Williams v. Ragaglia

• Decision Date: 06 August 2002
• Docket Number: (SC 16587)
• Citation: 802 A.2d 778,261 Conn. 219
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SHIRLEY WILLIAMS v. KRISTINE D. RAGAGLIA, COMMISSIONER OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES

261 Conn. 219

802 A.2d 778

SHIRLEY WILLIAMS v. KRISTINE D. RAGAGLIA, COMMISSIONER OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES

(SC 16587)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 11, 2002.

Officially released August 6, 2002.

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js. Stephen G. Vitelli, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).

Royal J. Stark, with whom, on the brief, was Eric V. McGrew, certified legal intern, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

KATZ, J.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the appeal by the plaintiff, Shirley Williams, from the decision of the defendant, Kristine D. Ragaglia, the commissioner of children and families (commissioner), revoking her special study foster care license was rendered moot when the plaintiff was awarded legal custody of the two children who were the subject of the foster care license. The defendant appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judgment dismissing the plaintiff's appeal on the ground of mootness. We conclude that, because the plaintiff has demonstrated a reasonable possibility that collateral consequences will arise from the revocation of her foster care license, her claim was not rendered moot when she was awarded legal custody of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record contains the following facts and procedural history that are relevant to our resolution of this issue. In 1993, the department of children and families (department) issued a limited special study foster care license (special license)¹ to the plaintiff, specifically to provide care to two minor half siblings, S and K.² The plaintiff is also the legal guardian of a half sister of S and K, D, and has minor children of her own. In May, 1997, after periodic renewals of the special license, the department sent a letter to the plaintiff citing several foster care regulations and stating that there were sufficient grounds to recommend a revocation of her license.³ On November 26, 1997, after conducting hearings on the department's recommendation, a hearing officer issued a proposed final decision. In the proposed decision, the hearing officer ruled that, although the plaintiff had violated certain foster care regulations, her special license "[would] be retained, with certain conditions . . . as it would be in the children's best interests to maintain them in this placement despite the licensing violations found."⁴

After department staff filed an objection to the proposed decision, on June 3, 1998, the commissioner remanded the matter for a further hearing to determine: (1) the extent to which the plaintiff had complied with the conditions of the proposed final decision; (2) the extent to which the plaintiff generally had complied with the department licensing regulations since the conclusion of the previous hearing; and (3) the best interests of S and K. On March 9, 1999, the hearing officer issued a second proposed final decision, finding that the plaintiff's adult daughter, who had been convicted on felony drug charges, was living in the plaintiff's household, and concluding, therefore, that the plaintiff was in violation of the regulations pertaining to limitations on who may be members of the foster household and on the provision of substitute care. The proposed decision upheld the department's May, 1997 recommendation to revoke the plaintiff's special license based upon her noncompliance with licensing regulations. The commissioner adopted the second proposed decision in its entirety on June 21, 1999.

The department then began action to remove S and K from the plaintiff's home. In response, the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the juvenile matters division of the Superior Court seeking legal custody of S and K.⁵ Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a contemporaneous administrative appeal in the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183, seeking a reversal of the decision revoking her special license.⁶ She also sought a stay of the decision revoking her special license.

While the administrative appeal was pending, the department decided to support the plaintiff's petition for custody and guardianship of S and K. On December 14, 1999, the trial court resolved the petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the plaintiff's favor and transferred legal custody of S and K to her. As the children's legal guardian, the plaintiff no longer needed a special license. See General Statutes § 17a-93 (d) (defining guardianship).⁷ As a result, on May 25, 2000, the commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's administrative appeal as moot. On June 27, 2000, after oral argument, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's administrative appeal as moot.

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that her claim was not moot because: (1) she was then suffering and would continue to suffer harm and adverse consequences as a result of the commissioner's decision to revoke her special license; and (2) the trial court could grant practical relief from this harm by overturning the revocation decision. Williams v. Ragaglia, 64 Conn. App. 171, 172, 779 A.2d 803 (2001). The Appellate Court agreed with the plaintiff that her claim was not moot. Id., 175. The court noted that, as the biological mother of her own minor children and as the legal guardian of S and K, who previously had been wards of the department, the plaintiff was a member of the class that the department is authorized to investigate.⁸ Id. The Appellate Court reasoned, therefore, that, if the plaintiff were to come under the department's scrutiny in the future, the department could use the plaintiff's record containing the license revocation against her. Id. It further noted that the trial court could provide practical relief to the plaintiff if it overturned the license revocation, thereby giving the plaintiff a clean record with the department. Id. Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiff's appeal was not moot, reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for an adjudication on the merits of the administrative appeal. Id., 175-76. Thereafter, the commissioner petitioned this court for certification to appeal. We granted the commissioner's petition, limited to the following question: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that [the] administrative appeal regarding the revocation of the plaintiff's special study foster care license was not moot?" Williams v. Ragaglia, 258 Conn. 921, 782 A.2d 1254 (2001).

A claim of mootness implicates the well established rule that "[a]n actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Giaimo v. New Haven, 257 Conn. 481, 492-93, 778 A.2d 33 (2001).

The commissioner claims that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the plaintiff's claim was not moot. Specifically, the commissioner contends that, once the plaintiff obtained legal custody of S and K, the special license was no longer required for the children's care. Therefore, relief in the form of reinstatement of the special license is now impractical. The commissioner also claims that the Appellate Court improperly expanded our mootness jurisprudence by allowing a speculative injury that might arise from future dealings with the department to satisfy our justiciability requirements.

The commissioner's claim raises an issue that is related to a similar claim raised in another case that we have decided today. See State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). In McElveen, we addressed the issue of whether the reasonable possibility for prejudicial collateral consequences stemming from a challenged impropriety can establish the requisite injury necessary for jurisdiction. Id., 205-212. We rejected therein the state's invitation to follow the United States Supreme Court's decision in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14, 118 S. Ct. 978, 140 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1998), which held that actual, necessary collateral consequences were required in order to justify the continuing exercise of jurisdiction under the United States constitution. State v. McElveen, supra, 209. Instead, we reaffirmed this court's long-standing mootness jurisprudence, namely, that, despite developments during the pendency of an appeal that would otherwise render a claim moot, the court may retain jurisdiction when a litigant shows that "there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur." Id., 208; see, e.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. Whitney, 227 Conn. 829, 837 n. 13, 633 A.2d 296 (1993); Housing Authority v. Lamothe, 225 Conn. 757, 765, 627 A.2d 367 (1993); State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 161, 540 A.2d 679 (1988); see also State v. Reilly, 60 Conn. App. 716, 724-25, 760 A.2d 1001 (2000); Haynes v. Bronson, 13 Conn. App. 708, 711, 539 A.2d 592 (1988). The commissioner does not contest our doctrine establishing that potential collateral consequences arising from a challenged action defeat a claim of mootness. Rather, the commissioner contends that the record must demonstrate that the plaintiff will or is likely to suffer specific, foreseeable collateral consequences stemming from the commissioner's decision to revoke her special license. Essentially, the commissioner contends that the Appellate Court's reasoning that the department could use the plaintiff's license revocation to her detriment in future...