Williams v. Philadelphia Housing
| Citation | 380 F.3d 751 |
| Decision Date | 26 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-1158.,03-1158. |
| Parties | Edward R. WILLIAMS; Angelynne Williams, H/W v. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Edward R. Williams, Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Eduardo C. Robreno, J.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Alex H. Pierre (Argued), Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.
Patrick J. Harvey, David E. Brier (Argued), Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee.
BEFORE: NYGAARD, FUENTES and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., prohibits covered employers from discriminating against qualified individuals on the basis of their disabilities. Edward Raymond Williams was unable to carry a firearm as the result of a mental condition, and was additionally perceived by his employer to be unable to have access to firearms, or be around others carrying firearms. Granting summary judgment in favor of the Philadelphia Housing Authority ("PHA"), Williams's employer, the District Court held that such limitations would not make Williams significantly restricted in the major life activity of working because they did not prevent him from performing work in a broad range of jobs in various classes. Because the District Court did not consider whether such limitations would prevent Williams from performing work in a class of jobs, and because a reasonable jury could conclude that Williams was actually (or perceived to be) precluded from working in a class of jobs, we will now reverse that grant of summary judgment and remand Williams's ADA discrimination claim (and corresponding claim under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act) for further proceedings. We will affirm the District Court's determination with respect to Williams's retaliation claims because Williams has not proffered sufficient evidence to support a retaliation claim.
Williams was hired by PHA as a police officer and worked for PHA for 24 years until his termination. On May 19, 1998, shortly after arriving for an evening shift, Williams received a page to report to the sergeant's office of PHA's police department. After being confronted by a superior officer about his fractious interactions with other employees, Williams yelled and made a number of profane and threatening remarks.
Williams was immediately suspended without pay. Later that evening, he called a counselor with Delaware County Psychological Services, and remarked, "I understand why people go postal." According to a PHA police officer who later spoke with the counselor, Williams talked of "smoking people, going postal, and having the means to do it."
Two days after the confrontation, PHA wrote to Williams and directed him to report to the PHA radio room for duty. Williams did not return to work, but instead began to call in sick on a daily basis. On June 25, 1998, PHA ordered Williams to undergo a psychological examination with its psychologist, Dr. Lauren Finley.
The parties agree that, sometime in June or July 1998, Williams submitted an application for a medical leave of absence from July 2, 1998 through August 28, 1998. The request included a "medical certification form" completed by Helen Huffington, M.S.S., a counselor with Delaware County Psychological Services, who diagnosed Williams as suffering from "Major Depression, recurrent, severe." A198. PHA approved the request. On July 29, 1998, PHA Assistant Chief Aaron Hughes wrote to Williams regarding his employment status. Hughes wrote, A197. Williams would again be asked, on September 22, 1998, to apply for a leave of absence, and did so.
On August 17, 1998, Williams's personal psychologist, Dr. Marjory Levitt, wrote a letter to Hughes regarding Williams. The letter stated, in pertinent part:
Sgt. Edward R. Williams, Sr., has requested that I write to you and report on his readiness to return to full time employment beginning August 20, 1998.
Sgt. Williams states that he is fully prepared physically and psychologically to resume his professional duties. He assures me that he is emotionally stable and able to perform reliably and fulfill his responsibilities. He is not taking any psychotropic medications and denies other substance use, with the exception of a medication for hypertension. He has not been evaluated by a psychiatrist, nor has he been in regular individual outpatient treatment. He does request that his contact with [the PHA superior officer Williams confronted on May 19, 1998] be as limited as possible.
A199.
In August and September 1998, Williams attended three appointments with Dr. Finley, PHA's psychologist. On September 21, 1998, Dr. Finley shared her evaluation of Williams's fitness for duty:
It is my professional opinion that Sgt. Williams should not resume active duty, involving his usual and normal work activities, unless he is under the proper care of medical and psychological personnel. He requires psychological treatment for depression and stress management. He also requires an evaluation by medical personnel to determine if he may be further helped by psychotropic medications. Sgt. Williams can resume working on alternate work assignments and should do so for a minimum period of 3 months in order to provide an initial opportunity for him to begin receiving benefits from regular medicinal and/or psychological treatment. He should be reevaluated after this time in order to determine whether or not he can resume active duty with the continuation of prescribed treatment regiment for the management of his stress and depression.
Sgt. Williams [sic] condition appears to be exacerbated by considerable tension between himself and one of his superiors.... It could be helpful if the difficulties between them could be mediated or if the amount of contact between the two was greatly reduced.
A200. Upon receipt of the Finley letter, PHA requested clarification of Dr. Finley's findings, to which Dr. Finley responded on October 10, 1998:
First, I have been called upon by human resources to provide a consultative evaluation for [Sergeant] Edward Williams. I have not nor will I be working with [Sergeant] Williams on an ongoing basis. Second, Mr. Williams is fully capable of working, for a temporary period, in either an administrative and/or clerical capacity. He should not carry a weapon, however, for a minimum period of three months. He can work around other officers who will be wearing their weapon. Third, it [is] anticipated that [Sergeant] Williams will be able to fully return to active duty, resuming his usual job responsibilities after this approximate three month period. However, a more definite time frame cannot be provided at this time, pending a reevaluation.
