Williams v. Peyton
| Decision Date | 08 February 1819 |
| Citation | 4 Wheat. 77,17 U.S. 77,4 L.Ed. 518 |
| Parties | WILLIAMS et al. v. PEYTON'S Lessee |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
THIS case was argued by Jones and Talbot, for the plaintiffs in error, and by Taylor, for the defendant in error.
This is an ejectment brought in the Circuit Court for the district of Kentucky, by the original patentee, against a purchaser at a sale made for non-payment of the direct tax, imposed by the act of congress of the 14th July 1798, c. 92. After the plaintiff in the circuit court had exhibited his title, the defendants gave in evidence the books of the supervisor of the district, showing that the tax on the lands in controversy had been charged to the plaintiffs, and that they had been sold for the non-payment thereof. They also gave in evidence a deed, executed by the marshal of the district, in pursuance of the act of March 3d, 1804, and proved by Christopher Greenup, the agent of the plaintiff, that there were tenants on the land, and that he did not pay the tax, nor redeem the land. Upon this evidence, the court on the motion of the plaintiff, instructed the jury, 'that the purchaser under the sale of lands for the non-payment of the direct tax, to make out title, must show that the collector had advertised the land, and performed the other requisites of the law of congress, in that case provided, otherwise, he made out no title.' The defendants then moved the court to instruct the jury, 'that the deed and other evidence produced by them, and herein mentioned, was prim a facie evidence that the said land had been advertised, and the other requisites of the law of congress, as to the duty of the collector, in that respect, had been complied with:' but the court refused to give the instruction; and, on the contrary, instructed the jury, 'that said deed, and other evidence, was not prim a facie evidence that the said land had been advertised according to law, nor that the requisites of the law had been complied with.' The defendants excepted to this opinion. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and the judgment rendered on that verdict is now before this court on writ of error.
As the collector has no general authority to sell lands, at his discretion, for the non-payment of the direct tax, but a special power to sell in the particular cases described in the act, those cases must exist, or his power does not arise. It is a naked power, not coupled with an interest; and in all such cases, the law requires that every pre-requisite to the exercise of that power must precede its exercise; that the agent must pursue the power, or his act will not be sustained by it.
This general proposition has not been controverted; but the plaintiffs in error contend, that a deed executed by a public officer, is prim a facie evidence, that every act which ought to precede that deed had preceded it. That this conveyance is good, unless the party contesting it can show that the officer failed to perform his duty. It is a general principle, that the party who sets up a title must furnish the evidence necessary to support it. If the validity of a deed depends on an act in pais, the party claiming under that deed is as much bound to prove the performance of the act, as he would be bound to prove any matter of record on which its validity might depend. It forms a part of his title; it is a link in the chain, which is essential to its continuity, and which it is incumbent on him to preserve. These facts should be examined by him, before he becomes a purchaser, and the evidence of them should be preserved as a necessary muniment of title. If this be true, in the general, is there anything which will render the principle inapplicable to the case of lands sold for the non-payment of taxes? In the act of congress, there is no declaration that these conveyances shall be deemed prim a facie evidence of the validity of the sale. Is the nature of the transaction such, that a court ought to presume in its favor anything which does not appear, or ought to relieve the party claiming under it from the burden of proving its correctness?
The duties of the public officer are prescribed in the 9th, 10th and 13th sections of the act of the 14th of July 1798, c. 92.(a) If these duties be examined they will be found to...
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... ... plaintiff, another deed from the Buchanan Company to the ... plaintiff, and a deed from Martin Williams et al. to the ... plaintiff. No objection was made to the introduction of any ... of the foregoing exhibits ... Exhibit ... 226, 236, 21 S.E ... 347; Sulphur Mines Co. v. Thompson, 93 Va. 316, 317, ... 25 S.E. 232; Minor's Tax Titles, p. 123; Williams v ... Peyton, 4 Wheat. 77, 80, 4 L.Ed. 518; Ronkendorff v ... Taylor, 4 Pet. 349, 359, 7 L.Ed. 882; Marx v ... Hanthorn, 148 U.S. 172, 180, 13 Sup.Ct ... ...
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Beggs v. Paine
...the acts of a stranger. This has been the settled law of this country ever since the decision of Williams v. Peyton, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 76, 4 L. Ed. 518, which involved a tax deed, and in which Chief Justice Marshall used this language: “As the collector has no general authority to sell the l......
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Beggs v. Paine
...no more validity than the acts of a stranger. This has been the settled law of this country ever since the decision of Williams v. Peyton, 17 U.S. 77, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 77, 4 L.Ed. 518, which involved a tax deed, and in which Chief Justice Marshall used this language: "As the collector has n......
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