Williams v. Ruskin Co.
| Decision Date | 01 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:10-cv-508-WC |
| Parties | EARL WILLIAMS, et al, Plaintiffs, v. RUSKIN COMPANY, RELIABLE DIVISION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #35), Plaintiffs' Opposition (Doc. #44), and Defendant's Reply (Doc. #48). Also pending before the court, is Defendant's Motion to Strike Evidentiary Submissions (Doc. #49), Plaintiffs' Response (Doc. #51), and Defendant's Reply (Doc. #52). For the reasons that follow, the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #35) is GRANTED and the Motion to Strike (Doc. #49) is DENIED.
The court has carefully considered the pleadings in this case and all documents submitted in support of, and in opposition to, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The submissions of the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, establish the following relevant facts:
Plaintiffs are current employees of Defendant Ruskin Company, Reliable Division ("Defendant"). All four plaintiffs are African American.
Defendant manufactures louvers and grilles for use in air conditioning units. Defendant's facilities are located in Geneva, Alabama. Defendant has approximately 465 employees in the Geneva plant. Defendant has a number of different departments and each department has several job categories. For example, in the production departments, job categories include: assembler, lead person, assistant supervisor, and supervisor. Supervisors report to production managers and production managers report to the plant manager.
George Helms has served as Human Resources Manager of Defendant's Geneva plant since 1992. David Burch has served as Plant Manager of the Geneva Plant since July of 2008.
Defendant's equal employment opportunity and anti-harassment policies are found in an employee handbook. This employee handbook is distributed to all employees at least once at the time of hiring and is updated periodically. Each Plaintiff received a copy of the handbook on at least one occasion.
Sometime in 2008, three African American employees (not the Plaintiffs) working in the Paint Shop found a monkey doll hanging by a noose in each of their lockers. These three employees were the only black employees in that department. Following this incident, Defendant conducted an internal investigation and hired a third-party law firm to conduct a separate investigation. Neither investigation was able to determine who was responsible for the incident. Defendant followed up with each of the complaining employees. InSeptember 2008, Defendant hired another third-party law firm to conduct an anti-harassment training for all employees.
Plaintiffs' claims in this lawsuit arise from their work in Ruskin Company, Reliable Division. On March 23, 2009, Plaintiffs collectively filed a Charge of Discrimination against Defendant with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Plaintiffs filed suit in this federal court on June 11, 2010, alleging discrimination in promotion decisions and a racially hostile work environment.
The Plaintiffs:
1. Earl Williams
Earl Williams has been employed by Reliable since April 26, 1977 and has worked in several parts of Reliable's Geneva plant since then. He does not have a high school diploma and has limited computer skills. He was initially hired as an Assembler and currently works in Department 15 assembling louvers by screwing and welding blades together in a personal work area.
2. Rebecca Williams
Rebecca Williams does not have a high school diploma and has been employed by Reliable since January 27, 1986. She was initially hired as an Assembler and currently works as a Large Punch Press Operator. During her time at Reliable, her work has been supervised by Eddie Ward up until two years ago when Terry Rogers became her supervisor.3. Willie Johnson
Johnson has a degree in communications electronics and was first hired by Reliable in March 2003. Johnson resigned from his job in September 2005, indicating that he felt Reliable does not "treat blacks fairly." Pls.' Brief (Doc. #44) at 6. In November 2006, Johnson was rehired to work in the Paint Shop. Johnson currently works as a Crane Operator in the Anodizing Department. Johnson's current Lead Person is Mickey Soles and his Supervisor is John Drake.
4. Erica Barefield
Barefiled has a high school diploma and was initially hired by Reliable as an entry-level Assembler in 1994, but her employment was terminated during the probationary period for lack of productivity. On November 20, 1995, Barefield was rehired as an Assembler in Department 3. In 1998, Barefield was promoted to Wrapper, a position she held until 1999. In or around the year 2000, Barefield was promoted to Wire Retain. In or around 2002 or 2003, Barefield was promoted to her current position of Small Press Operator in Department 3. Her current supervisor is Terry Rogers. Eddie Ward has been Barefield's Supervisor or Assistant Supervisor throughout her employment at Reliable. While at Reliable, Barefield has never asked for or expressed any interest in any type of training, acquiring any skills, or taking any classes. Barefield Depo. at 77-78.
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court shall grant a motion for "summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).1 Only disputes about material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion[,]" and alerting the court to portions of the record which support the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). However, once the movant has satisfied this burden, the non-movant is then similarly required to cite to portions of the record which show the existence of a material factualdispute. Id. at 324. In doing so, and to avoid summary judgment, the non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The parties must support their assertions "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed" by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations[], admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B).
If the non-movant "fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact" as required by Rule 56(c), then the court may "consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion" and "grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) & (3).
In determining whether a genuine issue for trial exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). Likewise, the reviewing court must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. After the non-moving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment,the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Defendant has moved for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs' claims. The court will address Defendant's arguments below.
Plaintiffs bring suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.2 Defendant contends that any Title VII claims alleging discrete acts of discriminatory conduct predating September 24, 2008 are time-barred as Plaintiffs filed their EEOC charge on March 23, 2009 and, thus, any claims filed outside of September 24, 2008 would fall outside of the 180-day statute of limitations period for filing an EEOC charge. As to Plaintiffs' § 1981 claims, Defendant contends that only discrete acts occurring between June 11, 2006 and June 11, 2010 are timely under Section 1981's four-year statute of limitations. While Defendant's position is potentially meritorious, the court ultimately need not determine whether such claims are time barred because, for the reasons given below, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs' discrimination claims.
Plaintiffs claim race discrimination in promotion, alleging "there was no true promotion procedure that allowed for [them] to compete with whites and that the positions were given to the white employees because of [their] race, black." Pls.' Am. Compl. (Doc. #3) at 2. Because Plaintiffs' failure to promote claim relies on circumstantial evidence, it is analyzed under the burden-shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Plaintiffs must first create a presumption of discrimination by establishing a prima facie case....
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