Williams v. Newport News Sch. Bd.

• Decision Date: 19 August 2021
• Docket Number: 4:20-cv-41
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: MALIKAH ABDUL-MUSAWIR WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. NEWPORT NEWS SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant.

MALIKAH ABDUL-MUSAWIR WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. NEWPORT NEWS SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant.

No. 4:20-cv-41

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Newport News Division

August 19, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

Lawrence R. Leonard United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant Newport News School Board's (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and accompanying memorandum. ECF Nos. 16-17. Plaintiff Malikah Abdul-Musawir Williams (“Plaintiff”) filed a Brief in Opposition, ECF No. 25, and Defendant file a Reply Brief thereto, ECF No. 29. Accordingly, the Motion is ripe for decision. The undersigned makes this ruling without a hearing pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 78(b) and E.D. Va. Local Civ. R. 7(J). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 16, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This matter concerns alleged discrimination that occurred during Plaintiff's employment as a teacher in the Newport News School system.^[1] Plaintiff is a Muslim woman who had been employed as special education teacher with the Defendant from 1999 through 2017. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 11. During the course of her employment, Plaintiff describes numerous events that she alleges amount to discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge on the basis of religion. Id. at ¶¶ 12-57. On September 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against Defendant (“the First EEOC Charge”). ECF No. 17, attach. 1. In the First EEOC Charge, Plaintiff selected the options for discrimination based on both retaliation and religion. Id. She also described a series of allegedly harassing events that occurred as early as 2007 until August 24, 2016, which was the date indicated as the “Latest Date Discrimination Took Place.” Id. Plaintiff later elaborated upon that description in her Complaint and Brief in Opposition:

a. Defendant authorized the recitation of prayers at mandatory faculty meetings, functions and activities in 2001-207. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 15.

b. Defendant authorized the playing of Gospel music and music associated with Christmas beginning in 2011. Id. at ¶ 16.

c. Plaintiff was moved to different classrooms each year “due to her opposition to prayer recitation” in 2002 through 2004 and was not given her own classroom in 2005 and 2006. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.

d. Plaintiff was involuntarily transferred from high school to elementary school in 2008, with an accompanying teaching assignment change and docking of pay. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.

e. “Due to her religion, her previous opposition to . . . prayer recitation . . ., and her prior filing of a charge of discrimination” with U.S. Department of Education OCR, Plaintiff underwent classroom changes, and switched grade levels in 20082010. Id. at ¶ 22.

f. In 2009, Plaintiff filed a case for the right to grieve with the Newport News Circuit Court, Id. at ¶ 23, following which, in 2010, she was involuntarily transferred schools with changes in duties. Id. at ¶ 24.

g. In the 2010-2011 school year, Plaintiff filed another complaint regarding Defendant's authorization of prayer during meetings and events, following which her classroom was moved in 2011 and 2012. Id. at ¶¶ 25-26

h. In 2015, Plaintiff was given religious pamphlets by a co-worker. Id. at ¶ 27.

i. In June 2016, Defendant authorized Christian prayer recitation during a mandatory end-of-year function; Plaintiff's request to be excused was refused. Id. at ¶ 29.

j. On August 16, 2016, Dr. Mills, her Principal, notified Plaintiff that she was required to switch classrooms two months after other teachers were notified of similar changes. Id. at ¶ 30.

k. On September 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination alleging religious discrimination, harassment and retaliation. Id. at ¶ 31.

l. On specific dates in September, October, and November, 2016, through February 2017, Plaintiff “advocated” on behalf of disabled/special education students' rights and requested Defendant comply with laws regarding such students. Id. at ¶ 32.

m. On September 19, 2016, Dr. Mills belittled Plaintiff during a meeting for asking a question, while he did not belittle other faculty members for asking questions. Id. at ¶ 33.

n. On October 21, 2016, a co-worker yelled “Praise Jesus” into Plaintiff's classroom; Plaintiff submitted a complaint of religious discrimination and retaliation to Defendant's Human Resources (“HR”) department. A meeting was held that day with HR to discuss her claim in which representatives of the HR department indicated options that could be taken included an involuntary transfer and breaking the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiff heard Mrs. Hautz (Director of Human Resources) say that HR “needed to put an end to the ongoing discourse [Plaintiff] had with the District.” Id. at ¶¶ 34-38.

o. Plaintiff followed up the meeting with an email in which she indicated, in part, that she did not consent to another transfer and would consider it to be retaliatory, and an email expressing her discontent regarding the proposed possible solution of breaking her contract. Id. at ¶¶ 39-40.

ECF No. 25 at 3-5.

On September 29, 2017, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights to Plaintiff on her First EEOC Charge (“First Right to Sue”). ECF No. 17, attach. 2. However, Plaintiff did not file a lawsuit within ninety days of receipt of the First Right to Sue.

On November 15, 2017, Plaintiff proceeded to file a second charge of discrimination against Defendant (“the Second EEOC Charge”). Id., attach. 3. Plaintiff again selected retaliation and religion as the bases of her charge, but she did not select the “Continuing Action” box. Id.

Further, Plaintiff indicated that January 23, 2017, was both the earliest and latest date discrimination took place. Id. In the “Particulars” section, Plaintiff describes the following events all of which took place on or after January 19, 2017:

In or about 1996, I became employed as a Teacher Assistant with the abovementioned employer. On or about 8/30/1999, I became a Special Education Teacher. Throughout my employment I have been subjected to disparaging comments and behaviors based upon my religion (Islam/Muslim). I have complained throughout my employment and filed charges of discrimination. On or about 1/23/2017, I was having a discussion with John White (Teacher) and Cassandra Gregory (Teacher) during hall duty. Mr. White called Muslims “Radical Islamic Terrorists” therefore he was referring to me as well. I asked him to stop several times and told him I was offended. He refused. I emailed a formal complaint to Dr. Darwin Mills (Principal) and Human Resources. My complaint was not resolved. In or about 2/2017, I was told by a coworker (teacher) that she was going to exclude me from the lunch orders that were placed from one of the local churches. On or about 2/6/2017, I was notified that I was being placed on administrative leave and directed to leave the building. On or about 3/23/2017, I was constructively discharged.

Ms. Nina Farrish (HR) stated I was placed on administrative leave due to a complaint being filed against me. Ms. Hautz (HR Director) stated I was being transferred because it was in the employer's best interest.

I believe that I was subject to harassment, discipline, demotion and constructively discharged in retaliation for filing a previous complaint with EEOC in 2016 protesting discrimination based upon my religion (Islam/Muslim) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

ECF No. 17, attach. 3.

On December 19, 2019, Plaintiff received a Notice of Dismissal and Right to Sue with respect to the Second EEOC Charge (“Second Right to Sue”). Accordingly, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on March 16, 2020, alleging in four counts claims for discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge on the basis of religion, retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and breach of contract. Defendant now alleges in the underlying Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff “fails to state a claim on any basis.” ECF No. 17 at 1.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2006). While considering this motion, the court must assume that the facts alleged are true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000); Mylan Labs., Inc. v Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Rule 8(a) requires that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). To be sufficient under Rule 8, the pleading must meet two basic requirements: it must contain sufficient factual allegations and those allegations must be plausible. Adiscov, LLC v. Autonomy Corp., 762 F.Supp.2d 826, 829 (E.D. Va. 2011) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). First, sufficient factual allegations include “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action will not do;” rather, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007). Second, to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, ” id. at 570, “plaintiff[s] [must] plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, to achieve...