Williams v. Patrick, CIVIL ACTION No. 07-776

• Decision Date: 02 June 2014
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION No. 07-776
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
• Parties: JERMAINE WILLIAMS v. GEORGE PATRICK, et al.

JERMAINE WILLIAMS v. GEORGE PATRICK, et al.

CIVIL ACTION No. 07-776

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

June 2, 2014

MEMORANDUM

McLaughlin, J.

The petitioner, Jermaine Williams, is currently serving a life sentence in Pennsylvania for his state conviction for first-degree murder. Williams has filed a motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), to reopen the Court's August 17, 2012 order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Williams argues that the Court was erroneous in concluding that four of his claims were procedurally defaulted and that the Court misapplied the federal statute of limitations to four of his other claims. For the following reasons, the Court will now deny Williams's motion pursuant to Rule 60(b).

I. Background

In 1997, Williams was convicted, by a jury, of first-degree murder. The Pennsylvania state courts, through both direct review and collateral review pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541, et seq., upheld his conviction.

On February 26, 2007, Williams filed a pro se petition seeking federal habeas relief. On March 28, 2007, however, Williams filed a second PCRA petition alleging newly discovered evidence. Williams's habeas petition was accordingly stayed on March 29, 2007, pending the resolution of the second PCRA petition. The second PCRA petition was ultimately dismissed as untimely, and that decision was affirmed on appeal in the Pennsylvania state courts.

This Court granted Williams's motion to lift the stay of his federal habeas petition on June 14, 2010. The habeas petition asserted the following claims relevant to this motion:

(1) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the failure to:

(a) Request or secure funds for the retention of a fingerprint expert, who would review a handgun and ammunition magazine found near the scene of the crime (Ground A); and

(b) Investigate the origins of the handgun found near the scene of the crime (Ground B).

(2) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for the failure to:

(a) Challenge, on the basis of error or abuse of discretion, the trial court's admission of alleged hearsay testimony over trial counsel's objections (Ground E); and

(b) Raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct alleging, during summation to the jury, that the petitioner's defense counsel used the right to discovery to present false testimony (Ground G).

(3) Commonwealth committed reversible error by using the "knowingly perjured testimony" of Officer Fox, who the petitioner claims lied about having used a "macro light" and a "fingerprint glass" to examine the handgun found near the scene of the crime for identifiable fingerprints (Ground K).

(4) Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland, 43 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose the results of Officer Fox's examination of the handgun by "macro light" and "fingerprint glass" (Ground L).

(5) Commonwealth denied the petitioner his rights to confrontation, due process, and the presentation of a complete defense by withholding evidence concerning an I.A.D. investigation into Officer Fox's testimony in an unrelated matter (Ground M).

(6) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to object and/or move for a mistrial because of the jury's inconsistent verdict (Ground N, raised in the petitioner's motion to amend his habeas petition).

United States Magistrate Judge Lynne A. Sitarski filed a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") on April 26, 2012 (Docket No. 45), recommending that the Court find Grounds K, L, and M procedurally defaulted for failure to comply with Pennsylvania statute 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b), and Grounds A, B, E, and G procedurally defaulted for failure to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119. The R&R also recommended that the Court find Ground N untimely under the federal statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

By order dated August 17, 2012, this Court approved and adopted the R&R and denied the habeas petition (Docket No.50). This Court also denied the petitioner's request for a certificate of appealability. Williams appealed, but the Third Circuit denied his request for a certificate of appealability on February 12, 2013:

[F]or substantially the same reasons given by the District Court, we conclude that jurists of reason would not debate that Appellant has failed to make a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Furthermore, reasonable jurists would not debate the District Court's procedural ruling regarding Appellant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct.

Order, Williams v. Patrick, No. 12-3608 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 2013) (Docket No. 55) (citations omitted).

Williams filed his Rule 60(b) motion on January 27, 2014 (Docket No. 57). Williams argues that the Court was incorrect in finding Grounds A, B, E, and G procedurally defaulted because the Court should not have concluded that Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119 is an independent and adequate state procedural ground precluding federal habeas review. Second, Williams argues that the Court incorrectly dismissed his newly discovered evidence claims in Grounds K, L, and M on statute of limitations grounds.¹ Lastly, Williams argues that his claim under Ground N should be entitled to anexception from the one-year statute of limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013). McQuiggin held that a claim of actual innocence, if proven, provides an equitable exception to the one-year statute of limitations. 133 S. Ct. at 1928.

II. Discussion

A. Second or Successive Habeas Petition

The Court concludes that Williams's Rule 60(b) motion is not a second or successive habeas petition. In those instances in which the factual predicate of a petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion attacks the manner in which the earlier habeas judgment was procured and not the underlying conviction, the Rule 60(b) motion may be adjudicated on the merits. However, when a Rule 60(b) motion seeks to collaterally attack the petitioner's underlying conviction, the motion is treated as a successive habeas petition. Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 727 (3d Cir. 2004).

Here, Williams challenges the Court's conclusions that some of his claims were procedurally defaulted and presents arguments regarding the propriety of the Court's application ofthe AEDPA statute of limitations in light of McQuiggin. Those claims attack the manner in which his habeas petition was dismissed, and thus his motion is properly treated as a Rule 60(b) motion rather than a second or successive habeas petition.

B. Rule 60(b) Motion Standard

Rule 60 regulates the procedures by which a party may obtain relief from a final order or judgment. Subsection (b) states the grounds for relief from a final order or judgment, which include: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or inexcusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; and (6) any other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Williams cites Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) in support of his motion.

At the outset, the Court must decide whether it has jurisdiction to rule on Williams's Rule 60(b) motion. The Third Circuit has held that, when reviewing a Rule 60(b) motion brought following an appeal, district courts are "withoutjurisdiction to alter the mandate of this court on the basis of matters included or includable in [the party's] prior appeal." Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 679 F.2d 336, 337 (3d Cir. 1982). "[T]he Supreme Court's denial of certiorari ended this litigation, and the case was not sub judice when the defendants made their rule 60(b)(6) motion." Id.²

A Rule 60(b) motion based on matters that were before the Court on appeal may not be reviewed subsequently by the district court, whereas a Rule 60(b) motion based on matters that came to light after the appellate court has issued a decision properly may be reviewed by the district court. See Bernheim, 144 F. App'x at 222; see also Resyn Corp. v. United States (In re Resyn Corp.), 945 F.2d 1279, 1281-82 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that issues raised but not reached on a priorappeal are not within the law of the case doctrine); Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that a district court may enter any order or reach any decision so long as it was neither disposed of by an earlier district court order and not pursued on appeal, nor disposed of by the appellate court's mandate in the earlier appeal).

To the extent that the Court can construe Williams's arguments as outside the scope of the issues includable in his application for a certificate of appealability before the Third Circuit, the Court analyzes those claims below, for completeness.³ Williams's arguments under McQuiggin, however, certainly would not have been available at the time of hisappeal because that case was decided after the Third Circuit denied his application.

C. Rule 60(b)(1) Motion

Rule 60(b)(1) allows relief from a judgment for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made "within a reasonable time— and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Williams filed his motion on January 27,...