Williams v. Pearce
| Decision Date | 23 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | A-12-CA-368 SS,A-12-CA-506 SS,A-12-CA-936 SS |
| Parties | FRANKLIN L. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. MIKE PEARCE, WARDEN, FCI BASTROP, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Now before the Court are three cases filed by Franklin L. Williams, likely one of the most abusive writ filers currently incarcerated in the Bureau of Prisons. As is seen in what follows, all three of the cases are patently meritless. In this Report and Recommendation the undersignedrecommends not only that each of the cases be dismissed, but also recommends that sanctions be imposed against Williams to end his abuse of the Courts of the United States.
Petitioner Franklin L. Williams ("Williams"), Reg. No. 12952-021, is currently a federal prisoner incarcerated in the Bureau of Prisons pursuant to a judgment and sentence in Criminal Case No. 5:06-CR-00014 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Clerk's Doc. No. 1. Williams is serving time after a jury found him guilty of one count of distribution of more than five grams of cocaine base and one count of distribution of more than fifty grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See United States v. Williams, No. 5:06-CR-014-WTM-JEG, ECF No. 49-1. Williams was sentenced on June 20, 2007, to 292 months of imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently with his revoked state parole term for a 1997 state conviction in Georgia for possession of cocaine. Id., ECF No. 62 at 2. Williams's convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. United States v. Williams, 262 F. App'x 165 (11th Cir. 2008). Since 2007, Williams has been transferred to a number of different federal correctional institutions, including FCI-Bastrop, where he is currently serving his sentence.
To say that Williams is a frequent or abusive filer would be a massive understatement. In the Georgia federal courts alone, Williams has filed 44 separate proceedings since 2007.2 In thecourts of this Circuit in the past two years, Williams has filed twelve habeas corpus petitions (including the instant petition), four § 1983 suits, and one "Application for Writ of Replevin."3 The Fifth Circuit has warned Williams twice against "frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise abusive filings,"and admonished him that continuing to do so could subject him to the imposition of sanctions. See Williams v. Tamez, 476 Fed.Appx. 6 (5th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Tamez, 466 Fed.Appx. 326 (5th Cir. 2012). He is not, however, currently under any prohibitions from filing suits in this Court. After setting out principles applicable to all three cases, the Court addresses each of the captioned cases separately. In the last section, the Court recommends the imposition of sanctions against Williams for his frivolous and abusive filings.
Each of these cases is filed pro se. "'[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."' Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)); Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, pro se pleadings are entitled to a liberal construction that includes all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from them. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (); United States v. Pena, 122 F.3d 3, 4 (5th Cir. 1997); see Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985) (). Nevertheless, pro se litigants are still required to provide sufficient facts in support of their claims. United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1993).
A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 "attacks the manner in which a sentence is carried out or the prison authorities' determination of its duration, and must be filed in the same district where the prisoner is incarcerated." Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Tolliver v. Dobre, 211 F.3d 876, 877 (5th Cir. 2000). A writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2241is a distinct mechanism from a "motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255." Pack, 218 F.3d at 451. Furthermore, if "a favorable determination . . . would not automatically entitle [the prisoner] to accelerated release, the proper vehicle" to attack conditions of confinement is a § 1983 suit, not a § 2241 habeas petition. Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820-21 (5th Cir. 1997).
Petitioners seeking relief under § 2241 are required to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to presenting their claims in federal court. Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994). The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has established an Administrative Remedy Program whereby inmates confined in a BOP facility can "seek formal review of an issue which relates to any aspect of their confinement." 28 C.F.R. § 542.10. A prisoner must present his claim to the prison warden and appeal any adverse decision to the BOP Regional Director and General Counsel. Id. § 542.15(a).
A prisoner does not have a constitutional right to be placed in the penal facility of his choice. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983) (); see also Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1996) (). Furthermore, the BOP is authorized to designate any available correction facility to house a prisoner, whether maintained by the federal government or otherwise and whether the facility is within or outside the judicial district in which the person was convicted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2006).
The pending matters before the Court in this case are Williams's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Clerk's Doc. No. 1) and Mike Pearce's Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Deny Williams's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Dismiss Case (Clerk's Doc. No. 8). Additionally, the Court also has before it the following motions and their associated responses, replies, and supplements:
In this case, Williams brings his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting that he is unable to diligently pursue his remedies because the BOP lost his property. Broadly construed, Williams alleges: (1) that he cannot pursue his remedies due to the BOP's loss of his property; (2) that he is being denied due process and access to the courts resulting from the loss of his property; (3) that his case represents an extraordinary circumstance; (4) that he is being denied his right to access the grand jury transcript from November Term 1996 which provides evidence that he is being illegally detained because he was not properly indicted by a grand jury; (5) that he is being denied access to the courts resulting from an illegal injunction issued in Georgia state court; and (6) that he is actually innocent of the charges against him. Respondent contends: (1) Williams's claims may not bebrought as a habeas action; (2) to the extent the Court construes Williams's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the Court does not have jurisdiction over his claims; (3) to the extent Williams's claims are construed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, such claims are untimely or subject to the "detention of goods exception"; (4) to the extent Williams's claims are construed as a denial of access to courts, he has failed to meet his burden; and (5) Williams has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Clerk's Doc. No. 8.
Williams states multiple times that the BOP lost his property, and claims several grievances based on this allegation: (1) that he cannot pursue his remedies due to the BOP's loss of his property, (2) that he is being denied due process and access to the courts resulting from the loss of his property, and (3) that his lost property presents an extraordinary circumstance. Clerk's Doc. No. 1. The record shows that Williams submitted an inquiry about his lost property to the BOP on June 2, 2010, and has followed his initial inquiry with appeals to the BOP Regional Director and BOP Central Office. As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, attempts to locate Williams's lost property have not been successful. Clerk's Doc. No. 8.
These claims are not properly brought. As noted previously, if "a favorable determination . . . would not automatically entitle [the prisoner] to accelerated release, the proper vehicle" to attack conditions of confinement is a § 1983 suit, not a § 2241 habeas petition. Carson, 112 F.3d at 820-21. Williams has not demonstrated that obtaining his property would automatically entitle him to accelerated release. The return of his property would not alter the length of Williams's sentence. Moreover, to the extent Williams seeks monetary damages for the loss of his property, he cannot obtain such...
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