Williams v. Ricci, Civil Action No. 09-1822 (DRD)
| Decision Date | 14 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 09-1822 (DRD) |
| Parties | JERMAINE A. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. MICHELLE R. RICCI, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This matter comes before the Court upon: (a) receipt of Petitioner's counseled brief, which arrived accompanied by exhibits filed in support of Petitioner's Ground One challenges; (b) Respondents' filing of a letter, formal brief and supporting exhibits opposing Petitioner's Ground One claims raised in the Petition and elaborated upon in Petitioner's counseled brief; and (c) Petitioner's submission of his pro se brief and pro se traverse, filed seemingly with the goal to cure what Petitioner perceived as shortcomings in the brief submitted by his appointed counsel. See Docket Entries Nos. 37-39, 41-44 and 46.
For the reasons detailed below, Petitioner's Ground One challenges will be dismissed, as not warranting habeas relief. Respondents will be directed to answer the remainder of Petitioner's Grounds. The limited appointment of Petitioner's counsel will be terminated, with renewal of the same reserved.
Typically, a judicial decision examining habeas challenges opens with a discussion of the underlying facts, proceeds to briefly summarizing the standard of review and concludes with application of substantive tests to the claims raised by the habeas litigant. However, little has been typical about the case at bar. Therefore, assessing the relevant legal considerations and dense factual predicate underlying Petitioner's claims, it appears warranted to alter the usual continuum by: (a) opening with a summary of procedural history accrued in this matter; then (b) summarizing just a few key aspects of the standard of review; (c) upon carefully detailing the underlying facts, (d) addressing the latest legal position taken by Respondents; and (e) closing by examining the factual predicate present here under the governing substantive test.
This matter was commenced upon the Clerk's receipt of Petitioner's pro se petition seeking habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Docket Entry No. 1. Yet, shortly after initiation of this action, Petitioner filed an application requesting stay of the instant matter to accommodate his intent to exhaust his unexhausted claims in state fora. See Docket Entry No. 4. The Court, thus, issued an order granting Petitioner the requested stay. See Docket Entries Nos. 5 and 6.
However, shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion requesting reopening of this matter and notifying the Court that he elected to seek habeas relief solely on his already exhausted claims. See Docket Entry No. 8. This Court, therefore, provided Petitioner with notice, pursuant to Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2000), and directed him to submit his amended pleading stating only the claims he wished to litigate. See Docket Entry No. 11.
Petitioner responded by filing his amended petition and a brief elaborating on his claims. See Docket Entries Nos. 13 and 14. That brief indicated his intent to raised four umbrella-type challenges, with the fourth challenge consisting of the "a" to "o" claims, i.e., effectively asserted fifteen different grounds. See id. The Court, thus, directed Respondents to answer the amended petition. See Docket Entry No. Respondents, being then represented by counsel who later withdrew, filed an answer and exhibits, see Docket Entries Nos. 19 and 20, but that answer insufficiently addressed Petitioner's challenges.
The Court, hence, subdivided Petitioner's challenges into two groups: the first group consisted solely of Petitioner's Ground One, while the second group embraced Petitioner's remaining fourteen claims. See Docket Entry No. 23.
With regard to the former, the Court: (a) directed the Clerk to appoint a federal public defender to represent Petitioner; and(b) ordered the parties to re-brief Petitioner's Ground One.1 See id. Both sides complied. See Docket Entries Nos. 29 and 30.
Having examined the re-briefing submissions, the Court: (a) noted that the parties were not in dispute as to the substantive legal principle governing Petitioner's right-to-presence challenges raised in his Ground One; but (b) the parties omitted to address how these principles applied to Petitioner's rather unique circumstances. See Docket Entry No. 31. Thus, the Court directed the parties to supplement their re-briefs by stating their positions on that issue. See id.
Since the Court's order to that effect was not immediately complied with, the Court granted a sua sponte extension of time to supplement the parties' re-briefs.2 See Docket Entry No. 33. Both sides duly made their filings.3 See Docket Entries Nos. 38-39, 41-43. However, shortly thereafter, being seemingly unsatisfied with two rounds of counseled briefs filed by his appointed counsel, Petitioner filed his own supplement. SeeDocket Entry No. 44. Since that filing was neither provided for nor envisioned in the Court's order directing supplemental re-briefing, the Court offered Respondents an opportunity to file a sur-reply to Petitioner's submission and, if such sur-reply were filed, allowed Petitioner's appointed counsel an opportunity to traverse. See Docket Entry No. 45. Although neither Petitioner's counsel nor Respondents took advantage of the Court's offer, standing on the arguments raised in their prior filings, see, generally, Docket, Petitioner -- seemingly misreading the Court's directive -- filed yet another supplement, effectively reiterating and elaborating on the arguments already raised in his prior filings. See Docket Entry No. 46.
The substantial mass of these filings is presently before the Court. To the degree it appears feasible, the Court will address the parties' positions seriatim.
The general standard of federal habeas review is long-established, and it sets forth a narrowly-tailored test. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (). Thus, Section 2254(a) permits a federal court to entertain only claims alleging that a person is held in state custody "in violation of the Constitution or lawsor treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The AEDPA further limits a federal court's authority to grant habeas relief by providing that, when a state court has adjudicated a petitioner's federal claim on the merits, a district court "has no authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless the [state court's] decision 'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' or 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.'" Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
Consequently, the starting point of federal habeas review under § 2254(d)(1) analysis is to determine the relevant law clearly established by the Supreme Court.4 See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660 (2004). Clearly established law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions [entered by] the time of the relevantstate-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); accord Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003).
A decision is "contrary to" a Supreme Court holding, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), if: (a) the state court outright "contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court] cases"; or (b) the state court "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
Under the "'unreasonable application' clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from th[e Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Paramount here, under § 2254(d)(1), "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). Correspondingly, the standard posed by federal habeas review "is . . . difficult to meet, [since it is a] highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, [and that standard] demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1398 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, review under § 2254(d) islimited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See id.
The state courts summarized the events underlying Petitioner's conviction as follows:
[On] the afternoon of September 26, 1999, [Petitioner] and two of his friends, Stuart Jones and Jahkeam Francis, gathered in Newark. They decided to travel by taxi to the home of Jahkeam's cousin, Althea Cummings, in Paterson. [Petitioner] was in possession of a silver hand gun. [He] said that he needed money and would rob someone if he had the opportunity to do so. Late in the afternoon, [Petitioner], Jones and Francis took a taxi to East Orange, and there they got into a livery cab that was driven by another man. [Petitioner] was seated in the rear with Jones. Francis sat up front, alongside of the driver. The cab stopped at Cummings' mother's home and then proceeded to the intersection of North Fourth Street and Haledon Avenue in Paterson. There, at approximately 5:30 p.m., [Petitioner] observed Miguel...
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