Williams v. Lambert

• Citation: 46 F.3d 1275
• Decision Date: 01 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 327,D,327
• Parties: Elizabeth W. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Benjamin V. LAMBERT, Defendant-Appellee. ocket 94-7290.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Page 1275

46 F.3d 1275

Elizabeth W. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Benjamin V. LAMBERT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 327, Docket 94-7290.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued Sept. 12, 1994.

Decided Feb. 1, 1995.

Allan E. Mayefsky, New York City (Norman M. Sheresky, Baer Marks & Upham, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Victoria Lea Smith, New York City, for defendant-appellee.

Before: OAKES, ALTIMARI and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

OAKES, Senior Circuit Judge:

Elizabeth Williams ("Williams") appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, John E. Sprizzo, Judge, staying her case pending the resolution of a concurrent state court proceeding. Williams filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, N.Y.Fam.Ct.Act Sec. 516 (McKinney 1983) ("Section 516") violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution because it treats illegitimate children differently from those born in wedlock. The district court held that it was appropriate to abstain from deciding the case under the Pullman abstention doctrine, Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), and stayed the case pending the resolution of the related state case. We vacate the stay and remand the case for further proceedings in the district court.

I. Background

Appellant Williams and Appellee Lambert had a brief sexual relationship in 1987. Nine months or so later, Williams gave birth to a son, Henry. Williams and Lambert were never married. In 1990, Williams sought child support from Lambert. Lambert consented to a DNA test which showed that there was a high probability that Lambert was Henry's father. Lambert and Williams entered into a support agreement pursuant to Section 516. Lambert paid Williams a one-time lump sum of $250,000 for Henry's support. At the same time, he explicitly denied paternity in the agreement. As required by Section 516, a social worker submitted an assessment of the agreement to a judge, and the judge approved the agreement.

Williams now alleges that at the time of the agreement Lambert misrepresented his financial condition and that he induced her to sign the agreement by resuming a sexual relationship with her during the negotiations and by promising to participate in Henry's upbringing. She also alleges that her support agreement is inadequate because the parties, their attorneys and the court failed to apply the standards for child support under the New York Child Support Standards Act, Section 413 of the New York Family Court Act, N.Y.Fam.Ct.Act Sec. 413 (McKinney 1983), and Section 240 of the New York Domestic Relations Law, N.Y.Dom.Rel.Law Sec. 240 (McKinney 1988). These provisions establish the standards used to evaluate the support agreements between parents of legitimate children, including the "best interests of the child" test. N.Y.Dom.Rel.Law Sec. 240.

Under Section 516, however, Williams is prohibited from petitioning the New York state courts for a modification of the support agreement. Section 516 provides that once a support agreement for an illegitimate child is approved by a judge and is fully performed, it may not be reexamined even if grounds for re-examination would exist for an agreement entered into between the parents of legitimate children. ¹ A support agreement between the parents of a legitimate child, on the other hand, is subject to future scrutiny by a court in light of its adequacy in meeting the best interests of the child, whether it was the product of fraud or overreaching, and whether changed circumstances justify a modification of the agreement. Brescia v. Fitts, 56 N.Y.2d 132, 436 N.E.2d 518, 451 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1982). Williams filed this case seeking a declaratory judgment that this statutory scheme violates the equal protection rights of illegitimate children and their parents.

In 1992, before filing this action, Williams showed Lambert a draft of the complaint, purportedly to facilitate settlement discussions. Lambert, in response, commenced a preemptive action in New York State Supreme Court, New York County, on November 5, 1992, alleging breach of the support agreement and intentional infliction of emotional distress and seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 516 complies with the New York and United States constitutions. On November 10, 1992, Williams filed her complaint in this case in the Southern District of New York. Williams also removed the state court action to federal court, and it was consolidated with the federal action.

On February 22, 1993, Lambert moved to stay or dismiss the federal action and to remand the state action to state court. Williams cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the state causes of action and gave Lambert leave to renew the state claims in state court without also pleading the federal constitutional claim, which the judge suggested was merely an anticipation of Williams's defense. On June 15, 1993, Lambert filed a new complaint in New York Supreme Court that pled only the state law causes of action and therefore could not be removed to federal court.

The motions for stay or dismissal and for summary judgment were then renewed. The district court granted Lambert's motion to stay the federal case pending resolution of the state action on the basis of Pullman abstention. It held that issues of state law needed to be resolved before the court could decide whether the statute was unconstitutional. 844 F.Supp. 963. Williams appealed.

II. Discussion

A. Standing

Although the district court opinion does not address the issue of standing, Lambert raised the issue in the district court and raises it again on appeal. Standing doctrine, an essential part of the Article III requirement of a case or controversy, requires that a party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court demonstrate an "injury in fact." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

At oral argument, Lambert argued that Williams was not injured because she could petition the New York courts for modification of the support agreement pursuant to Section 165(a) of the New York Family Court Act (McKinney 1983) ("Section 165(a)") and N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R. Sec. 5015 (McKinney 1992) ("CPLR Sec. 5015"). Section 165(a) provides that ... [W]here the method of procedure in any proceeding in which the family court has jurisdiction is not prescribed, the provisions of the civil practice law and rules shall apply to the extent that they are appropriate to the proceedings involved.

New York courts have construed this provision to allow parties in family court proceedings to move for relief pursuant to CPLR Sec. 5015, which provides for relief from a court order "upon such terms as may be just," upon a showing of fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct by an adverse party. ² See, e.g., Pezner v. Schumeyer, 133 Misc.2d 1018, 509 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Fam.Ct.1986).

Williams alleges in her complaint that at the time of the settlement negotiations, and at the time the state court approved her support agreement, she did not receive full financial disclosure from Lambert and that he fraudulently induced her to enter into the agreement by resuming a sexual relationship with her and by making false promises regarding his future role in raising their child. On the basis of these allegations, Williams can seek a modification of the agreement by making a motion pursuant to CPLR Sec. 5015 for relief from the state court's order approving the support agreement.

Lambert also contends that Williams has not shown an "injury in fact" because she has not alleged a financial need for modification of the agreement and she has not shown that the agreement would be eligible for modification under the standards applied to support agreements for legitimate children.

Whether Williams has standing turns on how her injury is defined. If, as Lambert argues, Williams's injury consists of a loss of child support money, then she does not have standing because success in this case would not guarantee a remedy to her injury. She would still have to petition the state court for modification, and she might not be successful there.

Determining "injury in fact" is not always easy. We are guided in this inquiry by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated General Contractors v. Jacksonville, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). That case, like the one before us, involved an equal protection claim. The plaintiff was a trade association challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance which required that ten percent of the money spent on city contracts be set aside for minority- or female-owned businesses. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2299. The association, whose membership consisted largely of businesses that were not minority- or female-owned, alleged that many of its members would have bid on certain set-aside contracts if it were not for the restrictions imposed by the ordinance. Id. The court of appeals held that the association lacked standing because it had presented no evidence that any members would have actually obtained a contract if they had been allowed to compete. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2300. The Supreme Court reversed. Relying in part on Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978), the Court held that the association's "injury in fact" was the contractors' "inability to compete on an equal footing in the bidding process, not the loss of a contract." Id. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2303.

The Court explained, "When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not...