Williams v. Payne
| Decision Date | 03 November 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-CV-74761.,98-CV-74761. |
| Parties | Kim WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. Officer FNU PAYNE, Officer FNU Lasseigne, Sergeant FNU Cosby, City of Pontiac, Donald Brock, D.O., and Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Fred B. Walker, Royal Oak, MI, for plaintiff.
Leon B. Jukowski, Pontiac, MI, Stephanie L. Pappas, David M. Ottenwess, Detroit, MI, for defendant.
This case involves claims by the Plaintiff, Kim Williams, who contends, inter alia, that the Defendants1 encroached upon his civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and existing state laws. At issue are the motions for summary judgment and dismissal that have been filed by the Defendants, all of whom seek dispositive relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56. For the reasons that have been set forth below, their respective applications for relief will be granted in part and denied in part.2
In his Complaint, Williams asserts that he was wrongfully arrested on drug charges by Payne and Lasseigne in front of his home in Pontiac, Michigan on April 5, 1998.3 Immediately prior to his arrest, these officers perceived that Williams had consumed some illegal drugs in an ostensible effort to avoid detection and reduce the probability of a successful prosecution against him. Payne, after finding some evidence of marijuana on the ground near the site of the arrest, ordered Williams to open his mouth for an inspection.4 Immediately thereafter, Williams was transported to the municipal police station where, among other things, he was tested for traces of cocaine. (Payne Dep. at 23:25-24:9, 26:4-7:14; Williams Dep. at 11:20-12:16.) When the test yielded a positive result, Williams contends that Payne orally advised Cosby, his supervising sergeant, that "the little _________ swallowed some crack cocaine." In response, Cosby allegedly instructed Payne to "take his little ____ down to Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital and have his stomach pumped." (Williams Dep. at 11:10-14; see also Cosby Dep. at 14:24-15:2.) Williams was transported to the emergency room of the Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital by Payne and Lasseigne where they conferred with Brock, a physician, who was on duty at the time of their arrival.5 (Payne Dep. at 40:5-18.) During their conversation with Brock outside of Williams' presence, Lasseigne expressly asked the doctor to initiate a stomach pumping procedure, saying "we would like to get some evidence ...." (Brock Dep. at 45:7-11, 48:7-12, 48:20-49:4). Acting upon Brock's directive, Williams' stomach was forcibly and involuntarily pumped by the medical personnel.6 Thereafter, Williams was involuntarily catheterized to retrieve a urine sample. There was no warrant for either procedure. (Brock Dep. at 51:1-2.) At the conclusion of these medical procedures, Williams was ultimately placed in the Oakland County Jail where he remained for a period of two days until his release from custody. This law suit followed.
The Defendants have captioned their pleadings as a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on some claims and an application for the dismissal of other claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Where, as here, a party presents matters outside the pleadings, a motion that has been filed under Rule 12(b)(6) will be treated as one for the entry of summary judgment under Rule 56. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b).
Federal Rule 56(c) permits this Court to grant a summary judgment only if the pleadings and the evidence "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party will satisfy its burden only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find only for the movant. See id.; id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ().
In considering a request for the entry of a summary judgment, the Court is obliged to examine all pleadings or evidentiary submissions in the light that is most favorable to the non-moving party. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Boyd v. Ford Motor Co., 948 F.2d 283, 285 (6th Cir.1991). However, hearsay evidence may not be considered by the Court when evaluating the merit, if any, of a summary judgment motion. Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prod. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 927 (6th Cir.1999). By the same token, "[i]f a party fails to object ... to the affidavits or evidentiary materials submitted by the other party ..., any objections to the district court's consideration of such materials are deemed to have been waived." Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 226 (6th Cir.1994). It is neither the obligation nor the responsibility of this Court to weigh the facts. 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435-36 (6th Cir.1987). Rather, the Court determines only "whether ... there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Once the movant has satisfied its initial burden, the non-moving party must take affirmative steps to avoid the entry of a summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A mere scintilla of supporting evidence is insufficient. See Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir.1989). Additionally, if a party fails to make a showing that is "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial" the entry of a summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
On the other hand, if this Court determines that (1) a genuine issue of a material fact exists as to a particular claim, or (2) the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a particular claim, it may deny a summary judgment on that claim even while granting a partial summary judgment on any remaining claims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). Thus, each individual claim must be analyzed under the summary judgment standard.
