Williams v. New York City Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 27 January 2009
• Docket Number: 115453/01.,4490.
• Citation: 872 N.Y.S.2d 27,61 A.D.3d 62,2009 NY Slip Op 00440
• Parties: GINA WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

61 A.D.3d 62

872 N.Y.S.2d 27

2009 NY Slip Op 00440

GINA WILLIAMS, Appellant, v.NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY et al., Respondents.

115453/01.

4490.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department.

Decided January 27, 2009.

Gina Williams,appellantpro se.

Ricardo Elias Morales,New York City(Steven J. Rappaport and Donna M. Murphy of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ACOSTA, J.

Introduction

This appeal presents us with the opportunity to construe for the first time the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005 (Local Law No. 85 [2005] of City of NY [Restoration Act]).

Defendants' summary judgment motion—addressed to an amended complaint alleging a hostile work environment, disparate treatment on the basis of sex, and retaliation in violation of applicable provisions of the Executive Law and the New York City Administrative Code—was granted in its entirety.While we agree with the motion court that the claims arising under both the State and City Human Rights Laws must be dismissed, we take a different approach and consider the city claims under the commands of the Restoration Act, as a distinct analysis is required to fully appreciate and understand the distinctive and unique contours of the local law in this area.

Background

Plaintiff was, at all times relevant to the action, an employee of defendant Housing Authority.From November 1995 to June 2004, she worked as a heating plant technician assigned to the Authority's South Jamaica Houses development.As such, she was responsible for maintaining the development's heating system.

The pro se plaintiff commenced this action in August 2001.After converting defendants' dismissal motion to one for summary judgment, Justice Louise Gruner Gans dismissed the claims asserted under title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964(as amended), and otherwise granted plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint.In the 2003 amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants engaged in, or permitted, a hostile work environment, disparate treatment on the basis of sex, and retaliation, all in violation of Executive Law § 296 (1)(a);(6) and (7) and Administrative Code of the City of NY§ 8-107 (1)(a);(6) and (7).

Plaintiff alleged she was sexually harassed in January 1997, when her supervisor allegedly told her, after she had requested facilities to take a shower, "You can take a shower at my house."Plaintiff alleged a second incident on October 21, 1998, where sex-based remarks were made in her presence, although not directed at her.Plaintiff interpreted some of those remarks as being complimentary to a co-worker, and a disparaging reference to the supervisor's own wife.

For her disparate treatment claim, plaintiff alleged that her supervisor denied her tools that she needed for her work, preferred (higher paying) shifts, and some training, all during her probationary year (i.e., no later than 1996).Plaintiff acknowledges that she was ultimately permitted to work the preferred shifts when they were vacated by employees of longer standing.She also alleged that she was denied two training opportunities in 2001.The record reflects that plaintiff did participate in other substantial training throughout her tenure.

Plaintiff asserted that she was retaliated against after making complaints about discriminatory treatment.She alleges that in August 1999she had to do work outside of her regular duties; specifically, she was required to strip and wax the boiler room office floor, a task that she completed in two regular workdays.Plaintiff also asserted that in August 2001, she was required to perform work in the field and to respond to tenant complaints, work she claimed was customarily given to utility staff.She alleged that a 2002 incident of retaliation consisted of her supervisor's refusal to permit her to take "excused time" to resolve a parking ticket she had received.

Plaintiff was promoted in June 2004 to become an assistant superintendent.

In August 2007, the court(Michael D. Stallman, J.) granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint in its entirety (2007 NY Slip Op 34401[U]).The sexual harassment claim was dismissed on the basis that the conduct complained of was not "severe or pervasive."(Id. at *4.)

On the disparate treatment claim, the court found the allegations from plaintiff's probationary year were time-barred because they were not part of a continuing pattern of discriminatory conduct.It also found that plaintiff had attended at least nine one- or two-day training courses, and did not allege that she suffered any injury as a result of not attending more.Finally, it found that plaintiff accepted a promotion offered in May 2004, and had not claimed that she would have been promoted earlier had she taken more classes.The court characterized the disparate treatment claim as missing the necessary element of an "adverse employment action."(Id. at *5.)

