Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo
| Decision Date | 17 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | 95576 |
| Parties | Christine WILLIAMS and Citizens for Life, petitioners, v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
The issue in this case is the constitutionality of an injunction against abortion protestors. The injunction limits their First Amendment activities to a sidewalk separated from the clinic that is the object of their protest by a busy four-lane avenue. The case has made its way back here after we set aside the Supreme Court of California's earlier judgment approving the injunction, 7 Cal.4th 860, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 873 P.2d 1224 (1994), and remanded the case so that the court could reconsider its holding in light of our decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). 513 U.S. 956, 115 S.Ct. 413, 130 L.Ed.2d 329 (1994). On remand, the Supreme Court of California concluded that the provision in question "is equally valid under the new standard set forth in Madsen, '' and therefore "reaffirm[ed] the judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood.'' 10 Cal.4th 1009, 1012, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 90, 898 P.2d 402, 404 (1995). That was in my view patent error, and has been confirmed as such by Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y., 519 U.S. ____, 117 S.Ct. 855, ___ L.Ed.2d ____ (1997). I think it important to the dignity of this Court and the integrity of its processes to set aside what can only be regarded as an intentional evasion of its decrees. I would grant the petition for certiorari, summarily reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of California, and remand for further proceedings.
This case-unlike Schenck -is not one in which the record reveals instances of serious unlawful conduct by clinic protestors. The following was the testimony of Janice Schoenfeld, the "escort coordinator'' of the clinic, at the hearing on the application for a permanent injunction:
This is a record so devoid of threatening physical confrontation it would make an old-fashioned union organizer blush. Yet the trial court entered-and the Supreme Court of California approved- an injunction severely curtailing the speech rights of clinic protestors in a public forum.
The basis for that injunction-and for the Supreme Court of California's initial approval of it-was the perceived government interest in preventing "increased stress and anxiety'' among abortion patients. 7 Cal.4th, at 872-876, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d, at 635-638, 873 P.2d, at 1230-1233 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the Supreme Court of California explained, "emotionally jarring confrontations with anti-abortion pickets or sidewalk "counselors' may pose serious health risks.'' Id., at 874, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d, at 637, 873 P.2d, at 1232. The "substantial governmental interest in protecting the patients' physical and emotional health and safety'' justified restricting the abortion opponents to areas far removed from the clinic. Id., at 876, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d, at 638, 873 P.2d, at 1233.
This holding was no longer supportable after we vacated the Supreme Court of California's judgment in light of Madsen, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Madsen, in disallowing an injunction which prevented abortion opponents from approaching persons seeking services at an abortion clinic, said:
"Absent evidence that the protesters' speech is independently proscribable (i.e., "fighting words' or threats), or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm, this provision cannot stand.'' 512 U.S., at 774, 114 S.Ct., at 2529 (citation omitted).
Despite this holding, the Supreme Court of California, on remand, did not abandon but reaffirmed its assertion that avoiding upset to the clinic's clients justified keeping the protesters at a distance. 10 Cal.4th, at 1021, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d, at 96, 898 P.2d, at 410. When the defendants again petitioned us for certiorari, we held the case pending our decision in Schenck.
Whatever glimmer of hope Madsen might have left regarding the legitimacy of the Supreme Court of California's "emotional upset'' justification was entirely snuffed by Schenck, in which we reiterated, in the most unmistakable terms, that there is no legitimate government interest in protecting the "right of the people approaching and entering [clinics] to be left alone'' on the public streets, 519 U.S., at ____, 117 S.Ct., at 869. Schenck would require, without further analysis, a reversal of the judgment here, but for one additional factor: In its second opinion in this case-after our remand in light of Madsen-the California Supreme Court for the first time discerned a second state interest in support of the injunction: an interest in "ensuring unfettered access'' to the clinic, 10 Cal.4th, at 1022, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d, at 96, 898 P.2d, at 410. This, it should be noted with suspicion, is an interest which the court had expressly disclaimed in its first opinion, saying that "the critical issue [is] not access, but health and safety.'' 7 Cal.4th, at 879, n. 10, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d, at 640, n. 10, 873 P.2d, at 1235, n. 10.
It is not normally our practice to scrutinize the record support for the grounds asserted by state courts or lower federal courts as a basis for rejecting constitutional claims. We have, however, sometimes been disposed to do so when the abridgment of First Amendment rights was at issue. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915, and n. 50, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3427, and n. 50, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235, 83 S.Ct. 680, 683, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963). And we should in my view always be disposed to do so when the grounds are newly minted after a remand, contradict what was said before the remand, and bear indication of an attempt to evade the consequences of our holding prompting the remand. That is the case here; and an examination of the record for support of the newly minted ground discloses that it does not exist.
The trial court made many findings regarding activities tending to cause, not blocking of the entrances to the clinic parking lot, but "increased stress and anxiety'' to clinic patrons and staff: protesters "confront and intimidate women seeking [respondent's] services,'' "force . . . "counseling' upon [respondent's] staff and clients,'' "have called staff "murderers' or asked them not to "kill babies' in the presence of small children,'' "have pursued [respondent's] clients to their cars or public transportation in an effort to distribute literature and the plastic fetuses,'' and "bring small children to the area who run up and down the public sidewalk in front of plaintiff's premises.'' App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a-43a. The trial court also made findings regarding the impact of these activities on respondent, its patrons, and its staff: " [Respondent] must escort its clients through picket lines and [petitioners'] "picketers/counselors' in its parking lot,'' and " [t]he conduct of [petitioners] and their picketers/counselors have [sic] caused some of the women seeking counselling or services from plaintiff to become emotionally distraught.'' Ibid. But the only finding remotely related to access to the clinic is the following: Protesters "stand directly in front of [respondent's] office door and interfer [sic] with or obstruct entrance to and from [respondent's] clinic.'' Id., at 42a. This finding (which, by the way, has no support in the record if it is interpreted to mean physical obstruction1) pertains to behavior at the entrance to the clinic -which is some 100 feet inside the parking lot, from which the injunction (without objection) excludes the protesters entirely. It obviously cannot support excluding protesters from the public sidewalk adjoining the entrances to the parking lot, where it has never been so much as suggested that any blocking of access occurred. The Supreme Court of California's opinion misrepresents this, saying that "the trial court found here, that petitioners had significantly blocked driveways . . . . '' 10 Cal.4th, at 1023, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d, at 97, 898 P.2d, at 411. The only authority cited for this proposition is that portion of the court's own pre-Madsen opinion...
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