Williams v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 11 August 1972
• Docket Number: No. 2712.,2712.
• Citation: 347 F. Supp. 544
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
• Parties: Charles Everett WILLIAMS and Teresa Jean Williams, by their mother and next friend, Mae Helen Livingston, et al., Plaintiff, v. Elliot L. RICHARDSON, Secretary, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant.

347 F. Supp. 544

Charles Everett WILLIAMS and Teresa Jean Williams, by their mother and next friend, Mae Helen Livingston, et al., Plaintiff, v. Elliot L. RICHARDSON, Secretary, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant.

No. 2712.

United States District Court, W. D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division.

August 11, 1972.

Gail F. Barber, Thomas W. Pulliam, Jr., Thomas H. Wyche, Shelley Blum, Donald A. Gillespie, Jr., Marvin B. House and James A. Long, IV., Legal Aid Society of Mecklenburg County, Charlotte, N. C., for plaintiffs.

Keith S. Snyder, U. S. Atty., Asheville, N. C., David B. Sentelle, Asst. U. S. Atty., Charlotte, N. C., Paul Merlin, Chief of Litigation, and Sarah L. Kemble, Atty., Social Security Div., Dept. of HEW, Washington, D. C., for defendant.

Before CRAVEN, Circuit Judge, WOODROW W. JONES, Chief District Judge, and McMILLAN, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

McMILLAN, District Judge:

This case was heard before a three-judge court in Charlotte, North Carolina. The facts are not in dispute, and they appear from the pleadings and from affidavit of Hugh F. McKenna, Director of the Bureau of Retirement and Survivors Insurance of the Social Security Administration.

Charles Edward Williams and Teresa Jean Williams are natural children of Charles E. Williams, now deceased, and of their mother and next friend, Mae Helen Livingston. They bring this suit as a class action for themselves and other illegitimate children similarly situated, to enjoin the defendant Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare from enforcing Title 42 U.S.C., §§ 403(a) and 416(h) (3) so as to deny them participation in their father's Social Security survivors' benefits. Plaintiffs contend that the statutory discrimination against certain illegitimate children in the distribution of Social Security benefits is a violation of their rights under the Fifth Amendment to due process and equal protection of laws.

Charles E. Williams was a wage earner, covered under Social Security, who died domiciled in Baltimore, Maryland, in August, 1969. He was legally married to Edna Williams, and left two legitimate minor children, Zerita and Emily Williams, children of Edna Williams.

At the time of his death, however, Charles E. Williams was not living with his lawful wife, but was living with Mae Helen Livingston, now a resident of Charlotte, North Carolina, mother of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were born out of wedlock to Mae Helen Livingston while their father was lawfully married to Edna Williams, and the plaintiffs therefore are illegitimate children.

The relevant Social Security statutes are not simple in their wording, though they are essentially simple in the results they would accomplish:

42 U.S.C. § 402(d) provides benefits for any child of the wage earner.

42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) defines "child" in terms of state law, and incorporates state law into the federal Act, as follows:

"In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death . . . ."

Under Maryland (or North Carolina) law, plaintiffs are not entitled to inherit personal property and, therefore, can not meet the § 416(h)(2)(A) definition of "child."

Notwithstanding 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2)(A), an applicant is deemed a child under § 416(h)(2)(B) if the parents had gone through a marriage ceremony which was legally defective. Plaintiffs do not qualify under (B), because there had been no such ceremony.

In addition even a clearly illegitimate child is deemed a "child" under § 416(h) (3)(C) if:

"(i) such insured individual (I) had acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son or daughter,

(II) had been decreed by a court to be the father of the applicant, or

(III) had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the applicant because the applicant was his son or daughter,

and such acknowledgment, court decree, or court order was made before the death of such insured individual, or

(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the Secretary to have been the father of the applicant, and such insured individual was living with or contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual died."

Under § 416(h)(3)(C), nothing further appearing, plaintiffs, though illegitimate, share the statutory death benefits because they are shown by evidence satisfactory to the Secretary to be natural children of the wage earner and because he was living with them and contributing to their support when he died.

