Williams v. Santander Consumer U.S. Holdings, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 February 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 3:21-CV-3176-D
• Parties: KERINTON WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA HOLDINGS, INC. and CHRYSLER CAPITAL, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

KERINTON WILLIAMS, Plaintiff,
v.
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA HOLDINGS, INC. and CHRYSLER CAPITAL, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-3176-D

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

February 24, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER SENIOR JUDGE

Plaintiff Kerinton Williams (“Williams”) brings this pro se action against defendants Santander Consumer USA Holdings, Inc. (“Santander”)^[1] and Chrysler Capital (“Chrysler”), ^[2]alleging claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and other federal statutes. Defendants move to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Williams moves in multiple motions and amended motions to compel the production of documentary evidence. Defendants move to strike Williams' motions to compel, and Williams, in turn, moves to strike defendants' motion to strike. For the reasons that follow, the court denies

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defendants' motion under Rule 12(b)(1) but grants their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), denies Williams' motions and amended motions to compel and motion to strike, and grants defendants' motion to strike. The court also grants Williams leave to replead.

I

The pertinent facts are straightforward.^[3] In July 2021, Williams purchased a car using the proceeds of a loan that he obtained from a car dealership. Chrysler was the indirect lender and was assigned the contract between Williams and the car dealership.^[4] In September 2021, Chrysler sent Williams an account statement that included his monthly payment and outstanding loan balance.

In November 2021, Williams read over his contract with the car dealership and contacted Chrysler via the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) website, seeking proof that Chrysler was the “original creditor” on his loan. Williams also asked Chrysler to

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cease and desist its collection communications regarding the debt. Chrysler responded that it was the assignee of the contract between Williams and the car dealership.

Unconvinced, Williams directly contacted the Vice President of Chrysler that same month with a similar request (in response, he received documentary evidence of his contract with the car dealership and the date of the transaction), and, later, the CEO and CFO of Santander. Williams was current on his loan as of November 15, 2021.

On December 21, 2021 Williams filed this lawsuit. Defendants now move to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); Williams has filed multiple motions and amended motions to compel; and Williams and defendants have filed motions to strike. The court now decides all the pending motions on the briefs.

II

The court first addresses defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).^[5]

A

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can mount either a facial or factual challenge. See, e.g., Hunter v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 2013 WL 607151, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2013) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing Paterson v. Weinberger,

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644 F.2d 521, 523 (5^th Cir. 1981)). When a party makes a Rule 12(b)(1) motion without including evidence, the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is facial. Id. The court assesses a facial challenge as it does a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in that it “looks only at the sufficiency of the allegations in the pleading and assumes them to be true. If the allegations are sufficient to allege jurisdiction, the court must deny the motion.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523). “The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citations omitted).

B

Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction over Williams' FDCPA claims, and also appears to contest Williams' claim under 25 U.S.C. § 3116(b). They contend that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Williams' FDCPA claims because the statute only applies to a “debt collector, ” and neither defendant qualifies as a “debt collector” under the statutory definition.

The court construes this motion as seeking relief under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(b)(1). This is so because defendants are challenging statutory standing, which is properly evaluated under Rule 12(b)(6). See Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 795 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Unlike a dismissal for lack of constitutional standing, which should be granted under Rule 12(b)(1), a dismissal for lack of prudential or statutory standing is properly granted under Rule 12(b)(6).”); Nixon v. Hegar, 2021 WL 4197207, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2021) (Fitzwater, J.) (construing Rule 12(b)(6) motion as Rule 12(b)(1)

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motion).

Defendants also maintain that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Williams' § 3116(b) claim because the statute is not an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction. The court disagrees and holds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Williams'§ 3116(b) claim. But even if the court were to hold that § 3116(b) does not provide an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction, see Ali v. Asura Insurance Services, 2016 WL 8731060, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2016), Williams brings other federal question claims (i.e., the FDCPA claims) that allegedly arise from the same facts giving rise to Williams' § 3116(b) claim. The court would therefore have supplemental jurisdiction over this claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). See § 1367(a); State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Yates, 391 F.3d 577, 579 (5th Cir. 2004); McKee v. Tex. Star Salon, LLC, 2007 WL 2381246, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2007) (Ramirez, J.).

Accordingly, the court denies defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion, either because it should be treated as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or because it lacks merit.

III

The court turns next to defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

A

“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court evaluates the sufficiency of [plaintiff's] complaint by ‘accept[ing] all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'” Bramlett v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 855 F.Supp.2d 615, 618 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (second alteration in original)

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(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). To survive defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Williams must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘shown'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)) (alteration omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted).

B

The court turns first to Williams' claims under the FDCPA.^[6]

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1

Defendants posit that Williams' claims under the FDCPA fail against them^[7] because they are not “debt collector[s].” In particular, defendants contend that the statute defines a “debt collector” as a person whose “principal purpose” is debt collection or who “regularly collects” debts owed to “another.” And under the “plain language of the definition, it is clear that Santander is not a debt collector.” Mot. Dis. ¶ 10. Defendants cite three cases in which courts held that Santander was not a “debt collector.”^[8]

Williams generally rejects defendants' arguments in his responses. In a later exhibit, however, Williams expands on this general rejection and states that, because Chrysler is doing business as Santander Consumer USA, Inc., it is using a name other than its own to collect debts-meaning that defendants are “debt collector[s]” under the statute.^[9]

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The court grants defendants' motion and dismisses Williams' FDCPA claims because he has failed to plausibly plead that Santander or Chrysler is a “debt collector, ” as defined

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under the FDCPA.^[10] “The purpose of the . . . [FDCPA] is to ‘eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.'” McMurray v. ProCollect, Inc., 687 F.3d 665, 668 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)); see also Raburn v. Cmty. Mgmt., L.L.C., 761 Fed.Appx. 263, 265 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

To prevail on a FDCPA claim, Williams must plausibly plead that “(1) he has been the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt; (2) the defendant is a debt collector defined by the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.” Hunsinger v. Sko Brenner Am., Inc., 2014 WL 1462443, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2014) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the second element, a “debt collector” is...