Williams v. Rubiera, 75-1383

• Decision Date: 27 September 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75-1383,75-1383
• Citation: 539 F.2d 470
• Parties: Ruthena WILLIAMS et al., etc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The Honorable C. P. RUBIERA et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 470

539 F.2d 470

Ruthena WILLIAMS et al., etc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The Honorable C. P. RUBIERA et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 75-1383.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 27, 1976.

Steven J. Wisotsky, Asst. Professor of Law, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., William L. Rogers, William Mark Grodnick, Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, Fla., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before COLEMAN, RONEY and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

RONEY, Circuit Judge:

This suit sought a United States district court declaratory decree that state welfare fraud defendants are constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel in cases in which the sentence is a fine, but not imprisonment. Such misdemeanor defendants are entitled to counsel under Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), if the sentence may be imprisonment. The alleged pattern and practice in Florida as to convicted welfare recipients, however, is to place them on probation and order them to pay back a portion of the defrauded funds each month. They are not imprisoned.

Without reaching the merits of the constitutional contentions, the district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing of one plaintiff, and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted as to the other two plaintiffs, holding that considerations of federal-state comity preclude a federal court's intervention in a pending state court prosecution absent a showing of bad faith, harassment, or other unusual circumstances that call for equitable relief. We affirm.

This suit was filed in federal district court against Judges of the County Court, Criminal Division in Dade County, Florida, and the State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. All three plaintiffs were recipients of public assistance funds and were defendants in criminal prosecutions for welfare fraud.

The prosecutions resulted from the State of Florida's effort to prune the welfare roles by prosecuting public assistance recipients who, on the basis of false representations, received more public assistance benefits than they were entitled to. Prosecutions were brought under the state's newly revised fraud statute, amended to include these types of welfare crimes. See, Fla.Stat. § 409.325 (1973). See also Fla.Stat. § 11.50 (1976 Supp.). The state's attorney was responsible for initiating such prosecutions. Beginning in 1973, this state-wide campaign proved immensely successful. The number of persons receiving public assistance was reduced from 331,172 in January 1973 to 271,940 by June 1974. Florida achieved the largest reduction of any large state in the number of people receiving welfare assistance.

All three plaintiffs, Ruthena Williams, Ernestine Lowe, and Annie Marie Brown, were prosecuted for welfare fraud. All three were unable to afford the assistance of privately retained counsel. Although requests for counsel were made, none were appointed.

Although plaintiff Ruthena Williams was convicted of welfare fraud, her conviction was reversed on appeal, and currently no state prosecution is pending against her. The district court ruled that Williams lacked standing to bring this suit. That court noted that the Williams' conviction for welfare fraud had been reversed on appeal after the state's attorney confessed error in that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. Nothing in the record indicates that Williams would be subject to any further prosecution. She has received no welfare assistance since February 1974. At oral argument plaintiff's counsel conceded that due to length of time the claims against Williams are no longer viable. Based on the foregoing the district court's dismissal of the Williams' claims is affirmed.

Prosecution of the case against plaintiff Ernestine Lowe was stayed pending the outcome of this suit. Subsequent to the filing of briefs on appeal, counsel notified the Court that the state criminal charges against Ernestine Lowe had been dismissed. The complaint filed with the district court made no assertion that Lowe was subject to any future welfare fraud prosecution. At oral argument counsel conceded that Lowe presented no viable claims on this appeal. We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of Lowe's complaint.

Although this case was filed as a class action no class was certified by the district court. Plaintiffs never filed a motion for certification. Therefore, only the claim of plaintiff Annie Marie Brown requires consideration here.

Brown pled not guilty to a charge of welfare fraud in June 1974. Thereafter she was induced by state agency representatives to change her plea to guilty. The state court ordered her to pay restitution at the rate of $50 a month to the Florida Division of Family Services. Subsequently the court vacated the guilty plea and granted a new trial. Scheduling of the new trial was deferred pending the outcome of this litigation, which was commenced on September 26, 1974. The prosecution is now pending.

In these circumstances, the district court ruled that the considerations of comity set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), barred federal court consideration of rights that can be vindicated in the state court prosecution. Harris had been indicted for violating the California Criminal Syndicalism Act and sued in federal court to enjoin that prosecution on grounds of the statute's unconstitutionality. The Supreme Court reversed the issuance of the injunction. The Court based its action on the longstanding policy disfavoring federal intervention in state court proceedings. Cf. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 370, 21 L.Ed. 287 (1872). In granting the injunction the federal court was directly involving itself in an ongoing state proceeding. The Supreme Court based its conclusion against federal interference in a state proceeding on the

vital consideration, the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the states and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.

401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750. See Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 91 S.Ct. 777, 27 L.Ed.2d 792 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 91 S.Ct. 769, 27 L.Ed.2d 781 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 89 S.Ct. 442, 21 L.Ed.2d 436 (1971). More succinctly stated, "(t)his interdiction of federal interference in state judicial proceedings is based on federalism concepts of comity and respect for state functions . . .." Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978, 94 S.Ct. 1565, 39 L.Ed.2d 874 (1974) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff contends that her suit for declaratory relief will not foreclose a state prosecution as would an injunction. She makes no attempt to secure an injunction or declaratory relief against the enforcement of a state criminal statute on the grounds of its unconstitutionality as in Younger. Brown seeks only declaratory relief that to deny her the assistance of appointed counsel is unconstitutional.

But Younger did not turn on the proposition that a state statute was being challenged for its unconstitutionality. It rested on the reciprocal doctrine of federal-state comity, the fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975); see Schlesinger v. Councilman,420 U.S. 738, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975). If relief were granted in this case it would have the effect of a federal court telling a state court how to run an ongoing criminal prosecution, i. e., whether it could constitutionally try the defendant without appointed counsel.

An injunction against a trial without appointed counsel would, of course, be direct federal interference in the state criminal prosecution. The issuance of only declaratory relief would not seem to alter the result. In Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971), the Supreme Court held that those principles making federal injunctive relief impermissible would also apply to declaratory judgments.

(O)rdinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the long-standing policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid.

401 U.S. at 72, 91 S.Ct. at 767. The Court found two reasons for this conclusion: (1) a federal court may need to grant further relief, such as a subsequent injunction, to effectuate the declaratory judgment; and (2) the declaratory judgment has practically the same impact on the state proceeding as a formal injunction. The district court here recognized the impact declaratory relief could have. To grant the requested relief would have the intrusive impact on the state proceeding that Younger and its progeny abhorred.

Plaintiff argues that Younger v. Harris has no application to this case since there is no opportunity to vindicate her constitutional rights in state court. The Supreme Court recognized that Younger "presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved." Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1697, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). Nothing in the record, however, indicates that the Florida state courts would not be the proper forum to fairly decide plaintiff's constitutional claims. This was the position taken by the district court.

Since the state court system would have the opportunity to rule on the right to counsel issue, comity compels the federal...