Williams v. Lumpkin
| Decision Date | 21 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:20-CV-3030-N,3:20-CV-3030-N |
| Citation | 541 F.Supp.3d 735 |
| Parties | Eric Lyle WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. Bobby LUMPKIN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Bruce Anton, Udashen | Anton, Dallas, TX, Amy Pickering Knight, Pro Hac Vice, Knight Law Firm LLC, Tucson, AZ, Benjamin B. Wolff, Michelle Elizabeth Ward, Office of Capital and Forensic Writs, Austin, TX, Danalynn Recer, Pro Hac Vice, Gulf Region Advocacy Center, Houston, TX, Mary Margaret Penrose, Texas A&M School of Law, Fort Worth, TX, for Petitioner.
Matthew Dennis Ottoway, Office of the Texas Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Austin, TX, for Respondent.
The matters before the Court are (1) Williams’ motion for travel authorization to allow his Arizona co-counsel to travel to Texas to meet face to face with Williams and various others, filed May 6, 2021 (ECF no. 41), and (2) Williams’ motion filed May 6, 2021 (ECF no. 28) requesting $25,000 in investigative funding plus an additional $2,500 in travel expenses for two investigators (mitigation specialists) to conduct an investigation of two hundred hours duration into the existence of new or additional potentially mitigating evidence. For the reasons discussed below, Williams’ motion for investigative funding again will be denied without prejudice. His request for travel authorization for his Arizona co-counsel will also be denied without prejudice.
In December 2014, a Kaufman County jury convicted Williams of capital murder in connection with the fatal shootings of the Kaufman County District Attorney and his wife. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion affirming Williams’ conviction recites that he began working as part of the legal community in Kaufman County, Texas in the early 1990's when he was hired as a trial court coordinator. Williams also worked and volunteered in law enforcement and served in the Texas State Guard. He obtained a law degree and began practicing law in Kaufman County. He was elected to the position of Justice of the Peace and took office in January 2011. In June 2011 Williams was charged with a felony offense. Kaufman County District Attorney Michael McLelland and Assistant District Attorney Mark Hasse represented the State in Williams’ prosecution. A jury convicted Williams of the offenses of burglary and theft. He subsequently lost his law practice, his elected office, and his Texas State Guard post. On a morning in January 2013, Assistant District Attorney Hasse was fatally shot while walking on a public sidewalk to his office. On March 30, 2013, District Attorney McLelland and his wife were both fatally shot multiple times inside their residence.
At the punishment phase of Williams’ trial, the jury heard evidence establishing that, in addition to the murders of the McLellands, Williams fatally shot Assistant District Attorney Hasse after researching Hasse online and purchasing a vehicle Williams used to drive to and from the crime scene, the same modus operandi Williams later employed in the McLelland murders. In addition, Williams’ wife Kim testified that after his burglary and theft convictions, Williams grew angrier and angrier and made detailed plans to murder both of the prosecutors who had handled his felony prosecution. Williams also told Kim that he planned to murder McLelland's wife because she would be a witness. After killing Hasse, Williams was described as "happy" and "joyous" and ready to kill his remaining victims. Following the murders. Williams enjoyed media attention, mocked the murder investigations, talked about killing the investigators, and submitted false Crime Stoppers tips. The jury also heard testimony that Williams displayed no remorse for his crimes and planned to kill two state judicial officers. After the jury answered the Texas capital sentencing special issues in a manner favorable to the prosecution, the trial court imposed a sentence of death.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Williams’ conviction and sentence, expressly finding the largely circumstantial evidence of Williams’ guilt introduced at the guilt-innocence phase of trial legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict and that the evidence fully supported the jury's affirmative answer to the Texas capital sentencing scheme's future dangerousness special issue. Williams v. State , AP-77,053, 2017 WL 4946865, *1-*7 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2017), cert. denied , 138 S. Ct. 1989, 201 L.Ed.2d 254 (2018).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently denied Williams’ application for state habeas corpus relief, which included a claim that Williams’ trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in connection with the punishment phase of trial by failing to adequately investigate Williams’ background and present available mitigating evidence. Ex parte Eric Lyle Williams , WR-85,942-01, 2020 WL 5540714, *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2020).
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f), in conjunction with § 3599(g)(2), authorizes this Court, with very specified statutory limitations, to authorize counsel appointed in a capital habeas corpus proceeding to retain the services of investigators if such services are "reasonably necessary." The determination of what is reasonably necessary requires a court to consider (1) the potential merit of the claims to be investigated; (2) the likelihood that the services sought will generate useful and admissible evidence; and (3) the prospect the petitioner will be able to overcome any procedural hurdles standing in the way of a merits determination. Ayestas v. Davis , 933 F.3d 384, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2019). Requests for funding must relate to a potentially viable federal habeas claim. Nelson v. Davis , 952 F.3d 651, 666-76 (4th Cir. 2020).
As explained previously, a federal habeas corpus proceeding is not a forum for retrying every aspect of a state criminal proceeding. The criminal trial is the main event where a defendant's rights are to be determined and not simply a tryout on the road to appellate (or habeas) review. Davila v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2066, 198 L.Ed.2d 603 (2017). A federal habeas corpus proceeding is likewise not a "do over" (using new evidence and new counsel) for claims fully litigated in the state courts, particularly for claims resolved on the merits after full evidentiary development in the petitioner's prior state habeas corpus proceeding.
Under AEDPA, the proper place for development of the facts supporting a federal habeas claim is the state court. See Harrington v. Richter , 562 U. S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (); see also Hernandez v. Johnson , 108 F.3d 554, 558 n.4 (5th Cir. 1997) (). Furthermore, where a petitioner's claims have been rejected on the merits in state court, further factual development in federal court is effectively precluded by virtue of the Supreme Court's holding in Cullen v. Pinholster , 563 U. S. 170, 181-82, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) :
We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that "resulted in" a decision that was contrary to, or "involved" an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time i.e., the record before the state court.
Thus, a petitioner is not entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing on any of his claims which were rejected on the merits by the state courts, either on direct appeal or during his state habeas corpus proceeding. See Halprin v. Davis , 911 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 2018) , cert. denied , 140 S. Ct. 167, 205 L.Ed.2d 104 (2019).
This court has previously denied one prior motion for investigative funding and twice denied Williams’ leave to proceed ex parte with sealed motions for investigative funding. The denial of Williams’ initial investigative funding motion was based upon his failures to specify the amount of funding he was requesting and to identify with any reasonable degree of specificity the new or additional mitigating evidence he wished to seek. See ECF no. 26. This court's denials of Williams’ requests for leave to proceed ex parte on two of his sealed motions seeking investigative funding were based on the failure of Williams to include any information in either of those two proposed motions that was protected by the attorney client privilege, the work product doctrine, or any other source of confidentiality recognized by state or federal law. See ECF nos. 30 & 37. This court did, however, grant Williams substantial funding (well in excess of the statutory cap contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3599(g)(2) ) to obtain expert assistance to examine voluminous electronically stored data furnished to his trial counsel, a matter that was the subject of extensive telephonic negotiations and consultations with all partie...
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