Williams v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.

• Decision Date: 09 September 2013
• Docket Number: CAUSE NO.: 2:12-CV-16-JD-PRC
• Parties: AUDRY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION d/b/a AMTRAK, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

AUDRY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION d/b/a AMTRAK, et al., Defendants.

CAUSE NO.: 2:12-CV-16-JD-PRC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION

SO ORDERED: September 9, 2013

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Second Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint [DE 59], filed by Plaintiff Audry Williams on June 24, 2013. Defendant filed a response on July 24, 2013, and Plaintiff filed a reply on July 31, 2013.

This cause of action stems from a train accident that occurred on March 8, 2010, near Monon, Indiana, involving an Amtrak train on which Plaintiff was traveling as a passenger. Plaintiff filed her Complaint on January 9, 2012. On April 19, 2012, following a Rule 16(b) preliminary pretrial conference, the Court issued a Scheduling Order setting the deadline to amend pleadings for July 13, 2012, and the discovery deadline for January 10, 2013. On December 5, 2012, the Court granted an extension of the discovery deadline to May 10, 2013. On April 11, 2013, the Court granted a second extension of the discovery deadline, extending the deadline to July 9, 2013.

On June 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint with leave of Court to correct the misspelling of her first name. As noted above, Plaintiff filed the instant motion on June 24, 2013.

ANALYSIS

In the instant motion, Plaintiff seeks leave of Court to file a Second Amended Complaint to add a claim for punitive damages against Amtrak. On June 20, 2013, Plaintiff received a report from retained expert Colon Fulk of Railex, Inc., in which he opines that the conduct of Amtrak'semployees was not only negligent but also reckless, in that they failed to provide proper horn signals as the train approached the crossing, failed to reduce their speed while "lost," and continued unrestricted through dense fog. Plaintiff notes that Mr. Fulk's report indicates that the sounding of the horn at the time of the accident was deliberate and intentional, that the authorized speed limit for the track at the place of the occurrence was 60 miles per hour, and that the event recorder obtained during discovery reveals that the train was traveling at 61 miles per hour at the time of the accident.

In support of the motion, Plaintiff cites Section 4(F) of the General Rules found in the CSX Transportation Operating rules, which are quoted in Mr. Fulk's expert report:

F. The following conditions must be reported promptly and by the quickest means to the proper authority:

. . .

4. Any unusual condition that may affect the safe, efficient operation of the railroad. Trains must be protected against any known condition that may interfere with their safety. When conditions may impair visibility or affect the track or structure, the train speed must be regulated. This must be done to ensure:

1. The train's safe passage; and

2. The observance of and compliance with signal indications. In case of unusually heavy rain, storm or high water, trains must approach bridges, culverts and other points likely to be affected, at Restricted Speed.

Pl. Br., Exh A., p. 8.

Plaintiff asserts that, prior to the receipt of Mr. Fulk's June 20, 2013 report, Plaintiff had no information on which to base a claim for punitive damages against Amtrak and, accordingly, did not include such a claim in either her original or Amended Complaints. Thus, Plaintiff requests leave to filed a Second Amended Complaint to include a count for punitive damages against Amtrak. Plaintiff argues that, because such a count would involve the same incident and operative facts as already alleged in Plaintiff's original and Amended Complaints, no additional discovery will berequired and Amtrak will not be prejudiced. The proposed amendment makes the following allegations:

29. On March 8, 2010, Defendant AMTRAK, through its duly authorized agents and employees, acted willfully and wantonly in one or more of the following ways:

a. With reckless disregard for the safety of the Plaintiff, failed to reduce the throttle setting of the locomotive prior to the collision when it knew that it was reasonably necessary to do so;

b. With reckless disregard for the safety of the Plaintiff, failed to reduce speed to avoid a collision when it knew that it was reasonably necessary to do so;

c. With reckless disregard for the safety of the Plaintiff, failed to properly and adequately activate its horn when it knew it was reasonably necessary to do so;

d. With reckless disregard for the safety of the Plaintiff, failed to stop or slow the train to avoid a collision when it knew it was reasonably necessary to do so;

e. With reckless disregard for the safety of the Plaintiff, operated a passenger train at a rate of speed that was greater than it knew was reasonable under the circumstances;

f. With reckless disregard for the safety of the Plaintiff, operated the train in excess of the authorized speed limit for the tracks, and

g. Deliberately and intentionally failed to properly and adequately activate its horn when it knew it was reasonably necessary to do so.

30. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of the aforesaid willful and wanton acts and/or omissions of the Defendant AMTRAK the Plaintiff sustained great injuries of personal and pecuniary nature.

Pl. Mot., Exh 2, pp. 8-9.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amendments to pleadings and provides that when a party is no longer permitted to amend its pleading as a matter of course, the "party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freelygive leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The United States Supreme Court explained the term "freely give" as follows:

In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of a movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require be freely given.

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 562 (7th Cir. 2010). The standard for futility is the same standard of legal sufficiency that applies under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Townsel v. DISH Network LLC, 668 F.3d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 2012); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1085 (7th Cir. 1997). The decision whether to grant or deny a motion to amend lies within the sound discretion of the district court. See Campbell v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 1990).

In its response brief, Amtrak makes two arguments in opposition to the proposed amendment. First, Amtrak contends that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for seeking leave to amend her Complaint after the deadline set by the Court in its Scheduling Order, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). Second, Amtrak argues that, for several reasons, the amendment would be futile because it could not withstand a motion to dismiss. The Court considers each objection in turn.

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) - Good Cause

The Court's Scheduling Order set the deadline for seeking leave to amend pleadings for July 13, 2012. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 requires good cause and the judge's consent to modify a scheduling order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The "good cause" standard for Rule 16 "primarilyconsiders the diligence of the party seeking the amendment," Trustmark Insurance Co. v. General & Cologne Life Re of America, 424 F.3d 542, 553 (7th Cir. 2005), and requires parties to "show that despite their diligence the time table could not have reasonably been met," Tschantz v. McCann, 160 F.R.D. 568, 571 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).

Amtrak argues that Plaintiff cannot show good cause for failing to seek this amendment prior to the July 13, 2012 deadline to seek leave to amend pleadings because the acts and omissions allegedly supporting her punitive damages claim, namely the speed of the train and the manner in which the engineer operated the horn, closely track the acts and omissions set forth in her original Complaint. The parties agree on this point, as Plaintiff also contends that the underlying facts remain the same. In the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Amtrak "[f]ailed to properly and adequately activate its horn when it knew or should have known it was reasonably necessary to do so" and "[o]perated a passenger train at a rate of speed that was greater than reasonable." (Compl., ¶ 13(e), (h)). Thus, Amtrak asserts that this information was available to Plaintiff a year ago, noting that the event recorder download for the train shows that the train was operating at 61 miles per hour and that the engineer activated the train's horn in four sequences beginning 22 seconds before impact. Amtrak notes that at least three public records concerning the track speed limit were available to Plaintiff before she filed her original Complaint. Amtrak also argues that Plaintiff never indicated to Amtrak or the Court that liability discovery was being pursued to develop evidence to support a punitive damages claim against Amtrak in either of her motions to extend the discovery deadline filed on December 3, 2012, and April 11, 2013.

First, Plaintiff replies that she did not receive the train's event recorder download from Amtrak until July 23, 2012, when Amtrak answered Plaintiff's written discovery, which was afterthe deadline of July 13, 2012, to seek leave to amend pleadings. Unlike in Trustmark, in which the plaintiff harbored suspicions of the facts underlying the equitable estoppel claim it sought to add in an amended complaint well before the filing of the original complaint, see 424 F.3d at 553, Plaintiff in this case states that, although she was aware of the facts...