A201.
On October 13, 1998, after Dr. Finley had cleared Williams for restricted duty, Williams requested that PHA temporarily reassign him to work in the PHA training unit. Hughes responded:
[I]t is the position of this police department that the specific position that you are requesting is not open to you due to your on-going treatment with Dr. Lauren Finley ... and her recommendation that you should not carry a weapon while still under her care for the next several months. This department has also concluded that once you have completed all of your treatment with Dr. Finley, releasing you to return to full duty, with authorization to carry firearms once again, you are to report back to uniform patrol duty.
A204.
One day later, Williams wrote to Hughes requesting an assignment "in the [PHA] radio room until [his] 3 month evaluation [was] over...." PHA did not respond to that request until this litigation ensued.1
On November 19, 1998, Deputy Chief of Police Ricks wrote an internal memorandum to Carl Marinelli, Assistant General Manager for Human Resources, regarding Williams's employment status. Wrote Ricks, A863.
On December 3, 1998, Marinelli wrote to Williams requesting that he file for medical leave.
As you know, you have exhausted all leave time available as a police Officer with the Philadelphia Housing Authority. It is now necessary that you obtain the required medical evidence and apply for a medical leave of absence. This information and your formal written request should be received by my office no later than December 18, 1998. Failure to do so will result in PHA terminating your employment as of that date.
A206. Williams did not contact Marinelli regarding an application for medical leave and did not respond to the letter.
On December 29, 1998, Marinelli sent a letter to Williams notifying him that he was being terminated.
In my letter to you dated December 3, 1998 I asked that you request a medical leave of absence and submit that request along with supporting medical evidence to me no later than December 18, 1998. As you have submitted neither, I am notifying you of your termination from the Philadelphia Housing Authority effective August 28, 1998. Please call ... to discuss your termination benefits.
A249.
Williams filed a complaint against PHA in the United...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mascioli v. Arby's Restaurant Group, Inc., Civil Action No. 06-1655.
...at 201. A request for a reasonable accommodation is a protected activity under the ADA. See Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dept., 380 F.3d 751, 759 n. 2 (3d Cir.2004) (employee argued he was retaliated against for requesting a reasonable accommodation); Shellenberger v. Summit ......
-
Eshelman v. Agere Systems, Inc.
...(emphasis added). And, we have previously held that "reasonable accommodation" is relevant to a "regarded as" disability claim. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 775 ("[T]he conclusion seems inescapable that `regarded as' employees under the ADA are entitled to reasonable accommodation in the same ......
-
Sowell v. Kelly Servs., Inc.
...leave is ultimately (though begrudgingly) granted. Additionally, we note that similar employer arguments were rejected in both Schtab and Williams , as well as in other circuits. See, e.g. , Xin Liu v. Amway Corp. , 347 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir.2003) ("The [FMLA] and the accompanying regula......
-
Straka v. Comcast Cable
...in itself seldom has been deemed to be solid foundation for finding a causal relationship. See Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Dept., 380 F.3d 751, 759 (3d Cir.2004) (surveying Third Circuit cases where temporal proximity has been deemed to be unusually suggestive and reje......
-
Disability discrimination
...could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith. Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Auth. Police Dep’t , 380 F.3d 751, 772 (3rd Cir. 2004). Fifth: The employee’s initial request for an accommodation triggers the employer’s obligation to participate in the int......
-
Rights Resurgence: the Impact of the Ada Amendments Act on Schools and Universities
...of the terms . . . but no agency has been granted authority to issue binding regulations."); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 762 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating, post-Sutton, that "'we are guided by the Regulations issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission......
-
Employment Discrimination - Peter Reed Corbin and John E. Duvall
...276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998); while those finding an accommodation obligation exists include: Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 755-76 (3d Cir. 2004); and Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1996). 266. Collado, 422 F.3d at 1235. 267. 135 F.App'x 351 (11......
-
29 C.F.R. 1630 app to Part 1630 Interpretive Guidance On Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act
...by his cancer; employee would now be substantially limited in normal cell growth); Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 763-64 (3d Cir. 2004) (issue of material fact concerning whether police officer's major depression substantially limited him in performing a cl......
-
29C.F.R. 1630 app to Part 1630 Interpretive Guidance On Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act
...by his cancer; employee would now be substantially limited in normal cell growth); Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 763-64 (3d Cir. 2004) (issue of material fact concerning whether police officer's major depression substantially limited him in performing a cl......
-
29C.F.R. 1630 app to Part 1630 Interpretive Guidance On Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act
...by his cancer; employee would now be substantially limited in normal cell growth); Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 763-64 (3d Cir. 2004) (issue of material fact concerning whether police officer's major depression substantially limited him in performing a cl......