Williams v. Philadelphia Transp. Co.
| Decision Date | 14 October 1964 |
| Citation | 203 A.2d 665,415 Pa. 370 |
| Parties | Alexander WILLIAMS and Madeleyne Williams, his wife, v. PHILADELPHIA TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant and Sadie Scott. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
James Conwell Welsh, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Morris M. Shuster, Freedman, Landy & Lorry, Philadelphia, for appellees Alexander Williams and wife.
Before BELL, C. J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.
This intersection collision occurred in daylight on a summer evening, between a bus of appellant, in which appellee-wife was a passenger, and an automobile owned and operated by the co-defendant Sadie Scott. Appellees, husband and wife recovered a verdict and judgment against both defendants. Only the Philadelphia Transportation Company appealed.
The bus was proceeding eastwardly on Haverford Avenue and, when crossing Forty-sixth Street, was struck on the right side by the automobile being driven north-bound. The intersection was controlled by three sets of traffic lights.
Appellant, in seeking a new trial, assigns as error statements made by the trial Judge during the trial and in the charge to the jury. The scope of our review is to determine whether the Court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. Nelson v Barclay Motors, 414 Pa. 633, 202 A.2d 48 (1964); Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 192 A.2d 355 (1963).
During the cross-examination of the defendant Sadie Scott by counsel for defendant Transportation Company, the following colloquy occurred: 'THE COURT: It seems perfectly obvious to me, gentlemen, that none of us has seemed to have grasped the point that the witness was not asked when she was giving the statement to the investigator of the Philadelphia Transportation Company the identical questions that she is being asked today, and it is obvious that there will be a difference between what she said on the stand and what she said not under oath to an investigator who is asking the particular questions. She is bound by her testimony under oath. If she made prior inconsistent statements, she owes a duty to explain it, but I see nothing inconsistent in this statement.
'MR. SHUSTER [Attorney for Appellee]: 'If that be the case, sir, I withdraw my objection.
'MR. GOLDSBOROUGH [Attorney for Miss Scott]: I withdraw my objection also.
'MR. WELSH [Attorney for PTC]: Do I understand you see nothing inconsistent to the part I have read to the witness?
The next day counsel for the Transportation Company moved for the withdrawal of a juror, which was denied.
About a wee after the accident an investigator for the Transportation Company called on Miss Scott and she gave a statement. The investigator, about the same time, interviewed the plaintiff, Mrs. Madeleyne Williams. The statement was written by the investigator in narrative form from information given to him by Mrs. Williams. The statement was signed in two places, at the bottom of the first page and on the back of the sheet of paper. Mrs. Williams admitted the signature as hers on the back page but either denied or didn't admit the signature on the front page.
Appellant called an examiner of disputed writings and documents who qualified as an expert. He testified that, in his opinion, the signatures were written by the same person.
Appellees called a lawyer who had represented a claimant against appellant, in a claim growing out of the same accident in an arbitration proceedings in County Court. The evidence as elicited to contradict some testimony of the bus operator in connection with the accident. The lawyer for the appellant in the same arbitration hearing was in the court room but was not called to refute the testimony of the claimant's lawyer in the arbitration case.
Appellant contends that the trial Judge should not have expressed his opinion of the statement of Miss Scott and how those statements are taken by investigators. The Judge's remarks were made to counsel and within the hearing of the jury during the course of his ruling on evidence. There had been extensive cross-examination of Miss Scott based on her statement which was a narrative of part of the event and her testimony in answer to questions during the trial. The Court expressed its opinion as the reason for ruling as it did. The trial Judge is charged with the responsibility of the proper conduct of a trial and must of necessity have reposed in him wide discretion to hold within bounds the examination and cross-examination of parties and witnesses. Experienced trial Judges often apply restraint on counsel by a remark or opinion in the course of ruling on questions and thus prevent a deviation from a proper line of examination. It also serves the purpose of indicating to counsel when the subject is exhausted and further cross-examination is a tedious waste of time. The record indicates a fairly extended examination of the co-defendant, Miss Scott.
The Court did not foreclose the question of inconsistency with the jury, as counsel was told if he thought there was anything inconsistent 'you will have an opportunity to say so to the jury when it comes to that stage of the case.' There was no prejudicial error or abuse of judicial discretion by the Court in this respect. Further, the contention of appellant of error by the Court in the colloquy with counsel about the manner of giving a statement to the appellant's investigator by Miss Scott is without merit. The portion of the statement used was a statement by Miss Scott relating to the operation of her car on 46th Street immediately before the collision, and her speed and view of the bus. The statement was not in question and answer form, as was the cross-examination, and it was obvious, as the Court observed, that the questions being asked in the trial were not the same as those asked by the investigator during the interview. While the Court said it saw nothing inconsistent counsel was told he could say so to the jury if he thought there was any inconsistency. This was not error.
The Court, in charging the jury with respect to the expert testimony on signatures said:
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