Williams v. Kenton Cnty., Ky.
| Decision Date | 16 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:21-CV-080 (WOB-CJS) |
| Parties | CARY WILLIAMS, PLAINTIFF, v. KENTON COUNTY, KY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
This is a lawsuit brought by Cary Williams against Kenton County and four deputies at the Kenton County Detention Center stemming from an incident that occurred there in August 2020. Currently before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 74), Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude or Limit the Testimony of Defendants' Expert (Doc. 79), and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the New Arguments in Defendants' Reply or, in the alternative for Leave to File a Sur-Reply Instanter, (Doc. 92).
The Court has carefully reviewed this matter and, being advised now issues the following Memorandum Opinion and Order.[1]
On August 16, 2020, Plaintiff Cary Williams (“Williams”) attended a friend's birthday party in Covington, Kentucky and also visited a nearby bar. (Doc. 74 at 2; Doc. 88 at 8). After a bartender called 911 regarding an alleged altercation between Williams and another patron, Covington Police officers responded to the scene at 10:05 p.m.[2] (Doc. 74 at 2; Doc. 74-3 at 3-4). At 10:10 p.m., the officers arrested Williams for public intoxication and the arrest was captured by their body-worn cameras.[3] . At 10:10:50 p.m., Williams fell onto the sidewalk while handcuffed. .
Williams was transported to the Kenton County Detention Center (“KCDC”) and arrived there around 10:40 p.m. (Doc. 74-10 at 1; Doc. 88 at 8). He was assessed at intake and thereafter assigned to an isolation cell under existing COVID-19 protocols because he is immunocompromised and because he was placed on suicide watch based on his answers to the relevant questions during the booking process.[4] (Doc. 74 at 3; Doc. 88 at 8). Deputy Noah Schoultheis (“Deputy Schoultheis”) and Deputy Leonard Slaughter (“Deputy Slaughter”) escorted Williams from booking to the medical isolation unit where Deputy Cory Fleckinger (“Deputy Fleckinger”) and Deputy Nick Taylor (“Deputy Taylor”) were on post. (Doc. 74 at 3; Doc. 88 at 9). Defendants agree that Williams did not display any physical aggression toward any deputy or clerk during the booking process or while being escorted to the isolation unit. (Doc. 74 at 3).
Once Williams was inside his cell, Deputy Slaughter held open a property bag and instructed Williams to remove his street clothes and change into a suicide smock due to his “high watch” status. (Id.; Doc. 88 at 9). Deputy Slaughter's body-worn camera and KCDC's surveillance cameras captured the incident that followed. (Doc. 74 at 4; Doc. 76, Williams C 16T1, Williams,Carydisruptive (Slaughter)). As Williams began undressing, Deputy Schoultheis approached the door and stood to Deputy Slaughter's left in the open doorway. (Doc. 76, Williams C 16T1; Doc. 74 at 3; Doc. 88 at 9). Deputy Fleckinger stood behind Deputies Schoultheis and Slaughter. (Doc. 76, Williams C 16T1; Doc. 74 at 3-4; Doc. 88 at 9). At 11:43:01 p.m., as Williams was removing his shorts, Deputy Slaughter told him, “You're not going to throw these at me when you take them off.” (Doc. 76, Williams,Carydisruptive (Slaughter); Doc. 88 at 9). Williams handed over his shirt and shorts without incident. (Doc. 76, Williams,Carydisruptive (Slaughter); Doc. 88 at 9).
At 11:43:27 p.m., the deputies instructed Williams to take his underwear off. (Doc. 76, Williams,Carydisruptive (Slaughter); Doc. 88 at 9). Williams responded, (Doc. 76, Williams,Carydisruptive (Slaughter); Doc. 88 at 9). He then called the deputies “fascists” and “Nazis” while removing his underwear. (Doc. 76, Williams,Carydisruptive (Slaughter)).
