Williams v. Manson
| Decision Date | 02 April 1985 |
| Citation | 195 Conn. 561,489 A.2d 377 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Michael D. WILLIAMS v. John R. MANSON, Commissioner of Correction. |
Barbara J. Hampton, Southbury, for appellant (petitioner).
Edward T. Ricciardi, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Francis M. McDonald, State's Atty., for appellee (respondent).
Before PETERS, C.J., and HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA and HADDEN, JJ.
Following a conviction of robbery in the first degree in a jury trial, the petitioner, Michael D. Williams, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court, claiming that he had not received the effective assistance of counsel. After a full evidentiary hearing and a review of the entire trial transcript, the court denied his petition, from which decision the petitioner appeals. The petitioner bases his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on his attorney's failure to object to evidence offered by the state in three instances at trial. We find no error.
The facts relevant to the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are summarized as follows. On November 25, 1980, at about 10 p.m., the victim was struck on the head, knocked to the pavement and robbed of her handbag while standing at a gas pump island at a gas station in Waterbury. About ten minutes later, two Waterbury police officers, responding to a broadcasted report of the crime, stopped the petitioner on a street not far from the gas station. His physical appearance and the ski jacket he wore matched descriptions given by witnesses of a black male observed running from the robbery scene. Upon questioning, the petitioner gave the police conflicting explanations as to why he was breathing heavily and how he had cut his hand, which was wet with blood. The police conducted a "pat down" search and retrieved forty-seven dollars in currency from the petitioner. This money was admitted into evidence at trial without objection by defense counsel.
The police transported the petitioner back to the gas station, where he was identified by several witnesses as the same person they had seen running from the gas station. The petitioner's ski jacket was a significant factor in the witnesses' descriptions and identifications. Two witnesses noted "brown markings" or blood stains on the jacket as one of the means by which they identified the petitioner's jacket as the one worn by the man observed fleeing the robbery scene, and one of the arresting officers also cited the stains as an identifying factor. The jacket was admitted into evidence without objection and witnesses referred to the stains as blood stains in their testimony. At the conclusion of the state's case, defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney stipulated in the jury's presence that the blood on the jacket was not that of the victim.
Two days after the robbery and arrest, the victim's credit card case was discovered in the police cruiser in which the petitioner had been transported to the police station following the incident. The credit card case was offered by the state and admitted into evidence at trial. Although defense counsel did not object to this piece of evidence, he cross-examined the police officer witnesses extensively regarding their failure to discover the case in their pat-down search of the petitioner and the location and security of the cruiser during the two days before the case was found.
In his habeas corpus petition, the petitioner alleged that his attorney's failure to challenge the state's introduction into evidence of the blood-stained ski jacket, the cash seized by the police during the pat-down search and the victim's credit card case denied him the effective assistance of counsel and due process of law guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. In his memorandum of decision on the habeas petition, the trial judge considered each of the three pieces of evidence, found that all were admissible, and concluded that the petitioner had in fact received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. We agree with the conclusions of the trial court.
To succeed in his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show that his attorney's performance was not " 'reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law' "; State v. Clark, 170 Conn. 273, 283, 365 A.2d 1167, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 962, 96 S.Ct. 1748, 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976), quoting Gentry v. Warden, 167 Conn. 639, 646, 356 A.2d 902 (1975); and further, that this " 'lack of competency contributed to the conviction.' " State v. Clark, supra; see also State v. Gregory, 191 Conn. 142, 143-44, 463 A.2d 609 (1983); State v. Scielzo, 190 Conn. 191, 206, 460 A.2d 951 (1983); State v. Chairamonte, 189 Conn. 61, 63, 454 A.2d 272 (1983). If the evidence upon which the petitioner bases his claim of ineffective assistance was properly admissible, he cannot sustain even the first part of this dual burden since the failure to object to admissible...
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Gipson v. Commissioner of Correction, (AC 17745)
...on direct appeal was not considered conduct falling below level of reasonably competent representation); see also Williams v. Manson, 195 Conn. 561, 564, 489 A.2d 377 (1985). After reviewing the record, the habeas court concluded that there were no issues worthy of certification by our Supr......
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Valeriano v. Bronson
...supra, 12 Conn.App. at 393, 530 A.2d 1100, see Levine v. Manson, 195 Conn. 636, 639-40, 490 A.2d 82 (1985); Williams v. Manson, 195 Conn. 561, 564, 489 A.2d 377 (1985). That test consists of two parts: first, it must be shown that the attorney's performance was so deficient that it fell bel......
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Sekou v. Warden, State Prison, 14061
...claims cannot be considered conduct falling below the level of reasonably competent representation. Accord Williams v. Manson, 195 Conn. 561, 564, 489 A.2d 377 (1985). After reviewing the constitutional claims not raised in Sekou's direct appeal, we are unpersuaded that his appellate counse......
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State v. Williams
...claiming that he was represented by ineffective counsel at his trial and have found no error in that determination. Williams v. Manson, 195 Conn. 561, 489 A.2d 377 (1985). In that proceeding, no claim was made concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. The state concedes that the dispositi......