Williams v. Puerto Rico

• Decision Date: 21 December 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. 12–1218 (FAB).
• Citation: 910 F.Supp.2d 386
• Parties: Danny WILLIAMS, et als., Plaintiffs, v. Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO, et als., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

910 F.Supp.2d 386

Danny WILLIAMS, et als., Plaintiffs,

v.Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO, et als., Defendants.

Civil No. 12–1218 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Dec. 21, 2012.

Osvaldo Sandoval–Baez, Sandoval Baez y Asociados, Fajardo, PR, for Plaintiff.

Maraliz Vazquez–Marrero, Departamento de Justicia, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

FRANCISCO A. BESOSA, District Judge.

Before the Court is the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) filed by defendants Police Department, Department of Justice, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Puerto Rico Superior Court (collectively, “defendants”). (Docket No. 15.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUNDA. Factual & Procedural History

On April 10, 2012, plaintiffs Danny Williams (“Williams”) and Ruben Gonzalez Lora (“Gonzalez”) filed an amended complaint, alleging that Puerto Rico's Weapons Act of 2000 (“P.R. Weapons Act”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 25, §§ 455–460k, is facially invalid pursuant to the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Docket No. 5.) Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On September 8, 2011, plaintiff Gonzalez, a law student at the Interamerican University in Puerto Rico, requested a permit to carry a weapon pursuant to section 456d of the P.R. Weapons Act. Id. at pp. 3 & 5. Judge Gisela Alfonso Fernandez (“Judge Alfonso”) of the Puerto Rico Superior Court denied plaintiff Gonzalez's petition after he failed to provide three sworn statements from reputation witnesses, a sworn statement to the effect that he filed his Commonwealth taxes, and a certificate from child support stating that he had no debt. Id. at p. 5. On October 11, 2011, plaintiff Williams, an active duty Coastguardsman, also requested a permit to carry a weapon pursuant to section 456d. Id. at pp. 3 & 5. Because his application was missing necessary papers—income tax returns and testimony by three reputation witness—Judge Alfonso also denied his petition on November 7, 2011. Id. at p. 5.

In their amended complaint, plaintiffs argue (1) that the Puerto Rico government may not license the right to keep and bear arms, pursuant to the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (2) that the P.R. Weapons Act discriminates against average citizens and favors certain government officials; (3) that sections 456a and 456d of the P.R. Weapons Act unconstitutionally vest uncontrolled discretion in the hands of state officials; and (4) that the filing requirements contained in sections 456a and 456d are unconstitutional. Id. at pp. 6–7.

On July 12, 2012, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing (1) that neither plaintiff has standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 456a; (2) that plaintiffs fail to establish a violation of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) that the P.R. Weapons Act is constitutional under an intermediate scrutiny standard of review.¹ (Docket No. 15.)

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court can dismiss a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When assessing whether a plaintiff's complaint provides “fair notice to the defendants” and states “a facially plausible legal claim,” the Court must utilize a two-pronged approach. See Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11–12 (1st Cir.2011). First, the Court can disregard statements that “offer legal conclusions couched as fact,” because the plaintiff must do more than “parrot the elements of the cause of action.” Id. at 12. Second, the Court is bound to treat all “properly pled factual allegations” as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. Id. The Court must base its determination solely on the material submitted as part of the complaint and expressly incorporated within it. See Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2001).

The factual material pleaded must be sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and to permit the Court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff's pleading must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A district court should not attempt to forecast the likelihood of success even if proving the alleged facts is “improbable.” Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint that contains a plausible basis for relief, therefore, “may proceed even if it appears that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal citation omitted). The Court will draw “on its judicial experience and common sense” in evaluating the complaint's plausibility. Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir.2012) (internal citation omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

The Court addresses in turn the following three arguments contained in defendants' motion to dismiss: First, that neither plaintiff has standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 456a; second, that plaintiffs fail to establish a violation of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and third, that the P.R. Weapons Act is constitutional under an intermediate scrutiny standard of review.

A. Constitutional Standing

1. Standard

“Article III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power of the United States to the resolution of cases and controversies.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). A crucial part of the case and controversy limitation on the power of federal courts is the requirement that a plaintiff must have standing to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. at 471–73, 102 S.Ct. 752. “[S]tanding is a threshold issue” and determines whether a federal court has “the power to hear the case, and whether the putative plaintiff is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the case.” Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 436 (1st Cir.1995) (internal citation omitted). If a plaintiff lacks standing to bring a matter to federal court, a district court lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case and must dismiss the complaint. United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir.1992).

To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs must show that they have a “personal stake in the outcome” of the claim asserted by meeting a three-part test. Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 27 (1st Cir.2006) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)) (internal citations omitted). They must show: “(1) a concrete and particularized injury in fact, (2) a causal connection that permits tracing the claimed injury to defendants' actions, and (3) a likelihood that prevailing in the action will afford some redress for the injury.” Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC v. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 589 F.3d 458, 467 (1st Cir.2009) (internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the standing inquiry is claim-specific: a plaintiff must have standing to bring each and every claim that he asserts. Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 71–72 (1st Cir.2012) (citing Pagan, 448 F.3d at 26). Because they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, “each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of litigation.” Katz, 672 F.3d at 71 (internal citation omitted). At the pleading or motion to dismiss stage, “general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citation omitted).

The first element of Article III standing is an injury in fact, defined as “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (footnote, citations, and internal quotations omitted). The First Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that these characteristics are distinct. See Katz, 672 F.3d at 71. “Particularity demands that a plaintiff must have personally suffered some harm [, and ... t]he requirement of an actual or imminent injury ensures that the harm has either happened or is sufficiently threatening; it is not enough that the harm might occur at some future time.” Id. The final two elements of standing are causation and redressability. Causation requires a plaintiff to show a sufficiently direct causal connection, which “cannot be overly attenuated,” between the challenged action and the identified harm. Donahue v. City of Boston, 304 F.3d 110, 115 (1st Cir.2002). Because the opposing party must be the source of the harm, causation is absent if the injury stems from the independent action of a third party. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Redressability requires a plaintiff to show that a favorable resolution of his or her claim would likely remedy the professed injury. Redressability is a matter of degree, and to satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff “need not definitively demonstrate that a victory would completely remedy the harm.” Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuño, 670 F.3d 310, 318 (...