Williams v. Lynch (In re Coordinator)

• Decision Date: 23 July 2018
• Docket Number: C/A No.: 1:16-3043-DCC-SVH
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Anthony D. Williams, #14113-112, Plaintiff, v. Ms. Loretta Lynch, Attorney General; Mr. Travis Bragg, C.E.O. Warden; Ian Connor, National Inmate Appeal Coordinator; M. Holliday, Chief Dietitian; M. Furman, Associate Warden; P. Kelly, Associate Warden; Mr. Hicks, Institutional Captain; S.K. Brosier, Admin Remedy Coordinator; Mr. Rich, CMC Coordinator; T. Whitehead, Unit Manager; J. Ackerman, Case Manager; Mrs. Roberts, Case Manager; Mrs. Bennett, Secretary; Ms. Prince, Correctional Officer; J. Onuoha; Mr. Padilla, Food Service Administrator; John/Jane Doe, Designation and Sentence Computation Unit Team; Ms. Murberry; United States of America; Mr. Cox; Mr. Parra; Mr. Davis, Unit Manager; and Mr. Rodriguez, Defendants.

Anthony D. Williams, #14113-112, Plaintiff, v. Ms. Loretta Lynch, Attorney General; Mr. Travis Bragg,

C.E.O. Warden; Ian Connor, National Inmate Appeal Coordinator;

M. Holliday, Chief Dietitian; M. Furman, Associate Warden;

P. Kelly, Associate Warden; Mr. Hicks, Institutional Captain;

S.K. Brosier, Admin Remedy Coordinator; Mr. Rich, CMC Coordinator;

T. Whitehead, Unit Manager; J. Ackerman, Case Manager;

Mrs. Roberts, Case Manager; Mrs. Bennett, Secretary;

Ms. Prince, Correctional Officer; J. Onuoha;

Mr. Padilla, Food Service Administrator; John/Jane Doe,

Designation and Sentence Computation Unit Team;

Ms. Murberry; United States of America; Mr. Cox; Mr. Parra;

Mr. Davis, Unit Manager; and Mr. Rodriguez, Defendants.

C/A No.: 1:16-3043-DCC-SVH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

July 23, 2018

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Anthony D. Williams ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action alleging a violation of his constitutional rights against the above-named defendants ("Defendants") while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution located in Bennettsville, South Carolina ("FCI-Bennetsville"), a facility of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). Plaintiff's constitutional claims are construed as brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). Plaintiff also brings claims pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1346(b) ("FTCA"). Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center in Devens, Massachusetts.

This matter comes before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 113].¹ Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the summary judgment procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendants' motion. [ECF No. 114]. The motion having been fully briefed [ECF No. 162, 164-168],² it is ripe for disposition.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been assigned to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In the 217 pages comprising Plaintiff's second amended complaint, he alleges 29 separate counts, many of which are redundant and contain only general allegations. Plaintiff's general allegations can be summarized as follows: (1) his transfer to FCI-Bennettsville was retaliatory; (2) he suffers retaliation when he exercises his constitutional rights; (3) he was not receiving his special medical diet; (4) Defendants failed to protect him from the retaliation of others, including other Defendants; and (5) his conditions of confinement have been unconstitutional. [ECF No. 67]. For ease of reference, the undersigned categorizes Plaintiff's claims as follows:

• "Group I Claims": Claims brought under the First, Fifth, and Eight Amendments, which include allegations of retaliation, denial of access to the courts, and unconstitutional conditions of confinement. (Counts 2-13, 15-16, 18-20, 26-29).

• "Medical Indifference Claim": This claim asserts a claim of medical indifference based on Bivens. (Count 14)

• "Group II Claims": Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. (Counts 17, 23, and 24)

• "FTCA Negligence Claim": (Count 21)

• "FTCA Medical Claim": (Count 22)

The undersigned notes that Count 1 is not a legally-distinct claim, but instead alleges that the continuing violation doctrine applies to all of Plaintiff's claims. Similarly, Count 25 only argues that the South Carolina long-arm statute applies to convey personal jurisdiction over all defendants.

II. Discussion

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendants contend that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against Defendants in their official capacities, they are indeed protected by sovereign immunity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (holding that an official capacity suit "generally present[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent" and "is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity") (internal quotations omitted); Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2002) (observing that "a Bivens action does not lieagainst either agencies or officials in their official capacity"). However, it appears that Plaintiff intended to sue Defendants in their official and individual capacities.

B. Personal Jurisdiction

Defendants argue that this court does not have personal jurisdiction over Connors, Holliday, and Marberry because they do not have sufficient contacts with South Carolina. Connors is the National Inmate Appeals Administrator, and his office is located in Washington, D.C. [ECF No. 113-2]. Plaintiff alleges Connors failed to investigate his claims of retaliation. Holliday is the Chief Dietician for the BOP, and his office is located in Rochester, Minnesota. [ECF No. 113-3]. Plaintiff's claims against Holliday stem from his review of meal plans served to inmates around the country. Marberry is the Regional Director for the Southeast Region of the BOP, and her office is located in Atlanta, Georgia. [ECF No. 113-4]. Marberry's only contact with South Carolina is through her regional supervisory responsibilities.

Courts have held that mere allegations relating to a federal official's decisions outside the forum state and other supervisory activities over a facility inside the forum state are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jones v. Hawk-Sawyer, 2000 WL 34203850, at * 2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2000); see also Hill v. Pugh, 75 Fed. Appx. 715, 719 (10thCir. 2003) (dismissing claims against BOP Regional Director, located in Kansas, and BOP Director, located in Washington, D.C., for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that it was "not reasonable to suggest that federal prison officials may be hauled into court simply because they have regional and national supervisory responsibilities over facilities within a forum state [Colorado]."); Johnson v. Rardin, 1992 WL 9019, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 17, 1992) (dismissing Regional Counsel for lack of minimum contacts where involvement was occasionally advising prison staff members in forum state); Durham v. Lappin, 2006 WL 2724091, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2006); Thornton v. Quinlan, 864 F. Supp. 90, 92 (S.D. Ill. 1994) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over BOP director whose only contacts with Illinois were in his official capacity); Murrell v. Chandler, 2007 WL 869568, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007) (dismissing BOP's Administrator of National Inmate Appeals, in Washington, D.C., for lack of personal jurisdiction)). The undersigned recommends Connors, Holliday, and Marberry be dismissed because the court lacks personal jurisdiction over them.

C. Request for Injunctive and Equitable Relief

Because Plaintiff has been transferred to a different facility, his claims for equitable and injunctive relief are now moot. See Ajaj v. Smith, 108 Fed. App'x 743 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding inmate's claims moot where he sought equitable relief from conditions at one facility and was subsequentlytransferred to another institution); Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that transfer mooted prisoner's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief); Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that prisoner's transfer moots his request for injunctive relief against conditions of confinement in facility from which he was transferred).³

D. Standard on Summary Judgment

The court shall grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;" or "showing . . . that an adverseparty cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in his favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248.

E. Analysis

1. Group I Claims

a. Bivens Claims Jurisprudence

In 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress provided a specific damages remedy for plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by state officials, but Congress provided no corresponding remedy for constitutional violations by agents of the federal government. In 1971, the Supreme Court in Bivens recognized an implied damages action to compensate persons injured by federal officers who violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 403 U.S. at 397. The Court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment does not provide for money damages "in so many words." I...