Williams v. Life Sav. and Loan
Decision Date | 23 June 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 85-1664,85-1664 |
Citation | 802 F.2d 1200 |
Parties | 42 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 767 Pamela WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LIFE SAVINGS AND LOAN, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Pamela Williams, pro se.
Robert R. Tepper of Rosenthal and Schanfield, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.
Before BARRETT, McKAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.
In accordance with 10th Cir.R. 9(e) and Fed.R.App.P. 34(a), this appeal came on for consideration on the briefs and record on appeal.
This is an appeal from an Order of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissing sua sponte for lack of personal jurisdiction plaintiff's Title VII action against defendant, a Rockford, Illinois bank where she was previously employed. Plaintiff's complaint was filed on April 26, 1985. (R., Vol. I, p. 4.) On April 29, 1985, prior to the expiration of the time period within which defendant was required to appear or to file a responsive pleading, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a), the district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Order of Dismissal stated that (R., Vol. I, p. 8.) We consider whether the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint on its own motion for lack of personal jurisdiction.
A court has an obligation to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, it may never dismiss a case on its own motion for improper venue. We hold that a district court may not inquire into its personal jurisdiction and dismiss a case sua sponte except when entering a default judgment.
It is well settled that a federal court must dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, even should the parties fail to raise the issue. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Railway v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884); Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 78-79 (9th Cir.1983). See also, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) ( ). A court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties, nor can it be conferred upon the district court by agreement of the parties. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 243, 55 S.Ct. 162, 164-65, 79 L.Ed. 338 (1934).
A defect in the district court's jurisdiction over a party, however, is a personal defense which may be asserted or waived by a party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1) ( ). A personal defense may not be raised by another on behalf of a party. Once waived, lack of personal jurisdiction may not be raised by the court. Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 58 (3rd Cir.1969) ( ). In addition, jurisdiction over a party may be conferred upon a court by contractual agreement of the parties, National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964), or by voluntary appearance of a party, Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto 714, 725, 95 U.S. 714, 725, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1878).
Defects in venue are also waived if they are untimely asserted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1). In addition, if a party is in default by failing to appear or to file a responsive pleading, defects in venue are waived, a default judgment may be validly entered and the judgment cannot be attacked collaterally for improper venue. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343, 80 S.Ct. 1084, 1089, 4 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1960). Defects in personal jurisdiction, however, are not waived by default when a party fails to appear or to respond. V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 225 (10th Cir.1979). This distinction between defects in venue and personal jurisdiction is due to their respective effect on the court's power: A judgment is void when a court enters it lacking subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the parties. Id. at 224. Defects in venue do not affect the court's power and a valid default judgment may be entered by a court notwithstanding the defect. Commercial Insurance Co. v. Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177, 180, 49 S.Ct. 98, 99, 73 L.Ed. 252 (1928).
Relief from a void judgment is mandatory. V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., supra at 224. Thus, when entry of a default judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, the district court has...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Authority
...712 (9th Cir.1999); Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 772 (10th Cir.1997); Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir.1986); Koshel v. Koshel, No. CIV.A.3:01-CV-2006-M, 2002 WL 1544681, at *4 (N.D.Tex. July 11, 2002)(holding that jurisdi......
-
Estates of Ungar & Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, C.A. No. 00-105L.
...has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction both over the subject matter and the parties.'")(quoting Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir.1986))(first alteration in original); Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 154 (2nd Cir.1999)(va......
-
Weininger v. Castro
...the court exercises its responsibility to determine that it has the power to enter the default judgment." Williams v. Life Say. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir.1986); see also System Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2001) (because a judgment ......
-
Estates of Ungar v. The Palestinian Authority, No. C.A.No. 00-105L (D. R.I. 1/27/2004), C.A.No. 00-105L.
...Cir. 1999); Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 772 (10th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir. 1986); Koshel v. Koshel, No. CIV.A.3:01-CV-2006-M, 2002 WL 1544681, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2002)(holding that jurisdiction......