Williams v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15-20610,15-20610
• Parties: Jimmie Williams, Plaintiff–Appellant v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Incorporated, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

826 F.3d 806

32 A.D. Cases 1531

Jimmie Williams, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.J.B. Hunt Transport, Incorporated, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 15-20610

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED June 20, 2016

Sufi Nasim Ahmad, Attorney, Cline Ahmad, Houston, TX, Plaintiff–Appellant.

James Bradley Spalding, Travis Justin Odom, Attorney, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Houston, TX, Defendant–Appellee.

Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON

, Circuit Judge:

Jimmie Williams appeals the district court's dismissal of his claim that defendant J.B. Hunt Transport, Incorporated fired him from his job as a tractor-trailer driver due to his disability and in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). We affirm.

I.

When J.B. Hunt hired Williams in June 1999, Williams affirmed that he had read and understood J.B. Hunt's company policies, which require that drivers meet “all Federal and State requirements for certification and [commercial driver] licensing ... including a current DOT [Department of Transportation] medical physical.” These policies reflect federal regulations prohibiting any person from “driv[ing] a commercial motor vehicle unless he/she is qualified.”¹ 49 C.F.R. § 391.11

. To be “physically qualified,” a driver must meet certain “physical qualification standards” and also “compl[y] with the medical examination requirements in § 391.43.” See id. § 391.41(a)(3)(i). A person is not physically qualified if, among other things, he has a current clinical diagnosis of any “cardiovascular disease of a variety known to be accompanied by syncope” (fainting), or any “condition which is likely to cause loss of consciousness or any loss of ability to control a commercial motor vehicle.” Id. § 391.41(b)(4), (b)(8). The medical examiner who provides the driver's certification must attest “that the driver does not have any physical, mental, or organic condition that might affect the driver's ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely.” Id. § 391.43. The DOT regulations also outline a process for resolution of conflicting medical evaluations. See id. § 391.47.

On May 19, 2010, Williams fainted at his home and was diagnosed with syncope. Williams went on medical leave the next day. The physician who made this diagnosis, Dr. Chuong Nguyen, recommended a diagnostic workup and advised that Williams could return to work on June 1, 2010. Dr. Nguyen later extended Williams's return-to-work date to July 15. He also diagnosed Williams with ventricular tachycardia

(a rapid and irregular heartbeat). On July 15, 2010, Williams saw a different physician, Dr. C.H. Howard with Concentra Medical Centers in Houston, who certified Williams as meeting the DOT standards outlined in 49 C.F.R. § 391.41. The notes from that examination reflect that Williams told the doctor that he passed out “due to a cough,” and do not mention Williams's prior diagnoses of syncope and ventricular tachycardia.

On July 16, 2010, J.B. Hunt received a report from Dr. Nguyen noting the syncope and ventricular tachycardia

diagnoses. J.B. Hunt forwarded that report to Concentra—believing that information therein differed from the medical history reflected in Dr. Howard's certification—and because Dr. Howard was not available, a third physician, Dr. Ellison Wittels, reviewed the report. Dr. Wittels then wrote a letter to J.B. Hunt stating: “I have reviewed the Medical Condition Report you faxed to me.... At this time [Williams's] DOT Certification is rescinded until further clarification is received in regard to his medical problem.” Less than a week later, Dr. Nguyen sent to J.B. Hunt notes and test results from the diagnostic workup, along with a letter opining that Williams could return to work immediately. J.B. Hunt forwarded these documents to Dr. Wittels. On July 29, 2010, Dr. Wittels saw Williams in his office and told him that his DOT certification was being rescinded.

Before Williams learned about the rescission of his certification, J.B. Hunt had informed him that it needed additional medical information in order for Williams to continue on approved leave. After the meeting between Williams and Dr. Wittels, J.B. Hunt sent Williams letters requesting more information and warning that his failure to provide it, or his inability to return to work by certain dates, could lead to his termination. Williams points to no evidence that he ever submitted additional medical documentation to J.B. Hunt or Concentra.² Nor did he ever file an application for the DOT to resolve any conflict between medical evaluations pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 391.47

. At some point after his medical leave expired and no earlier than September 8, 2010, J.B. Hunt administratively terminated Williams. J.B. Hunt maintains that it did so because Williams had not been medically certified to return to work.

After filing a disability discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and receiving a right-to-sue letter, Williams filed this lawsuit, alleging that he was terminated in violation of the ADA.³ J.B. Hunt filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion on subject-matter jurisdiction grounds. See generally Williams v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. , 132 F.Supp.3d 858 (S.D. Tex. 2015)

. Williams appealed.

II.

The district court dismissed Williams's ADA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

, reasoning that a plaintiff in Williams's situation must, before filing suit, exhaust his administrative remedies by initiating 49 C.F.R. § 391.47's process for resolution of conflicting medical evaluations. Williams , 132 F.Supp.3d at 874. Although no statute requires such exhaustion and § 391.47 does not itself refer to the ADA or discrimination claims, courts have found it prudent to impose an exhaustion requirement because of the DOT's greater competence in determining when its safety regulations are met. See, e.g. , Harris v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc. , 339 F.3d 635, 637–39 (8th Cir. 2003) ; Campbell v. Fed. Express Corp. , 918 F.Supp. 912, 916–21 (D. Md. 1996).

This court has not yet had occasion to determine whether to impose this exhaustion requirement. But any such requirement would not be jurisdictional. The Supreme Court recently emphasized “that a rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a court's adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki , 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011)

. And not all administrative exhaustion requirements are jurisdictional. Indeed, “in the absence of a statutory requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the jurisprudential doctrine of exhaustion controls.” Taylor v. U.S. Treasury Dep't , 127 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 1997). That doctrine “is not jurisdictional in nature.” Id. Accordingly, we have corrected district courts that have treated as jurisdictional administrative exhaustion requirements not mandated by any statute's text. See

Caldera v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa. , 716 F.3d 861, 867 n.11 (5th Cir. 2013) ; Premiere Network Servs., Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc. , 440 F.3d 683, 686 n.5 (5th Cir. 2006). No statute requires that an ADA plaintiff exhaust the § 391.47 process before filing a lawsuit, Campbell , 918 F.Supp. at 918, let alone does so in jurisdictional terms, see

Henderson , 562 U.S. at 438, 131 S.Ct. 1197. Thus, the district court should not have dismissed this ADA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

III.

J.B. Hunt moved in the alternative for summary judgment, arguing that Williams could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of disability. We may affirm on any ground raised below and supported by the record, even if the district court did not reach it. Gilbert v. Donahoe , 751 F.3d 303, 311 (5th Cir. 2014)

; see

Premiere , 440 F.3d at 692, 686 n.5 (affirming dismissal, but noting that Rule 12(b)(1) was the wrong vehicle for dismissing the action). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ ” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). But if a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” a court should enter summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination “on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)

. Where— as here—the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an ADA violation, we apply the McDonnell–Douglas burden-shifting framework. Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs. N.A., Inc. , 813 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016)

. Under this framework, the plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: “(1) the plaintiff has a disability, or was regarded as disabled; (2) he was qualified for the job; and (3) he was subject to an adverse employment decision on account of his disability.” Id. If he does so, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. Then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff “to produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that the employer's articulated reason is pretextual.” Id.

Of course, Congress did not intend the ADA to do away with federal safety regulations. As the Supreme Court has explained:

When Congress enacted the ADA, it recognized that federal safety rules would limit

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