Williams v. Mathewson

• Decision Date: 07 March 1905
• Citation: 60 A. 687,73 N.H. 242
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. MATHEWSON et ux.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

60 A. 687

73 N.H. 242

WILLIAMS

v. MATHEWSON et ux.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Grafton.

March 7, 1905.

Exceptions from Superior Court; Stone, Judge.

Bill by George M. Williams against Charles C. Mathewson and wife. In the superior court a demurrer to the bill was overruled, and defendant excepted. Exceptions sustained.

Bill in equity, alleging that on August 1, 1901, the defendant Charles C. Mathewson leased to the plaintiff by a written lease two rooms in a building in Warren for the term of three years from that date; that the plaintiff thereupon entered into the occupancy of the rooms, which were suitable for carrying on his business as a conveyancer and insurance agent; performed all of his covenants; that Mathewson, having covenanted for the peaceable occupation of the premises by the plaintiff, subsequently conveyed his interest in the building to his wife, who is the other defendant, subject to the lease; that in the fall of 1902, under an agreement with the trustees of the public library of the town, the library was moved into the leased rooms, and has been there ever since; that the defendants, conspiring together, on the night of April 30, 1904, during the temporary absence of the plaintiff, forcibly and without right broke into the rooms and locked the doors against him, claiming that he had violated the lease by allowing the library to be in the rooms, and thereafter refused to let him occupy the premises, although he had attempted to reenter; that there are no other suitable rooms in Warren for the plaintiff's business and for the libary; that the defendant Charles is financially irresponsible; that the plaintiff is without any adequate remedy at law; and that a multiplicity of suits will arise, and the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury, unless the defendants are restrained from interfering with his occupation. The prayer is for an injunction.

Smith & Smith, for plaintiff. Scott Sloane, for defendants.

WALKER, J. The questions presented arise on demurrer to the bill. The demurrer, for the purposes of the present inquiry, is regarded as an admission by the defendants of the truth of all material statements of fact contained in the bill which are well pleaded, but not of the inferences or conclusions of law which the plaintiff has seen fit to incorporate therein. Pearson v. Tower, 55 N. H. 36; Eastman v. Thayer, 60 N. H. 408. The truth of the allegation that the defendants' acts of which the plaintiff complains were "without right" is not admitted by the demurrer. In fact, the controversy between the parties relates to the legal right of the defendants, under the lease, to dispossess the plaintiff. The bill states that the defendants claimed the plaintiff had violated the lease in permitting the public library to be in the leased rooms, and urged this as a justification for their forcible entry. The point in dispute is thus made plain, and upon its determination the question of the parties' possessory rights depends. For the adjudication of such a question an action at law affords an appropriate remedy. While the plaintiff does not deny this general proposition, he insists that equity has jurisdiction, because, as he claims, his injury is in its nature irreparable, and not susceptible of being compensated in damages. The relief he seeks is, in effect, an order reinstating him in possession of the rooms. At the filing of the bill he was out of possession. The defendants had dispossessed him, and were in the actual occupation under a claim of right. See Wangeiin v. Goe, 50 Ill. 459; Mead v. Camfield, 11 N. J. Eq. 38. The plaintiff's position does not differ from that of an evicted tenant. If the eviction was wrongful, he may have redress by an action of trespass or other appropriate proceedings at law, in which compensatory damages are recoverable. 1 Tay. L. & T. § 317; Crocker v. Hill, 61 N. H. 345, 60 Am. Rep. 322. In such cases the general principle is that where the plaintiff's legal right is not clear, or where it is disputed, equity will not interfere and issue final orders or decrees before the right is established by proceedings at law. 2 Beach, Inj. § 1164; Bassett v. Company, 47 N. H. 426, 437. "To this rule some exceptions are allowed, arising in cases of pressing necessity, when it clearly appears that no adequate remedy at law exists, and that irreparable and permanent injury must result unless the summary process by injunction is interposed. But to authorize the interposition of equity in such a case, the mischief must be imminent, the remedy clearly inadequate to afford redress, and the right supposed to be invaded...