Evaluating the retaliation claim, the court found that a one-time assignment to perform a task arguably within plaintiff's duties did not constitute retaliation, and that the other claims did not involve being treated differently from workers who had not complained.

We agree with the court's analysis as it pertains to plaintiff's state claims under the Executive Law.The decision dismissing the action failed, however, to properly construe plaintiff's claims under the Restoration Act,¹ which mandates that courts be sensitive to the distinctive language, purposes, and method of analysis required by the City Human Rights Law(City HRL), requiring an analysis more stringent than that called for under either title VII or the State Human Rights Law(State HRL).In light of this explicit legislative policy choice by the City Council, we separately analyze plaintiff's City HRL claims.

I.Requirements and Purposes of the Restoration Act

While the Restoration Act amended the City HRL in a variety of respects,² the core of the measure was its revision of Administrative Code § 8-130, the construction provision of the City HRL:

"The provisions of this [chapter]title shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human rights laws, including those laws with provisions comparably-worded to provisions of this title, have been so construed."(Local Law85 § 7[deleted language in brackets, new language emphasized].)

As a result of this revision, the City HRL now explicitly requires an independent liberal construction analysis in all circumstances, even where state and federal civil rights laws have comparable language.The independent analysis must be targeted to understanding and fulfilling what the statute characterizes as the City HRL's "uniquely broad and remedial" purposes, which go beyond those of counterpart state or federal civil rights laws.

Section 1 of the Restoration Act amplifies this message.It states that the measure was needed because the provisions of the City HRL had been "construed too narrowly to ensure protection of the civil rights of all persons covered by the law."It goes on to mandate that provisions of the City HRL be interpreted "independently from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes."(Id.)Taking sections 1and7 of the Restoration Act together, it is clear that interpretations of state or federal provisions worded similarly to City HRL provisions may be used as aids in interpretation only to the extent that the counterpart provisions are viewed "as a floor below which the City's Human Rights law cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local law cannot rise"(§ 1), and only to the extent that those state or federal law decisions may provide guidance as to the "uniquely broad and remedial" provisions of the local law (§ 7).

The Committee Report accompanying the legislation likewise states that the intent of the Restoration Act was to "ensure construction of the City's human rights law in line with the purposes of fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991," and to reverse the pattern of judicial decisions that had improvidently "narrowed the scope of the law's protections"(Rep of Comm on Gen Welfare, 2005 NY City Legis Ann, at 536).

The City Council's debate on the legislation made plain the Restoration Act's intent and consequences:

"Insisting that our local law be interpreted broadly and independently will safeguard New Yorkers at a time when federal and state civil rights protections are in jeopardy.There are many illustrations of cases, like Levin on marital status, Priore[,]McGrath and Forrest that have either failed to interpret the City Human Rights Law to fulfill its uniquely broad purposes, ignore [sic] the text of specific provisions of the law, or both.With [the Restoration Act], these cases and others like them, will no longer hinder the vindication of our civil rights."³

In other words, the Restoration Act notified courts that (a)they had to be aware that some provisions of the City HRL were textually distinct from its state and federal counterparts, (b)all provisions of the City HRL required independent construction to accomplish the law's uniquely broad purposes,⁴ and (c)cases that had failed to respect these differences were being legislatively overruled.

There is significant guidance in understanding the meaning of the term "uniquely broad and remedial."For example, in telling us that the City HRL is to be interpreted "in line with the purposes of the fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991," the Council's committee was referring to amendments⁵ that were

"consistent in tone and approach: every change either expanded coverage, limited an exemption, increased responsibility, or broadened remedies.In case after case, the balance struck by the Amendments favored victims and the...