Williams v. Rappeport

• Decision Date: 09 June 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. No. K-87-292.
• Citation: 699 F. Supp. 501
• Parties: David McKivitt WILLIAMS v. Jonas R. RAPPEPORT and Alice Dvoskin.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

699 F. Supp. 501

David McKivitt WILLIAMS v. Jonas R. RAPPEPORT and Alice Dvoskin.

Civ. No. K-87-292.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

June 9, 1988.

David McKivitt Williams, Chestertown, Md., pro se.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Md., James G. Klair, Julia M. Freit, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

FRANK A. KAUFMAN, Senior District Judge.

This case arises out of a hotly disputed state court custody battle between former spouses over their only child. Plaintiff David Williams brings this action against psychiatrist Jonas Rappeport and psychologist Alice Dvoskin, in connection with their roles in that state court custody litigation, seeking damages and injunctive relief for alleged constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and for state claims pursuant to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Williams contends that Drs. Rappeport and Dvoskin conspired with his former wife, Joan Turner, the state court judges involved in the custody case, Turner v. Williams, Equity No. 6206 (Circuit Court for Talbot County, Maryland), and others, to deprive him of custody of his daughter pursuant to a policy which discriminates against men in custody cases. Williams has sued those judges and others in two related cases pending in this court, Williams v. Anderson, Civil No. K-85-1646, and Williams v. North, Civil No. K-85-3088.¹

Williams was awarded custody of his daughter in March, 1978, in Turner v. Williams, supra, an action brought by Ms. Turner to obtain custody following the couple's divorce. During the daughter's visit with her mother in Virginia in September, 1984, Ms. Turner sought, and Judge John North, II issued, an ex parte order of the Circuit Court of Talbot County transferring custody of the child to her mother.

In August, 1985, after efforts by Williams to regain custody of the child, Judge North placed the child in a boarding school in Pennsylvania, and later ordered professional evaluations of both parents and of the child. The evaluations were to be conducted outside Talbot County because of the publicity associated with the custody battle and the high visibility of the parents. Judge North asked Dr. Rappeport, a psychiatrist, to conduct the examinations in his capacity as a private practitioner. Dr. Rappeport is also the director of the Medical Office of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Dr. Rappeport agreed to undertake the evaluations but, in view of Ms. Turner's financial status, suggested that the matter be handled through the Medical Office. Judge North agreed and issued an Order for Psychiatric and Psychological Treatment, dated February 26, 1986, referring the child and the parents to Dr. Rappeport and Dr. Dvoskin, a psychologist at the Medical Office. Dr. Dvoskin conducted the evaluations, obtained Dr. Rappeport's review and approval, and reported her findings to Judge North on May 6, 1986, apparently recommending that the child be placed in the mother's custody and sent to a boarding school. Both defendant doctors later testified to the contents of the evaluation report at a custody hearing before Judge North, who then determined to follow their recommendation.

This case centers on Williams' claim that "Dvoskin and Rappeport somehow reached an understanding and a meeting of the minds with Judge North ... and Joan Turner to deprive the plaintiff of the custody of his child, the right to supervise, protect and care for his child, without due process of law and in violation of his right to equal treatment or equal protection of the law all bottomed upon sexual preference and bias against the male sex in favor of the female sex."² Williams also asserts violations of his rights under Maryland law, including his right to privacy and his right to be free of a conspiracy to deprive him of the custody of his child.

Drs. Rappeport and Dvoskin have moved to dismiss Williams' complaint on the grounds that (1) they did not act under color of state law; (2) Williams has not stated a claim for violation of any rights protected by section 1983; (3) Williams has failed to state a claim cognizable under section 1985(3); and (4) they are entitled to absolute immunity as judicial officers. In response to a request by this court, defendants filed affidavits of Judge North and Drs. Rappeport and Dvoskin. Williams, although given the opportunity, did not submit any further documents in form appropriate under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Since documents in addition to pleadings are included in the record in this case, defendants' motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 56. For the reasons discussed below, this court concludes that Williams has stated a cause of action under section 1983 and also section 1985(3), but may not prevail because the two defendant doctors are entitled to absolute immunity.

