Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd.

• Docket Number: A-26-22
• Decision Date: 03 August 2023
• Parties: Leander Williams, Appellant-Appellant, v. New Jersey State Parole Board, Respondent-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

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Leander Williams, Appellant-Appellant, v. New Jersey State Parole Board, Respondent-Respondent.

No. A-26-22

Supreme Court of New Jersey

August 3, 2023

Argued April 24, 2023

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.

John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney John P. Flynn, on the brief).

Stephanie Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs, and Christopher C. Josephson Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs).

Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).

Katherine Beilin argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Katherine Beilin and CJ Griffin, on the brief).

FASCIALE, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the legal question is whether the New Jersey State Parole Board may impose a condition that mandates enrollment at a residential treatment program (RTP) for adult inmates who are entitled to administrative parole release under the Earn Your Way Out Act (EYWO Act), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55b to .55f.

Leander Williams pled guilty to non-violent third- and fourth-degree drug offenses. His primary parole eligibility date was approximately eight months after the EYWO Act became effective. During his prison sentence, Williams successfully completed multiple alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs, including an 87-day Alcoholics Anonymous program and a residential program in the Albert M. "Bo" Robinson Assessment and Treatment Center (Bo Robinson) for 187 days. After the Bo Robinson program and while remaining in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Williams resided at the Harbor Residential Community Release Program for 90 days for further rehabilitation.

Approximately one month before his primary parole eligibility date, a panel of the Parole Board certified that Williams met the "criteria for administrative parole release" under the EYWO Act, which entitled him to automatic administrative parole release. The panel imposed 21 general parole conditions and the "special" condition that Williams participate in an RTP for a minimum term of 180 days. Williams administratively appealed to the Parole Board, arguing that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 precluded the panel from requiring an RTP as a condition of his administrative parole release under the EYWO Act. The panel upheld the imposition of residential treatment but recommended that the Board reduce his mandated "term" of 180 days to 90 days.

The Parole Board issued its final agency decision and upheld the requirement that Williams reside at the RTP, determining that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a) authorized the panel to impose an RTP and that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d) was "inapplicable." Williams appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the Parole Board's determination. The Court granted certification. 252 N.J. 481 (2023).

HELD: The Parole Board cannot mandate participation in an RTP for inmates administratively paroled under the EYWO Act. Although N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 generally authorizes the Parole Board to impose parole conditions on adult inmates who have been administratively released under the EYWO Act, an RTP is not among the conditions that can be imposed in that setting.

1. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) details the process for release under the Parole Act. Under that provision, the Parole Board retains substantial discretion to deny parole if it finds the State makes a showing of lack of cooperation or a reasonable expectation of a future violation of parole conditions imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59. The process governing release under the EYWO Act, which took effect on February 1, 2021, is different. "Administrative parole release" means the release of an adult inmate who has met the criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(a). In this streamlined parole process, parole-eligible inmates who satisfy the criteria must automatically be released by the Board. According to a press release, the EYWO Act "place[s] a greater focus on reentry[,] allowing us to reduce recidivism and improve individuals['] ability to integrate back into their communities." Like the Parole Act release provision, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(b) authorizes the imposition of parole conditions via reference to the entirety of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59. (pp. 14-17)

2. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59, which governs the imposition of parole conditions, has multiple subsections. Subsection (b)(1)(a) lists various mandatory and discretionary parole conditions. The Parole Board relies on the part of subsection (b)(1)(a) devoted to discretionary conditions as its sole authority to impose an RTP on Williams. That part is a non-exhaustive list stating that the Board member or panel certifying release "may impose any other specific conditions of parole deemed reasonable in order to reduce the likelihood of recurrence of criminal or delinquent behavior, including a requirement that the parolee comply with the Internet access conditions," and "[s]uch special conditions may include, among other things, a requirement that the parolee make full or partial restitution"; "that the parolee have no contact with the victim"; and "that the person shall not own or possess an animal for an unlawful purpose or to interfere in the performance of duties by a parole officer." Although RTPs are not among the conditions mentioned in subsection (b)(1)(a) of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59, they are directly addressed in subsection (d) of that statute, which provides that the Board "may parole an inmate to any residential facility funded in whole or in part by the State if the inmate would not otherwise be released pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53] without such placement." (pp. 17-20)

3. The Parole Board and Appellate Division concluded that the language "include, among other things," in (b)(1)(a) should be read expansively to authorize the requirement that Williams reside at the RTP. In J.K. v. State Parole Board, the Court interpreted "include, among other things" to be terms of enlargement. 247 N.J. 120, 131-32 (2021). But that enlargement cannot be understood as infinite in scope. When specific words follow more general words in a statutory enumeration, courts can consider what additional items might also be included by asking whether those items are similar to those enumerated. An RTP is not like the class of specific conditions expressed in (b)(1)(a). In an RTP, one's liberty is significantly more curtailed than being unable to access certain internet websites, being prohibited from having contact with a specific person, or being barred from possessing an animal. And N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d) authorizes the imposition of an RTP as a parole condition "if the inmate would not otherwise be released pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4123.53] without such placement." Reading the statutes together, to impose an RTP for inmates who are ineligible under the EYWO Act, the Parole Board would generally have to show: (1) under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a), that "there is a reasonable expectation that the inmate will violate conditions of parole" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59; (2) under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a), that an RTP is "deemed reasonable in order to reduce the likelihood of recurrence of criminal or delinquent behavior"; and (3) under N.J. S.A. 30:4-123.59(d), that "the inmate would not otherwise be released [under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53] without such placement." If N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d) was "inapplicable" and "irrelevant," as suggested by the Parole Board, then it would be easier to impose mandatory "terms" of residential treatment on low-level offenders who qualify for automatic release under the EYWO Act than it is for the Parole Board to impose the same residence "terms" for adult inmates convicted of more serious offenses who are not eligible for administrative parole. That would be illogical. (pp. 20-27)

4. It is true that the Legislature expressed concern about recidivism and recognized a need to facilitate reentry in enacting the EYWO Act. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 30:1B-6.10(a). At the same time, however, the Legislature expressly contemplated that residential treatment could be completed during incarceration. Upon completion of the programming and satisfaction of the additional requirements set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d, the EYWO Act contemplates that adult inmates earn their way out -subject, of course, to sanctions for violation of parole conditions. And the Legislature has not granted leave to impose an RTP on those inmates who successfully earned their way out through that Act. Williams has fully satisfied and complied with the legislatively imposed process for his release, and his continued outpatient rehabilitation can be and has been prescribed by the Board. But the Board's prescriptions must remain within the limits imposed by the Legislature, which do not include an RTP. It is now time for Williams' "successful integration as a productive, law-abiding citizen." N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55c. (pp. 27-30)

REVERSED and REMANDED to the Parole Board.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, PIERRELOUIS, and WAINER APTER; and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE FASCIALE's opinion.

OPINION

FASCIALE JUSTICE

In this appeal, the legal question is whether the New Jersey State Parole Board may impose a condition that mandates enrollment at a residential treatment program (RTP) for adult...