The unfairness of which the plaintiffs complain arises from 42 U.S.C. § 403(a), dealing with apportionment of benefits in case individual benefits have to be reduced because of the "family maximum." A wage earner's account under the statute will only support a maximum total of survivors' benefits. Until the family maximum is exceeded, each dependent, including each § 416(h)(3) "child," is entitled to a fixed dollar amount of benefits. If the total number of dependents is so large that the individual payments would exceed the family maximum, § 403(a) provides for a proportionate reduction in benefits. However (and this is what plaintiffs complain about)

". . . if such total of benefits for such month includes any benefit or benefits under section 402(d) of this title which are payable solely by reason of section 416(h)(3) of this title, the reduction shall be first applied to reduce (proportionately where there is more than one benefit so payable) the benefits so payable (but not below zero)." Emphasis added.

The benefits plaintiffs are entitled to are obviously "payable solely by reason of section 416(h)(3) . . ."

When Charles E. Williams died the plaintiffs applied for and procured survivors' benefits for the minor plaintiffs, Charles Edward Williams and Teresa Jean Williams, under § 416(h)(3)(C) (ii), and these benefits were paid for the period from Williams' death in August, 1969, until June, 1970, at the monthly rate of $158.70.

Meanwhile, in February, 1970, the wage earner's legal wife, Edna Williams, applied for benefits for herself and her two children, Zerita Williams and Emily L. Williams. The benefits to Edna, Zerita and Emily L. Williams completely absorbed the "family maximum" benefit of $158.70 per month.

Obeying the statutory mandate of § 403(a), the Secretary thereupon cut off all benefits for plaintiffs Charles and Teresa Williams.

The above statutes provide three ways for admittedly illegitimate children to receive benefits. Plaintiffs can not inherit under the law of Maryland, and their parents did not go through a colorable marriage ceremony; two of the three ways thus appear closed. Nevertheless, though illegitimate, they applied for and received benefits under § 416(h) (3)(C)(ii). These benefits were then cut off under 42 U.S.C. § 403(a), and the application of this statute left plaintiffs with no source of benefits if § 403(a) is constitutional in its present application.

Plaintiffs were notified without a hearing that their benefits were being discontinued; on August 5, 1970, they requested reconsideration of the ruling; on September 22, 1970, they filed this action. At the hearing, counsel advised the court that because the legitimate children had now attained majority, benefits had been resumed for the individual plaintiffs. This would appear to moot part of the claim but it still leaves open the claims of the class, and the claims of the individual plaintiffs for the period when they have been, or may in the future be, denied benefits because of 42 U.S.C. § 403(a).

THE PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS

Jurisdiction of the Three-Judge Court.—The suit is brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2282, requesting an injunction restraining the defendant from depriving plaintiffs of benefits pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional Act of Congress. The amount in controversy is alleged to be over $10,000 and the evidence supports this contention. There is jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As indicated below there is also jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A three-judge court is proper because permanent injunctive relief is sought restraining the enforcement and operation of an Act of Congress based upon its alleged unconstitutionality. The case appears to be properly constituted in this court.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.—Plaintiffs brought suit without waiting for decision by the Secretary on their request for reconsideration of the administrative ruling terminating their benefits. Defendant says the suit should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and procure a "final decision" by the Secretary as contemplated by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

If there were any practical prospect that the statutory administrative review procedure would be more than an empty formality, this position of defendant would merit serious consideration.

However, there is nothing for the Secretary to review. The material facts, as shown by the administrative record, are not in dispute; no "findings of fact" are required of the Secretary and no question of statutory construction is presented, and no review of any discretion or judgment of the Secretary is possible, because on these undisputed facts the defendant admits that he is required by the statute to deny plaintiffs' claims. He says further that he has no power to declare § 403(a) unconstitutional; that he has never declared any federal statute unconstitutional; that he has had this same claim presented several times...