I. 1983 and Acting Under Color of State Law

Williams, in order successfully to state a section 1983 claim, must establish that the defendants acted under color of state law and deprived Williams of a right secured by the federal Constitution or a federal statute. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-36, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664-65, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Defendants contend that, as court-appointed professionals, they were acting as an arm of the judiciary and therefore were not acting under color of state law.

A person acts under color of state law "only when exercising power `possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'" Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18, 102 S.Ct. 445, 449, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941)) (footnote omitted). "The ultimate issue in determining if a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is whether the alleged infringement of federal rights is fairly attributable to the state.... This is a factbound inquiry." Calvert v. Sharp, 748 F.2d 861, 862 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1132, 105 S.Ct. 2667, 86 L.Ed.2d 283 (1985).

In Calvert, Judge Chapman concluded that a physician privately employed by a nonprofit professional corporation "employing numerous physicians and other health personnel," id. at 862, did not act under color of state law when he provided medical services to a prisoner in the Maryland penitentiary because the physician "had no supervisory or custodial functions," id. at 863, "owed his ethical obligation and undivided loyalty to his patient," id., and was not engaged in a function which traditionally had been the "exclusive prerogative of the state." Id. at 864. But see Ort v. Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 1986) (physician who contracted with the state to provide medical care to inmates was acting under color of state law, since "he took over the state's responsibility for attending to inmate medical needs").

When a professional, whether a public defender or a psychiatrist, is "not amenable to administrative direction in the same sense as other employees of the State," Polk County, 454 U.S. at 321, 102 S.Ct. at 451, and when the professional-client relationship mirrors a similar relationship in private practice, state action is not involved. In Polk County, Justice Powell wrote that a public defender, though appointed by the state, as "a defense lawyer is not, and by the nature of his function cannot be, the servant of an administrative superior." Id. The state could not interfere with the attorney's recognized duty to protect "the undivided interest of his client." Id. at 318-19, 102 S.Ct. at 450 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204, 100 S.Ct. 402, 409, 62 L.Ed.2d 355 (1979)). Further, the state itself has a duty to "respect the professional independence of the public defenders whom it engages." Id. 454 U.S. at 321-22, 102 S.Ct. at 451 (footnote omitted). In Jackson v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15 (1st Cir.1980), then Chief Judge Coffin wrote "that court-appointed counsel works primarily for the benefit of his indigent client and only indirectly for the benefit of the state or society in general, and in this relationship counsel is controlled by the wishes of his client and his independent professional judgment while he is in no significant way controlled by the state to which his client's interests are legally adverse." Id. at 17.

Neither Dr. Rappeport nor Dr. Dvoskin owed an independent obligation to Williams or possessed freedom from state control. Dr. Rappeport himself notes in his affidavit that his evaluations of Williams, the child, and the mother were conducted by a public office, i.e., the Medical Office of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Both Dr. Rappeport and Dr. Dvoskin performed their duties as public employees, not as private practitioners, and were paid by the Medical Office for the services they rendered. Additionally, both professionals regarded their primary duty as running to the court and not to Williams, the mother, or the child. That conclusion is buttressed by Judge North's order, which required the parties to "execute all necessary releases so the aforesaid doctors can evaluate and report to the court without hinderance of doctor/client privilege."³ The substance of the interviews and analyses by both doctors ultimately was disclosed in court. Accordingly, since Drs. Rappeport and Dvoskin were public employees appointed by the court to assist Judge North, saw their responsibility running to the court and owed no ethical duty to protect the interests of any individual, both defendants acted under color of state law.⁴

II. 1983 and the Violation of Federal Constitutional or Statutory Rights

Defendants also contend that the record lacks factual support for a claim that defendants deprived Williams of any rights or interests secured by the ...