At 11:43:42 p.m., Williams tossed his underwear toward Deputy Schoultheis. (Id.). Deputy Schoultheis used his right hand to deflect the underwear and they landed on his right shoulder. (Id.). One second later, Deputy Slaughter reached forward and removed the underwear from Deputy Schoultheis's shoulder. (Id.). At 11:43:44 p.m., Deputy Schoultheis moved forward, making contact with Williams's neck using a straight arm and an open hand, and began pushing him under the chin toward the rear of the cell. (Id.) Deputy Slaughter entered the cell behind Deputy Schoultheis while Deputy Fleckinger remained in the cell doorway. (Doc. 76, Williams C 16T1). At 11:43:45 p.m., Williams fell backward onto the floor of the cell. (Doc. 76, Williams,Carydisruptive (Slaughter)). His right arm was blocked from the camera by Deputy Schoultheis's body, but his left arm was above him, reaching toward the wall. (Id.).
At the same moment, Deputy Slaughter said “Alright.” (Id.; Doc. 88 at 11).
While Williams remained on the floor of the cell, Deputy Schoultheis yelled, “Do it again,” to which Williams replied, “Do what?” and (Doc. 76, Williams,Carydisruptive (Slaughter); Doc. 88 at 11). Thereafter Deputy Schoultheis left the cell and Deputy Slaughter tossed in the suicide smock. (Doc. 76, Williams,Carydisruptive (Slaughter)). At 11:44:08 p.m., Deputy Slaughter closed the cell door. (Id.).
At around 3:40 a.m., Licensed Practical Nurse Angela Miller (“Nurse Miller”) arrived at Williams's cell, accompanied by Deputy Taylor, to do a “diabetic check.” (Doc. 74 at 5; Doc. 88 at 12).
Though this visit was captured on surveillance video, there is no audio recording of the encounter. (See Doc. 76, Williams C 19T1). At 3:42:18, a.m., Williams can be seen gesturing to his right arm. (Id.). However, he thereafter uses his right arm to sign a document. (Id.).
The parties agree that, at some point during Nurse Miller's visit, Williams complained of arm pain. (Doc. 74 at 5; Doc. 88 at 12-13). However, Nurse Miller documented that she did not observe visible signs of injury or pain, symptoms suggesting the need for immediate emergency medical referral, or restricted mobility due to deformity or injury. (Doc. 74-8 at 1).
Williams was released from KCDC later that morning at 7:19 a.m. (Doc. 74 at 5; Doc. 74-10 at 1; Doc. 88 at 13). He retrieved his car and then went to the Emergency Department at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with a fractured right ulna. (Doc. 74 at 5; Doc. 87-1 at 1, 3; Doc. 88 at 13). Williams's injury was treated by orthopedic specialists for three months and required multiple braces. (Doc. 74-1, Williams Dep. at 42:4-24, 45:4-10, 45:22-46:5, 46:21-47:8, Doc. 88 at 13).
On June 24, 2021, Williams filed this action. (Doc. 1). In the operative pleading, the Second Amended Complaint, he alleges claims for: (1) violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Kenton County and Deputies Schoultheis, Slaughter, Fleckinger, and Taylor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) assault and battery against Deputy Schoultheis; and (3) negligence against Deputies Schoultheis, Slaughter, Fleckinger, and Taylor. (Doc. 36).
Defendants filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired on Williams's state law claims. (Doc. 38). The Court denied that motion without prejudice because the issues it raised were beyond the scope of the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and specifically noted that Defendants may “raise the issue again at a later date.” (Doc. 56 at 3-4). After discovery, Defendants moved for sanctions based on an allegedly late expert disclosure, or alternatively, moved to limit the use of Williams's expert's opinions to rebuttal of the expert opinions offered by Defendants. (Doc. 68 at 1-2). The Court denied Defendants' motion without prejudice, but specifically noted that Williams was only permitted to use his expert's opinions to rebut expert opinions offered by Defendants. (Doc. 73 at 1-2).
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “In determining whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” See Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id.
Williams's § 1983 claim against Deputy Schoultheis for use of excessive force must be analyzed under the framework of the qualified immunity doctrine. The qualified immunity analysis has “two steps that can be undertaken in any order: (1) whether the public official's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the events.” Stewart v. City of Euclid, Ohio, 970 F.3d 667, 672 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Godawa v. Byrd, 798 F.3d 457, 462-63 (6th Cir. 2015)).
Under the first prong of qualified immunity analysis, the Court must identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). “[A] pretrial detainee's excessive force claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is subject to the same objective standard as an excessive force claim brought under the Fourth Amendment.” Clay v. Emmi, 797...
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