This section addresses only the motion that was filed on July 7, 1999 by the Defendants, Payne, Lasseigne, Cosby and the City of Pontiac, requesting the entry of a summary judgment against Williams on all claims.
Williams contends that Payne, Lasseigne and Cosby failed to perform their ministerial duties as law enforcement officers when they collectively violated the law and encroached upon his constitutional rights as a United States citizen. However, Williams has not presented any evidence or authority upon which to ground his argument that these Defendants violated any of the ministerial duties which were required of them as police officers.
It is well settled that ministerial duties are, in general, those obligations that attach to an office and do not require an exercise of judgment or discretion. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Coxe, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 170, 192, 1 L.Ed. 786 (1800) ( ).
Although Williams argues that Mich.Comp.Laws § 691.1407 governs his claim against these Defendants for their alleged violations of their respective ministerial duties, this statute only discusses governmental immunity and its limitations. More significantly as it pertains to the Defendants in this action, § 691.1407 does not address the ministerial duties that attach to any relevant office or position, such as that of a law enforcement officer. Williams' allegations improperly characterize imperatives, which proscribe all violations of any federal or state substantive laws, as ministerial. (Compl.47-50.) These are not ministerial duties. Rather, they are fundamental constitutional and legal requirements. On the basis of the present record, this Court cannot find any support for his claim of a violation of ministerial duties by Payne, Lasseigne and Cosby, and, therefore, grants a summary judgment in their favor on this issue.
Governmental agents in Michigan receive significant immunity under Mich. Comp.Laws § 691.1407 from general tort liability. However, this immunity does not extend to intentional torts. See Mich. Comp.Laws § 691.1407(2)(c); Sudul v. City of Hamtramck, 221 Mich.App. 455, 458, 562 N.W.2d 478 (1997) (). With regard to the question of whether Payne and Lasseigne committed intentional torts, an examination of Williams' testimony in its best light supports a rejection of the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, as the subsequent evaluation by the Court under subsections 1 (Assault & Battery) and 2 (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) reveals.
In their...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Sutherland v. Mizer
...ultimately demonstrate that the alleged tortfeasors are not entitled to protection under the doctrine. Williams v. Payne, et al., 73 F.Supp.2d 785, 795 (E.D.Mich.1999), citing Blake, supra at (a) Claims Involving a Probable Cause Determination In Counts I, III and VII of the amended complai......
-
Meyer v. Woodward
...Plaintiff was a "proper goal," and "whether the means that were used to affect the medical procedure were reasonable." Williams v. Payne, 73 F.Supp.2d 785 (E.D.Mich.1999). In this case, it is undisputed that the catheterization was medically necessary, and ordered for no other reason. Thus,......
-
Curtis v. Jaskey
...925, 237 N.W. 444, 450 (1931). Many jurisdictions have articulated a similar basis for the emergency exception. In Williams v. Payne, 73 F.Supp.2d 785, 803 (E.D.Mich.1999), the court held that "consent may be implied, as in cases of emergency where there is no opportunity to obtain actual c......
-
Watson v. City of Burton
...apprehension of imminent contact, coupled with the apparent present ability to accomplish the contact." Williams v. Payne, 73 F. Supp. 2d 785, 791 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (quoting Espinoza v. Thomas, 189 Mich.App. 110, 119, 472 N.W.2d 16 (1991)). In the present case, Plaintiff stated that "I have......