” as well as the dam and “resulting lake” that were “created under” the 1901 Indenture. Berthal stated that this “agreement provides for certain obligations to maintain the lake” and alleged that these obligations were now IRR's obligations. (App. 65). In his letter, Berthal stated that the overflow water from the dam was “exiting the lake through the sink hole” and that the sink hole had been there since at least 2004. (App. 65).
[10] Approximately two years later, in June 2010, Berthal sent IRR another letter regarding the sink hole and his concerns regarding it. Berthal also stated that “the sink hole is allowing the water level of the lake to fall 1 to 2 feet below an overflow device installed by Canadian Pacific Railway in 2004” and “to a level significantly below the level which the Railroad is required to maintain[.]” (App. 67). Berthal also stated that, pursuant to the Indenture, IRR was required to “maintain an accumulation of water of a depth of not less than 14 nor more than 20 feet at its deepest point in the pool of the lake created by the dam.” (App. 67).
[11] On June 4, 2012, the Williamses filed a complaint against IRR and then filed an amended complaint on November 5, 2012. In their amended complaint, the Williamses—citing to...
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