Williams v. Overmyer

• Decision Date: 22 January 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:18-cv-00098 (Erie)
• Parties: KEVIN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. SUPT. OVERMYER, OBLANDER, SAWTELLOE, BLICHA, GUSTAFSON, RIETTENHOUSE, MAHONEY, TERMAINE, TREVOR WINGARD, GINA, AND PATRICA PETERSON, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

KEVIN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. SUPT. OVERMYER, OBLANDER, SAWTELLOE, BLICHA,GUSTAFSON, RIETTENHOUSE, MAHONEY, TERMAINE,TREVOR WINGARD, GINA, AND PATRICA PETERSON, Defendants

Case No. 1:18-cv-00098 (Erie)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

January 22, 2020

SUSAN PARADISEBAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ECF NO. 53

ECF NO. 62

I.Recommendation

It is respectfully recommended that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment(ECF No. 62) be GRANTED and that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment(ECF No. 53) be DENIED.

II.Report

A.Introduction

PlaintiffKevin Williams a/k/a Kirby Stewart(Williams), an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest in Marienville, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Forest"), began this action by filing a pro se civil rights complaint, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on April 12, 2018.Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint on June 13, 2018[ECF No. 18], the operative pleading here.Named as Defendants are Michael D. Overmyer, Superintendent at SCI-Forest ("Overmyer); and prison officials Oberlander, Sawtelle, Blicha, Gustafson, Riettenhouse, Mahoney, Termaine, Trevor Wingard("Wingard"), "Gina," and Patrice Peterson("Peterson")(collectively, "DOC Defendants").¹After a period of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.SeeECF No. 53;ECF No. 62.

B.Standards of Review

1.Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).Under this standard "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48(1986).A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078(3d Cir.1992).An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257;Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88(3d Cir.1991).

When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682(3d Cir.1993);Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600(3d Cir.1992);White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59(3d Cir.1988).To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings.Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that shows the lack of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324(1986).

Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the lack of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements.The Rule mandates summary judgment if the plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each element.When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.SeeHarter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851(3d Cir.1992).

The court applies these standards no differently when, as here, it reviews cross-motions for summary judgment.Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310(3d Cir.2008)."'Cross-motions are no more than a claim by each side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such inherently contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist.'"Id.(quotingRains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245(3d Cir.1968)).If review of cross-motions reveals no genuine issue of material fact, then judgment may be granted in favor of the party entitled to judgment in view of the law and undisputed facts.Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 302(3d Cir.1998)(citation omitted).

2.Pro Se Pleadings and Filings

Pro se pleadings, motions, and other filings, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521(1972);see alsoLeamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 547-48(3d Cir.2002)(holding that the court must construe a pro se plaintiff's filings liberally).This means that if the court can reasonably read pleadings or filings to state a valid claim, position, or argument on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.SeeBoag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364(1982);United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555(3d Cir.1969)(reading petition prepared by a prisoner "with a measure of tolerance" where it was inartfully drawn).

C.The Amended Complaint

Williams raises violations of his due process rights and retaliation by the Defendants stemming from a misconduct he received for using abusive language toward prison staff members.Id. at pp. 2-4.²Williams also claims constitutional violations by Defendants Gina, Peterson, and Wingard for their failure to respond to telephone calls from his family and, alternatively, for providing his family with incorrect information about Williams' administrative custody status.Id. at p. 4.A final claim against Defendants Rittenhouse, Mahoney, and Termaine for their handling of his property is also pled.Id. at p. 5.

D.Background

Williams filed a Concise Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 54) and the Defendants' filed their own Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 64).Williams responded to the Defendants' Concise Statement.ECF No. 77.To date, the Defendants have not filed a Responsive Concise Statement to Williams', as is required by LCvR56(C)(1).³Under this rule, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment is required to file a responsive concise statement of material facts in whichhe or she must: respond to each numbered paragraph in the movant's concise statement; admit or deny the facts contained in the movant's concise statement; set forth the basis for denial if any fact within the movant's concise statement is not entirely admitted by the non-moving party, with appropriate citation to the record; and set forth, in separately numbered paragraphs, any other material facts at issue.SeeLCvR56(C)(1).Courts in this district require strict compliance with the provisions of Local Rule 56.See, e.g., Coleman v. Tice, 2018 WL 5724125, at *2 n. 3(W.D. Pa.Oct. 10, 2018), adopted by2018 WL 5722316(W.D. Pa.Nov. 1, 2018);First Guard Ins. Co. v. Bloom Services, Inc., 2018 WL 949224, at *2-3(W.D. Pa.Feb. 16, 2018);Hughes v. Allegheny County Airport Auth., 2017 WL 2880875, at *1(W.D. Pa.July 6, 2017).The consequences of not responding to the other party's Concise Statement are "severe."Hughes v. Allegheny County Airport Auth., 2017 WL 2880875, at *1(W.D. Pa.July 6, 2017).Any alleged material facts "set forth in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts ... which are claimed to be undisputed, will for the purpose of deciding the motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party."LCvR56(E).Here, because the Defendants have not filed a Responsive Concise Statement, the Court will deem Williams' statement as admitted.See, e.g., Abed-Rabugh v. Hoobrajh, 2019 WL 343178, *2(W.D. Pa.Jan. 28, 2019).The Court will also cite to other, uncontested portions of the record to supply additional background facts of this case.See, e.g., Sam Mannino Enterprises, LLC v. John W. Stone Oil Distributor, LLC, 127 F. Supp. 3d 318, 321 n.1(W.D. Pa.2015).See alsoFed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

On March 9, 2018, Williams was issued a misconduct charge based on his use of abusive language.ECFNo. 63-2, p. 1;ECF No. 64, ¶ 2;ECF No. 77, ¶ 3.The Defendants claim that Williams stated, in speaking about Defendant Rittenhouse, "you'd think she would have learned from what happened at Somerset."ECF No. 64, ¶ 3.The Defendants explain the significance of Williams' comment and why it warranted issuance of the misconduct by noting that "it occurred justtwo days after the funeral of Sergeant Baserman, who had died 11 days earlier after being brutally attacked and kicked by an inmate at SCI-Somerset."ECF No. 64, ¶ 4.Williams disputes this, restating his statement as "you'd think she would be more careful when entering cells while a prisoner is present."ECF No. 77, ¶ 4.In the Amended Complaint, Williams expounds on his statement that he was not threatening the sergeant but instead was "just going to tell her to be careful [b]ecause I don't want to see her get jumped on/get assaulted."ECF No. 18, p. 2.The misconduct charge was referred to a unit manager who then forwarded it the hearing examiner.ECF No. 77, ¶ 6.Williams...