Williams v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.

• Decision Date: 08 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. Civ. PJM 00-1429.,Civ. PJM 00-1429.
• Citation: 115 F.Supp.2d 561
• Parties: Anthony WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiff, v. POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

115 F.Supp.2d 561

Anthony WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiff, v. POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, Defendant.

No. Civ. PJM 00-1429.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

September 8, 2000.

Steven B. Preller, Peter D. Fastow, Troese, Fastow & Preller, Annapolis, MD, Dennis C. Reich, Paul T. Warner, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Ralph N. Albright, Jr., Mark A. Srere, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

OPINION

MESSITTE, District Judge.

This proposed class action suit was removed from the Circuit Court for Calvert County. Anthony and Toni Williams, the two named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, have sued the Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO) for damages resulting from an oil discharge from a PEPCO pipeline that occurred on April 7, 2000 at or near Swanson Creek, a tributary of the Patuxent River in Southern Maryland. Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Remand the case to state court which PEPCO opposes. On the supposition that the Court will retain jurisdiction, PEPCO has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.

The Court will DENY Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand. PEPCO's Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED IN PART and DEFERRED IN PART.

I.

A) Plaintiffs reside in Prince Frederick, Calvert County, Maryland. PEPCO is a corporation duty organized according to the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the District of Columbia, with principal offices in the District of Columbia. PEPCO controls, maintains and operates a 51-mile long pipeline for the purpose of transporting oil to the Chalk Point Generation Station in Aquasco, Maryland where the oil is converted to electricity. On April 7, 2000, a section of the 51-mile long pipeline burst, causing more than 100,000 gallons of fuel oil to leak into marshland near the Chalk Point Station. The oil eventually entered the Patuxent River and washed ashore on land owned by Plaintiffs as well as others in Calvert and Prince George's Counties.¹ Plaintiffs claim that as a result they and the 500 or so members of the proposed class suffered environmental damage, loss of use and enjoyment of their property; foul odors; decrease of real property value; loss of use and enjoyment of piers and bulkheads; noxious odors, fumes and hazardous material in the water and on the property; loss of recreational use and enjoyment of the resources of the Patuxent River and of the Patuxent River itself; loss of commercial use and enjoyment of the resources and of the Patuxent River itself; medical expenses; mental distress; and loss of income.

Believing that PEPCO's acts and omissions caused the oil spill, Plaintiffs have framed causes of action against it in negligence (Count I), trespass (Count II), strict liability (Count III), and nuisance (Count IV). As to each count, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the proposed class, seek damages "in an amount exceeding Twenty-Five Thousand and No/100 ($25,000.00) in compensatory damages, punitive damages, court costs, post judgment interest at the legal rate, and any further relief deemed appropriate by this Court."

B) PEPCO bases its removal of the case to this Court on both federal question and diversity of citizenship grounds. As to the former, PEPCO contends that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990(OPA), 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., which imposes liability inter alia for discharges of oil into or upon navigable waters and which establishes a comprehensive scheme for the presentation and consideration of claims arising from such discharges prior to the commencement of litigation, pre-empts the state claims Plaintiffs are attempting to assert.

With regard to diversity jurisdiction, PEPCO points out that the citizenship of the parties is indisputably diverse and that, while the Complaint pleads damages "in excess of $25,000.00," were Plaintiffs to prevail on their claim, their damages would exceed the $75,000.00 diversity jurisdictional amount. PEPCO argues that Plaintiffs seek to enforce a "simple, unitary, individual right" on behalf of the class and that, accordingly, the damages of the class, including punitive damages, should be aggregated for purposes of determining whether the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum. Alternatively, PEPCO asks the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any unnamed plaintiffs whose damages claims might not satisfy the jurisdictional minimum.

In support of their Motion to Remand, Plaintiffs argue that the present action is not founded on a claim or right arising out of the laws of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. They contend that OPA does not preempt state causes of action so that their failure to make presentment according to the provisions of OPA is irrelevant. They further deny that PEPCO has shown that the damages they claim exceed the requisite diversity jurisdictional amount.

In reply, PEPCO elaborates upon its OPA pre-emption argument and says that Plaintiffs may not, under the "artful pleading" doctrine, defeat removal by omitting to plead this federal question. Alternatively, PEPCO develops a series of legal and factual arguments to the end of establishing the Court's diversity jurisdiction.²

Because issues pertaining to the Motion to Remand and the Motion to Dismiss overlap to a considerable extent, the Court analyzes the issues generically, then applies its conclusions to the respective motions.

II.

Does OPA preempt State law causes of action?

A) Whether a case "arises under" federal law for jurisdictional purposes is determined by reference to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). By this rule the Court considers what appears in the plaintiff's statement of claim without reference to the answer filed by defendant. There is no federal question jurisdiction where a defendant simply claims that a complaint based on state law is preempted by federal law. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). Thus a defendant cannot ordinarily exercise "defensive preemption," that is, remove a case from state court on the ground that state law is preempted by federal law. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 13-14, 103 S.Ct. 2841. On the other hand, because the preemptive force of certain federal statutes is sufficiently strong that it displaces any state causes of action, in such cases a plaintiff's "artful pleading" of state law will not undermine the federal nature of the lawsuit and the state court action will be removable to federal court. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987).

Plaintiffs in this case have clearly pleaded what on their face are purely state law causes of action. The question is whether OPA, as PEPCO claims, is sufficiently preemptive to displace those causes of action and validate the removal.

B) For all of PEPCO's arguments that OPA preempts state common law causes of action to recover removable costs and damages in oil spill cases because the state actions would conflict with OPA's "full purposes and objectives," see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), the matter was effectively put to rest in U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000), decided by the Supreme Court last term. Locke involved state regulations governing tanker operations and their interrelation with federal statutes and international instruments applicable to such operations. Finding preemption as to a number of the state regulations, the Court had occasion to comment upon the savings clauses of Title I of OPA:

Title I of OPA contains two saving clauses, stating:

"(a) Preservation of State authorities ...

"Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall —

"(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as pre-empting, the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to —

"(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State

. . . . .

"(c) Additional requirements and liabilities; penalties

"Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 (46 U.S.C. § 183 et seq.), or section 9509 of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 9509]), shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof —

"(1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements

. . . . .

"relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil." 33 U.S.C. § 2718.

* * *

The savings clauses are found in Title I of OPA, captioned Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation and creating a liability scheme for oil pollution.... Placement of the saying clauses in Title I of OPA suggests that Congress intended to preserve state laws of a scope similar to the matters contained in Title I of OPA, not all state laws similar to the matters covered by the whole of OPA or to the whole subject of maritime oil transport. The evident purpose of the saving clauses is to preserve state laws which, rather than imposing substantive regulation of a vessel's primary conduct, establish liability rules and financial requirements relating to oil spills. See Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250 ___, 120 S.Ct. 740, 744, 145 L.Ed.2d 747 (2000) (words of a statute should be interpreted consistent with their neighbors to avoid giving unintended breadth to an Act of Congress).

Our conclusion is fortified by Congress' decision to limit the saving clauses by the same key words it used in declaring the scope of Title I of OPA. Title I of OPA permits recovery of damages involving vessels "from which oil is discharged or substantial threat of a discharge, or which pos[e] the substantial threat of a discharge of oil." 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). The saving clauses, in parallel manner, permit States to impose liability or requirements ...