Williams v. Romarm S.A.
| Decision Date | 14 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-cv-183 (EGS),19-cv-183 (EGS) |
| Parties | WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ROMARM S.A., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
On April 1, 2020, the Court granted Defendant Romarm S.A.'s ("Romarm") Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9; Plaintiffs J.H. (through his legal representatives Norman Williams and Diane Howe), Kevin Attaway, and Jamel Blakeley's (collectively "Plaintiffs") action against Romarm under the District of Columbia's Assault Weapons Manufacturing Strict Liability Statute ("SLA"), D.C. Code § 7-2551 et seq., for damages stemming from two separate shootings in March 2010. See April 1, 2020 Order, ECF No. 20; see also Mem. Op. ("MTD Mem. Op."), ECF No. 22. Pending before the Court are: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration ( ), ECF No. 22; (2) Romarm's Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 ("Def.'s Sanctions Mot."), ECF No. 27; (3) Plaintiffs' First Motion for Sanctions ( ), ECF No. 34; and (4) Romarm's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' First Motion for Sanctions ("Def.'s Strike Mot."), ECF No. 37. Upon careful consideration of the motions, the oppositions, the replies thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court: (1) DENIES Plaintiffs' Recon. Mot., ECF No. 22; (2) GRANTS Def.'s Sanctions Mot., ECF No. 27; (3) DENIES Pls.' Sanctions Mot., ECF No. 34; (4) DENIES Def.'s Strike Mot., ECF No. 37; and (5) ENJOINS Plaintiffs from filing in any United States District Court any new civil action against Romarm or any defendant, based on the same operative facts, without first seeking leave to file such a complaint.
Much of the factual background for this case is set forth in this Court's prior Memorandum Opinion. See MTD Mem. Op., ECF No. 21 at 3-4 (quoting Williams v. Romarm, S.A., 751 F. Appx. 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2018) ("Williams IX 2018")). Since 2011, Plaintiffs have been attempting to hold Romarm civilly liable "for two separate shootings [that took place] in March 2010, during which firearms manufactured by Romarm were allegedly used." MTD Mem. Op., ECF No. 21 at 1.
Since that time, Plaintiffs have filed suits alleging the same claims, based on the same operative facts, against the same defendant in various state and federal courts across the nation,including this Court twice.1
In its April 1, 2020 Memorandum Opinion, the Court found that Plaintiffs' claims were barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, see MTD Mem. Op., ECF No. 21 at 8; noting that: (1) the "same issue now being raised was contested by the parties and submitted for judicial determination in the prior cases," id. at 10; (2) the "issue was actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in the prior cases," id. at 12; and (3) "[p]reclusion in this case [did] not work a basic unfairness to the parties bound by the prior determinations," id. at 13. In addition, noting that Plaintiffs' "Complaint is devoid of factual allegations and legal claims," id. at 17, the Court held it was appropriate to subject Plaintiffs' Counsel to Rule 11 sanctions because "at the time Plaintiffs' counsel filed the Complaint in this case, it was notreasonable for him to believe that the Complaint was based on a plausible view of the law," id. at 20.
Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Reconsideration on April 28, 2020, see Recon. Mot., ECF No. 22; to which Romarm filed its Opposition ( ) on May 12, 2020, see Recon. Opp'n, ECF No. 23. Plaintiffs filed their Reply to Romarm's opposition ( ) on May 20, 2020. See Recon. Reply, ECF No. 25. On May 29, 2020, Romarm filed its Motion for Sanctions, see Def.'s Sanctions Mot., ECF No. 27, to which Plaintiffs filed their untimely Opposition ( ) on June 18, 2020, see Pls.' Sanctions Opp'n, ECF No. 32. Romarm filed its Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition ("Def.'s Sanction Reply") on June 25, 2020. See Def.'s Sanction Reply, ECF No. 33. Plaintiffs then filed their Motion for Sanctions on July 30, 2020. See Pls.' Sanctions Mot., ECF No. 34. Romarm filed both its Motion to Strike, see Def.'s Strike Mot., ECF No. 37, and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanction ("Def.'s Sanction Opp'n"), see Def.'s Sanction Opp'n, ECF No. 38, on August 13, 2020, to which Plaintiffs filed their combined Opposition to Romarm's Motion to Strike and Reply to Romarm's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanction ( ) on August 28, 2020. See Pls.' Combined Resp., ECF No. 39.
The motions are ripe and ready for the Court'sadjudication.
Motions for reconsideration, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), are "discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)(internal citations and quotation marked omitted). A "Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to ... raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment," GSS Grp. Ltd v. Nat'l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 812 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted); as these motions "are disfavored and relief from judgment is granted only when the moving party establishes extraordinary circumstances," Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001) (internal citation omitted). Thus, "the law is clear that a Rule 59(e) motion is not a second opportunity to present argument upon which the Court has already ruled, nor is it a means to bring before the Court theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may impose sanctions on any party if a "pleading, written motion, or other paper ... is presented for any improper purpose; ... the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are unwarranted by existing law; ... the allegations and other factual contentions have no evidentiary support; or the denials of factual contentions are unwarranted on the evidence." Naegele v. Albers, 355 F. Supp. 2d 129, 143 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)-(c)) (internal brackets omitted). Rule 11(c) limits the types of sanctions that may be imposed "to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated" and allows for "an order to pay a penalty into [a] court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, an "attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct." "To qualify as unreasonable and vexatious behavior, there must be 'evidence of recklessness, bad faith, or improper motive' present in the attorney's conduct." Hall v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 219 F. Supp. 3d 112,119 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 899, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1998)), aff'd sub nom. Hall v. Dettling, No. 17-7008, 2017 WL 2348158 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 2017)). "A court may infer this malicious intent from a total lack of factual or legal basis in an attorney's filings," Hall, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 119 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); and the "issuance of such an award is ultimately vested in the discretion of the district court," id.
Finally, "Federal courts possess certain 'inherent powers,' not conferred by rule or statute, to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases, . . . [and] [t]hat authority includes the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process." Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Recon. Mot., ECF No. 22 at 1. Citing to Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 802 (1988), Plaintiffs declare that the District of Maryland's finding that the District of Vermont had personal jurisdiction over Romarm because it had "targeted Vermont specifically by funneling its products through an exclusive distributor located there," see Williams VI 2017, 2017 WL 87014, at *2 (emphasis added); "has a binding effect on this [District of Columbia] forum," see Pls.' Sanctions Opp'n, ECF No. 2 at 2; because the District of Vermont never "overturned" the ...
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