Williams v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 09 July 2018
• Docket Number: Case Number 1:17-CV-13369
• Parties: JESSE MACKLAMOR WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. CARMEN D. PALMER, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

JESSE MACKLAMOR WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. CARMEN D. PALMER, Respondent.

Case Number 1:17-CV-13369

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

July 9, 2018

Honorable Thomas L. Ludington United States District Judge

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY OR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Petitioner Jesse Macklamor Williams is presently confined at the Michigan Reformatory in Ionia, Michigan. On October 5, 2017, Williams filed a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted by his plea of guilty in the Wayne County Circuit Court of carjacking, Mich. Comp Laws § 750.529a, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, Mich. Comp Laws § 750.227b. Petitioner was sentenced to nine to twenty five years imprisonment on the carjacking conviction and two years in prison on the felony-firearm conviction. Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, and that he was denied his right to a direct appeal and the effective assistance of appellate counsel. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition, asserting that the claims lack merit and/or are moot. For the following reasons, the petition will be denied.

I.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to carjacking and felony-firearm in the Wayne County Circuit Court. Pursuant to that agreement, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss three charges against Petitioner. There was also a Cobbs agreement that Petitioner would be sentenced to nine to twenty five years on the carjacking conviction, plus two years on the felony-firearm conviction.¹ Tr. 6/23/14, pp. 3-4. The judge advised Petitioner of the rights that he would be waiving by pleading guilty. Id. pp. 4-5. The following exchange took place between the judge and Petitioner:

THE COURT: If I accept your plea, you may not claim the plea was a result of promises or threats not disclosed to me?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: And you may not claim it was not your choice to plead guilty?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: If I accept your plea, any appeal of the conviction and sentence will be by application for leave to appeal and not by right, you understand that?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: On March 24th, 2014, were you at 17615 Patton in the City of Detroit?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: And did you steal a Dodge from a person by the name of Charles Bradford at the time he was in the vehicle?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: And did you have a weapon at the time?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: What was the weapon?

MR. WILLIAMS: AK-47.

THE COURT: And you used that in order to force him to get out of the car?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: And you actually drove it away?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

Id. pp. 5-6.

On the day of sentencing, Petitioner moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The following exchange took place between Petitioner and the judge:

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, your Honor, for the record, I wish to withdraw my plea today, your Honor, simply because I'm innocent of this crime. I wish to take a polygraph test to prove that I'm innocent. Also, I was coerced into taking this plea by force because I was pressured into this involuntarily and I was left without no choice. I was told by the judge that at the time the charges would be stacked if I didn't accept the plea and I was scared.

THE COURT: I didn't say it would, I said it could be.

MR. WILLIAMS: And I was scared and I didn't know what to do. I'm wishing to withdraw my plea today.

THE COURT: Well, the carjacking offense does carry a consecutive sentencing if you're convicted of all of the charges in the Information. So the sentence for carjacking, armed robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, felonious assault would be consecutive to the sentence for carjacking. And obviously the felony firearm is a mandatory two. And Mr. Williams, it is true, is it not that you pled guilty to this offense under oath?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: If you withdraw your plea, you are telling me that you lied when you made that plea, is that correct?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: Well, that subjects you to penalties for perjury which in this case is an, could be an additional charge with up to life in prison, you understand that?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

Tr. 7/11/14, pp. 5-6.

Both the prosecutor and defense counsel told the judge that they did not believe that Petitioner had a legal basis to withdraw his plea of guilty. Id., pp. 6-7. The judge agreed and denied the motion to withdraw. Id. p. 7. When the judge asked Petitioner if he had anything to say regarding sentencing, Petitioner replied:

Yes, I'm innocent of this crime. I'm asking for a polygraph test to prove that I'm innocent. I didn't do this. I didn't do it. I'm asking for a polygraph test to prove that I didn't do it. I didn't do it.

Id. p. 7.

The judge sentenced Petitioner to nine to twenty five years on the carjacking conviction plus two years on the felony-firearm conviction. Id., p. 7. Petitioner requested the appointment of appellate counsel. Frederick Finn was appointed to represent Petitioner on his appeal. Mr. Finn unexpectedly passed away before filing an appellate brief on Petitioner's behalf. On February 10, 2015, the court issued an order appointing substitute counsel, Arthur Rubiner.

Mr. Rubiner filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment with the trial court pursuant to M.C.R. 6.500, et. Seq. The judge denied the motion, in part because Petitioner failed to show cause and prejudice, as required by M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3), for failing to raise his claims on a direct appeal. People v. Williams, No. 14-002951-FC (Wayne Cty.Cir.Ct. Mar. 22, 2016).

Mr. Rubiner then filed an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied the application "because defendant . . . failed to establish that the trial court erred in denying the motion for relief from judgment." People v. Williams, No. 332367 (Mich.Ct.App. June 6, 2016).

Petitioner filed a pro se application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. As part of his application, Petitioner essentially argued that he had been constructively denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel because his first appellate attorney died before the timeperiod for filing a direct appeal had expired and his second appellate counsel was appointed only after the appeal period had expired, forcing his second appellate counsel to have to seek relief via a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment. See Dkt. 8-6.

The Michigan Supreme Court issued the following order:

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 6, 2016 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of the defendant's April 6, 2016 delayed application for leave to appeal under the standard applicable to direct appeals. The defendant's former appellate attorney failed to timely file in the Court of Appeals, on direct review, a delayed application for leave to appeal within the deadlines set forth in MCR 7.205(G)(3). Because appointed counsel died shortly before the time expired for seeking leave to appeal under MCR 7.205(G), the defendant was constructively denied the assistance of counsel altogether. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477, 120 S.Ct 1209, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000); Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 28, 119 S.Ct. 961, 143 L.Ed.2d 18 (1999). The motion to add additional issue and the motion to remand to the trial court are DENIED as moot.

People v. Williams, 500 Mich. 924, 888 N.W.2d 115, 116 (Mich. 2017).

On remand, the Michigan Court of Appeals issued the following order:

After remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration under the standard applicable to direct appeals, the Court orders that the application for leave to appeal is DENIED for lack of merit in the grounds presented.

People v. Williams, No. 332367 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2017).

The Michigan Supreme Court subsequently denied Petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Williams, 500 Mich. 1004, 895 N.W.2d 534 (2017).

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:

I. A writ of habeas corpus should be issued where petitioner is innocent of the crimes for which he pled to and the failure to allow him to withdraw his Cobb based plea agreement, prior to the imposing of the sentences denied him of his rights to due process and fundamental fairness.

II. A writ of habeas corpus should be issued where petitioner was deprived of his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel during his Cobb based plea agreement and sentencing whencounsel failed to seek withdrawal of the plea after being informed that his client is innocent of the crimes for which he pled to.

III. A writ of habeas corpus should be issued where petitioner was denied his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a direct appeal following his Cobb based plea conviction and sentencing where the untimely death of petitioner's initial appellate counsel foreclosed his direct appeal, and where his newly appointed appellate counsel sought relief from judgment, as opposed to seeking to reopen his direct appeal. Alternatively, a writ of habeas corpus should issue where the Michigan Court of Appeals failed to consider the issue presented under the standards applicable to direct appeal after being instructed to do so by the Michigan Supreme Court to afford petitioner due process of law.

II.

The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), which govern this case, "circumscribe" the standard of review which federal courts must apply when considering applications for a writ of habeas corpus raising...