Williams v. Rapelje

• Decision Date: 10 June 2014
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 11-14801
• Parties: TIMOTHY L. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. LLOYD RAPELJE, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

TIMOTHY L. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. LLOYD RAPELJE, Respondent.

CASE NO. 11-14801

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: June 10, 2014

HONORABLE SEAN F. COX

OPINION AND ORDER

DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,

DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, BUT

GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

Pending before the Court is petitioner Timothy L. Williams's pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The habeas petition challenges Petitioner's convictions for carjacking and assault with intent to rob while armed. Petitioner alleges that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient, the jury's verdict was inconsistent, he was deprived of a fair trial by the victim's reference to a bullet fragment in his eye and by the prosecutor's closing arguments, he is entitled to be re-sentenced, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress his statements to the police. Respondent Lloyd Rapelje argues in a responsive pleading filed through counsel that four of Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted and that his other claims lack merit or are not cognizable in a habeas action. Having reviewed the pleadings and record, the Court concludes that the state court's adjudication of Petitioner's claims was objectively reasonable. The habeas petition therefore is denied. A procedural history and analysis of Petitioner's claims follow.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Charges, Trial, Sentence, and Appeal

Petitioner was charged in Wayne County, Michigan with seven counts: assault with intent to rob while armed, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.89; carjacking, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529a; assault with intent to commit murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.83; assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84; felon in possession of a firearm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f; felonious assault, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.82; and possession of a firearm during the commission of, or attempt to commit, a felony, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. Petitioner was tried before a jury in Wayne County Circuit Court where the evidence established that,

[i]n the early morning hours of June 6, 2008, Andre Le-France, a federal air marshal, was on his way home when he stopped to order food at a Coney Island restaurant drive-thru. After Le-France had placed his order, a young man wearing a bandana over his face and carrying what appeared to be a gun in his hand, approached the open window of Le-France's vehicle, and ordered Le-France out of the vehicle. As Le-France was reaching for his own service weapon, he saw and heard a gunshot. Le-France fired several shots at defendant and defendant ran from the vehicle. Le-France attempted to pursue defendant, then gave up and returned to his vehicle. Defendant was apparently hit with Le-France's shots and, immediately after the incident, went to the hospital for treatment of his gunshot wounds. Defendant was later arrested.

People v. Williams, No. 288704, 2010 WL 4671107 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2010).

On September 22, 2008, the jury found Petitioner guilty of assault with intent to rob while armed, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.89, and carjacking, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529a. The jury acquitted Petitioner of the other five charges. The trial court subsequently sentenced Petitioner as a habitual offender, second offense, toimprisonment for two consecutive terms of eighteen to thirty-five years in prison.

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence and then moved to remand his case to the trial court for re-sentencing and an evidentiary hearing. The Michigan Court of Appeals declined to remand the case for re-sentencing, but it granted Petitioner's request for a remand to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

On remand, Petitioner moved for a new trial on the ground that his trial attorney should have moved to suppress his statements to the police. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and then denied Petitioner's motion after concluding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to attempt to suppress Petitioner's statements to the police.

The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed Petitioner's convictions, but remanded his case for re-sentencing because his sentencing guidelines were calculated incorrectly. See Williams, 2010 WL 4671107.¹ On April 25, 2011, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because it was not persuaded to review the issues. See People v. Williams, 489 Mich. 899; 796 N.W.2d 89 (2011) (table).²

B. The Habeas Petition and Answer

On November 1, 2011, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition in this Court. He argues that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for assaultwith intent to rob while armed; (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for carjacking; (3) his assault conviction must be vacated because it is inconsistent with his acquittal on the charges for felonious assault and felony firearm; (4) evidence that the complainant may have a bullet fragment in his eye deprived him of a fair trial; (5) the prosecutor deprived him of a fair trial by misstating the law and by bolstering the credibility of the star prosecution witness; (6) he is entitled to re-sentencing because (a) the statute does not contemplate consecutive sentencing, (b) his sentence was disproportionate, and (c) he was not given credit for time spent in custody prior to sentencing; and (7) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress his statements to the police. Petitioner incorporates by reference his state appellate briefs.

Respondent urges the Court to deny the habeas petition on the grounds that Petitioner procedurally defaulted claims III, IV, V, and VI and that his remaining claims lack merit or are not cognizable on habeas review. "Procedural default is not a jurisdictional bar to review on the merits." Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 476 (6th Cir. 2005). Consequently, "federal courts are not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the petitioner on the merits." Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997)).

Furthermore, to obtain habeas relief on claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court, a petitioner "must establish cause and prejudice for the defaults" and "also show that the claims are meritorious." Babick v. Berghuis, 620 F.3d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Hargrave-Thomas v. Yukins, 374 F.3d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 2004)).Petitioner's claims lack substantive merit, and because a "cause-and-prejudice analysis adds nothing but complexity to the case," the Court "cut[s] to the merits here." Id.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The statutory authority of federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)." Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783 (2011). Pursuant to § 2254, the Court may not grant a state prisoner's application for the writ of habeas corpus unless the state court's adjudication of the prisoner's claims on the merits

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). While some federal judges find the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) too confining, all federal judges must obey the provision of law. White v. Woodall, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1701 (2014).

Under the "contrary to" clause [of § 2254(d)(1)], a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause [of § 2254(d)(1)], a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (O'Connor, J., opinion of the Court for Part II). "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that courtconcludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411.

"AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997), and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt,' Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). "[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). To obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on his or her claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 786-87.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The first two habeas claims allege that there was...