Williams v. NIBCO Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. SA-20-CV-0048-JKP-RBF |
| Parties | JANICE WILLIAMS; ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, JR.; PRINCESS DIANE PIPPEN; DIANE ROBINSON; and MAYA ROBINSON, Individually and on Behalf of All Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. NIBCO INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court is Defendant NIBCO Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14). With Plaintiffs' filed response (ECF No. 18) and Defendant's reply brief (ECF No. 20), the motion is ripe for ruling. After considering the motion, briefing, and applicable law, the Court denies the motion in its entirety.
In April 2020, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint (ECF No. 13) in response to a prior motion to dismiss. In this class action diversity case, Plaintiffs represent homeowners with PEX products installed in their homes in certain areas in Texas and Alabama. First Am. Class Action Compl. ¶ 6. They sue NIBCO, Inc., a corporation that manufactures, markets, and distributes PEX products for use in residences. Id. ¶¶ 45-48. This case involves a Texas subclass (with putative class representatives Janice Williams and Antonio Rodriguez, Jr.) and an Alabama subclass (with putative class representatives Princess Diane Pippen and the Robinsons(Diane and Maya)) of homeowners who have suffered injuries and damages to their homes and property due to PEX products. Id. ¶¶ 2-4, 11, 19, 26, and 34. Both subclasses were "intentionally excluded from a previous nationwide class settlement in which they had been putative class members." Id. ¶ 5.
Plaintiffs assert the following claims under both Texas and Alabama law: (1) breach of express warranty (¶¶ 135-47), (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability (¶¶ 148-54), (3) breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular use (¶¶ 155-63), (4) negligent failure to warn (¶¶ 195-212), (5) negligent design (¶¶ 213-26), and (6) unjust enrichment (¶¶ 227-32). They also assert, violations of the Texas Products Liability Act (¶¶ 164-71), the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA") (¶¶ 172-81), and the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act (¶¶ 182-94).
Defendant has moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and (6). See Mot. at 1-20. Under Rule 12(b)(2), it argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over claims asserted by the Alabama named plaintiffs. See id. at 4-7. It asserts a litany of other reasons why various claims fail to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), including being barred by applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 7-20. In their response (ECF No. 17), Plaintiffs disagree with each of Defendant's arguments and contentions. They maintain that they have adequately pleaded their claims and that neither personal jurisdiction nor any statute of limitations bars any claim. With respect to the limitations defense, they argue that Defendant ignores material facts and two dispositive equitable tolling principles. The motion to dismiss became ripe for ruling with Defendant's reply brief (ECF No. 20).
The Court thereafter issued a Phase One Scheduling Order (ECF No. 29) to set various deadlines, including an October 22, 2021 deadline for Plaintiffs to move for class certification. Recently, the Magistrate Judge assigned to this case, issued an Order (ECF No. 35) after conducting a status hearing in this case. Finding "that principles of judicial efficiency and the interests ofthe putative class members merit entry of a stay," the Magistrate Judge stayed this action "at least until such time as the District Court rules on NIBCO's pending and ripe motion to dismiss." The Magistrate Judge further noted that, "[a]fter ruling on the motion, the District Court may determine that lifting the stay is appropriate or, instead, that the interests of the Court and putative class members are best served by further extending the stay." At the hearing before the Magistrate Judge, the named Plaintiffs in this action confirmed that the putative class here is effectively identical to a provisionally certified class in a related, but earlier-filed, case," Matson v. NIBCO, No. 5-19-CV-717-RBF (W.D. Tex. filed June 19, 2019).
"Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law." Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); accord Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Because jurisdiction in this case is based on diversity of citizenship, this generally means that the Court applies "Texas law," including its law regarding statutes of limitations. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. Berry, 852 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2017); accord West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 n.4 (1987); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980); Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 869 F.2d 879, 880 (5th Cir. 1989). In this case, however, the parties apply Alabama law to all Alabama claims and Texas law to the claims arising under Texas law. The Court has no reason to disagree with that approach and will proceed similarly.
"When reviewing issues of state law, federal courts look to the law of that state's highest court." City of Alexandria v. Brown, 740 F.3d 339, 351 (5th Cir. 2014); accord Price v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 431 F.3d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 2005). Absent a final decision by the state's highest court that "'precisely' resolves the legal issue, federal courts "must make an Erie guess" to determine as best they can what the highest court would decide. Martinez v. Walgreen Co., 935 F.3d396, 398 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). When compelled to make an Erie guess, federal courts "defer to intermediate state appellate court decisions, unless convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise." Mem'l Hermann Healthcare Sys. Inc. v. Eurocopter Deutschland, GMBH, 524 F.3d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Price, 431 F.3d at 893 n.5. The federal courts not only look to the intermediate state appellate decisions, but also to "the general rule on the issue, decisions from other jurisdictions, and general policy concerns." Martinez, 935 F.3d at 398 (citation omitted).
At the outset, the Court addresses the argument that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant relative to the three named Alabama Plaintiffs and that it should thus dismiss their claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The parties agree that general jurisdiction provides no basis for personal jurisdiction in this action. See Mot. at 4-5; Resp. at 5 n.4. They disagree as to specific jurisdiction and Plaintiffs focus on the putative class members of the Alabama subclass whereas Defendant focuses on the three named representative members of that subclass.
Plaintiffs have "the burden of establishing that the court has personal jurisdiction." Int'l Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 211 (5th Cir. 2016). Although they have "the burden of demonstrating specific jurisdiction for each claim asserted against the nonresident defendant," they may carry that burden by making a prima facie showing when the Court limits itself to the pleadings. Id. at 211 & n.73. "When a court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, as in the present case . . . the nonmoving party need only make a prima facie showing, and the court must accept as true the nonmover's allegations and resolve all factual disputes in its favor." Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoted Dontos v. Vendomation NZ Ltd., 582 F. App'x 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)); accord Luv N' care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2006) ().
Whether there is specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant depends on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014)). In other words, "specific" or "case-linked" jurisdiction depends on the connection "between the forum and the underlying controversy." Walden, 571 U.S. 283 n.6 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
Because "the Texas long-arm statute extends as far as constitutional due process allows," this Court "may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant" so long as "the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 759 (5th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, "specific personal jurisdiction is a claim-specific inquiry," which means that when a plaintiff brings "multiple claims that arise out of different forum contacts of the defendant" the plaintiff "must establish specific jurisdiction for each claim." Id. (quoting Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 2006)). The Fifth Circuit
applies a three-step analysis for the specific jurisdiction inquiry:
(1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, i.e., whether it purposely directed its activities toward the forum state or purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there; (2) whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.
Monkton, 768 F.3d at 433 (quoting Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 271). Plaintiffs have the burden to "establish the first two prongs," but once they do, the burden shifts to the Defendant for...
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